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Summary 
This thesis argues that the Republic of France was constructed on a colonial imaginary 
that establishes a differentiation between French, “white,” citizens and inferior, “Other,” 
subjects. It explores how this imaginary is reproduced in dominant discourses, practices, and 
representations in France in a way that remakes the French colonial project of the civilizing 
mission. This differentiation, or postcolonial racism, targets the French descending from the 
formerly colonized populations who also are postcolonial immigrants. The author contends 
that it particularly targets the French of Algerian descent, represented as the “French 
Muslim.” Furthermore, it argues that it is important that the Republic of France, its state and 
society, goes through a process of transformative decolonization of its national imaginaries in 
order to embrace the plurality of subjectivities that makes up the community of France today.  
Este trabajo argumenta que la República francesa se ha construido a través de un 
imaginario colonial que establece una diferenciación entre ciudadan@s frances@s, 
“blanc@s”, y sujetos, construidos como “Otros”, inferiores. Investiga como este imaginario se 
reproduce en discursos, prácticas y representaciones dominantes en Francia de una manera 
que reviven la misión civilizadora del proyecto colonial francés. Esta diferenciación, o 
racismo postcolonial, condiciona a l@s frances@s que descienden de las poblaciones 
colonizadas en Francia, o inmigrantes postcoloniales. Esta tesis sostiene que condiciona 
particularmente a l@s frances@s de ascendencia argelina que el imaginario 
colonial/postcolonial representa como “frances@s musulman@s”. A continuación, la autora 
plantea la importancia de que la República de Francia, su estado y sociedad, pase por un 
proceso de descolonización transformativa con el fin de abarcar la pluralidad de 
subjetividades que conforma la comunidad de las personas que son Francia hoy en día. 
Ce travail défend l’idée que la République française s’est construite à travers un 
imaginaire colonial qui établit une différenciation entre citoyen-ne-s français-e-s « blanc-he-
s » et sujets, « Autres », inférieurs. Il explore comment cet imaginaire est reproduit dans les 
discours, pratiques et représentations dominantes en France de telle façon qu’il fait revivre le 
projet colonial français de la mission civilisatrice. Cette différenciation, ou racisme 
postcolonial, cible les français-e-s qui descendent des populations anciennement colonisées 
qui sont aussi les immigré-e-s postcoloniaux. Cette thèse soutient qu’elle cible tout 
particulièrement les français-e-s d’ascendance algérienne qui sont représenté-e-s comme les 
« musulman-e-s français-e-s ». En outre, l’auteure avance qu’il est important que la 
République française, son état et sa société, passe par un processus de décolonisation 
transformative de façon à embrasser la pluralité des subjectivités qui constitue la communauté 
des personnes qui font la France aujourd’hui. 
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Introduction 
If I was going to dance, I wanted to dance about real things that were real in my life.  
(Anna Halprin in Breath Made Visible 2009) 
 
Starting With My Own Story 
I grew up in Northern France in predominately white countryside. I mean that I grew 
up in a place where postcolonial immigration was not visible. At the age of seventeen, the 
journey of my life experiences made me realize that I was the only person with the great 
power to decide for myself. In Calais, the town where I attended high school, I became 
involved in the local not-for profits supporting the sans-papiers who live in extremely poor 
conditions in Calais. The sans-papiers are persons in migration transiting in Calais in order to 
reach England through whatever means available when one does not have official documents 
to travel. A year later, I moved to the city as a student. There, I built true interest in the 
cultural richness and mixing of populations that inhabit and give life to the city. I also built 
deep friendships with students from Algeria who were studying in the same university as I. 
During the summer, I joined a group of other French young people at a French not-for-profit 
and participated in an intercultural exchange with a small village located in the South of 
Morocco. This experience was quite determinant in building my critical consciousness on the 
importance of deconstructing differences and dialoguing across cultures, as well as on the 
structural and cultural inequalities that condition human relations across the globe.  
The faculty where I studied was located in a very poor neighborhood of the city. This, 
among other things, led me to reflect on social relations in a way that raised my concern for 
inequalities. I specifically remember telling myself that I would not fall victim to the 
simplicity of essentializing race/culture, that there is something out there that I had to explore. 
I was already driven by the strong belief that humans are not naturally violent, nor are they 
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naturally bad or deviant. Rather, humans are shaped by their environment and to some extent 
conditioned by the structures of society. Later, I understood that within that environment, 
humans have endless possibilities to create and transform, but that realization arose from 
Peace Studies, not my reflections at the time. Driven by such beliefs, I looked for answers to 
my questions through researching on my own, attending conferences, cultural events, and 
meeting people that opened ways toward shaping my own understanding of the world and its 
dynamics. Particularly, I started to build strong interest in issues related to colonialism and 
racism. I realized then how little I had been taught in school about these topics in particular 
and how much of this was hidden or just not talked about in general, despite the fact that it 
appeared to me as a major issue of our world.  
At the end of my second year at university, I was selected to participate in a summer 
institute at Drexel University (Philadelphia), co-organized by the Fulbright Institution and the 
US State Department. It was dedicated to civic engagement and addressed to “outstanding 
European students.” Apart from the immense richness such an experience provided me with 
on many levels, it was a considerable step towards empowering myself. It pushed me to 
believe that I was capable of contributing in some way to making this world a more liveable 
one for all. Besides, it allowed me to further develop interest in issues of race and inequalities.  
Since then, many more experiences have shaped me. I have become increasingly 
aware of my existence as a woman in a patriarchal society, which has held an important place 
in my life. I have tried to lead my life in a way that promotes in me an open curiosity of the 
world as well as a form of critical engagement to peace. I let the world surprise me. This has 
been my dance of life. 
The place in which I am now – the place that inspired me to write this piece of 
research and to take the path of Peace and Conflict Studies – is a result of this personal 
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journey to find my own place in relation to the world. Part of this has been, for me, to 
negotiate how people see me and how I see myself, and to become aware of my political 
identities when making my own choices for life and who I want to be. It is important for my 
research because it directly relates to my position in the world, which allows me to see certain 
things and be blind to others. I will discuss this later in this introduction. However, this 
process of finding my place in relation to the world has led me to undo – decolonize – the 
imaginaries and learnt practices within me – the pieces of the social and political 
constructions of whiteness in France. It is a constant process of renewed consciousness that 
move through different energies and places. Thus, the result of this research comes from a 
place of here and now, where both anger and transformation (and many more energies) come 
together. It is constantly moving and radically open. 
Contextualizing Research 
My interlocked interests in French colonialism and racism, as well as my concern for 
transforming conflictive realities, have led me to research on the legacies of French 
colonialism in the dominant discourses and practices in diverse France today. The present 
context is marked by the growing wave of popularity of the extreme-right nationalist party of 
Front National, both in discourses and in voting polls. This political evolution, however, 
takes shape within a context of growing nationalist-racist, patriarchal discourses on the part of 
the French elite in general. The intrusion in public debate of discourses targeting the citizens 
perceived as Muslims and the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 generation immigrants in general plays out as a 
repetitive questioning of the legitimacy of certain populations within the nation-state. Such 
discourses seem to systematically orientate the discussion towards questioning the so-called 
“integration,” within the “national” or “Republican” identity, of people who are French yet 
labeled “Français-e-s d’origine immigrée.” Furthermore, such discourses also place 
“immigration” as a major issue for French society today, in a way that generalizes it as a 
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universal fact, hiding its multiple dynamics and the historical conditions that shaped it. Such 
discourses do not situate themselves in relation to the world and problematize the idea of 
“national identity.” Yet, the multiplicity of faces that inhabit the country is mainly the result 
of a long colonial history that has durably and in multiple forms tied the French society to 
diverse populations, mostly but not only from West Africa and North Africa.
1
  
These discourses have intensified in the last ten to fifteen years. They reflect a 
malaise, or conflicts – a sort of unease with oneself. They seem to be the result of the growing 
place “les immigrés,” the descendants of Algeria and other colonized peoples, occupy in the 
national landscape. I do not think, however, that there is an issue of “integration,” 
“immigration,” or the place of Islam within the French Republic. On the other hand, I do 
believe there is a malaise that finds its roots in the immense gap that exists between these 
elitist, white, heterosexual, middle-class, middle-aged, male discourses, and the multiple, 
plural faces, stories, realities that make French society. 
Furthermore, the political and philosophical tradition of the French Republic 
permeates these discourses. Its nationalist-universalist blindness to “race” seems to be an 
impediment to recognizing French diversities and the discriminations – the multiple and 
intersecting levels of discriminations – that hinder the potential for living together in 
harmony. The negation of race as a potential factor of politico-social division seems to be the 
expression of a negation to recognize colonialism, the internalization of colonial/patriarchal 
imaginary, language, representations, and practices that subjugate the colonized “Others.” 
Beyond, it seems to me that it is a negation to problematize the potential continuities of such 
construction in relation to identity, memory, and territory in 2014 France.  
                                                          
1
 I include people from the French overseas territories who were mostly taken from West Africa for the slave 
trade.  
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Most specifically, I sense that the French of Algerian descent are the target of an 
exceptional form of postcolonial racism ingrained in the dominant discourses and the 
imaginaries that support them. As the intimacy of the relationships between France and 
Algeria radically transcend borders, the descendants of Algeria in France are the most familiar 
of all immigrants, yet they seem to be, in the dominant imaginaries, the most “problematic” of 
all French communities.
2
 I want to explore the exceptionality of Algeria as a colony and as a 
postcolony within the French colonial and postcolonial relational landscape. 
In sum, I want to investigate how postcolonial racism permeates social relations in 
multicultural, postcolonial France. I understand this form of postcolonial racism as a 
differentiation on the basis of perceived race, ethnicity, religion, and colonial background 
within the nation. Postcolonial domination takes place within a system in which it is 
inherently tied to other systems of domination. It targets specifically the so-called French of 
immigrant background, who are in fact descendants of formerly colonized populations. It is 
postcolonial for it reproduces practices, imaginaries, discourses and representations of French 
colonialism in a way that remakes the French colonial project of the civilizing mission. When 
I refer to French citizens of Algerian/colonized background, the “français-e-s issu-e-s de 
l’immigration” or “French Muslim” (musulman-e-s français-e-s), I understand nationality and 
citizenship in a broad sense, in a sense of belonging. I thus include all generations of 
immigrants who grew up in France, whether or not they hold French nationality and 
citizenship. 
Until recently, French colonialism has been the object of a general silence in France. 
Since early 2000s, however, debates on French postcoloniality and racial discriminations have 
                                                          
2
 French-Algerian relations are complex and identities are hybrid. There are also white-Catholic French who 
descend from Algeria. By “French of Algerian background” or “French descendants of Algeria,” I refer to the 
descendants of Algeria who are perceived as such, in this case as “Arab” and “Muslim.” The same applies to the 
expression “descendants of formerly colonized populations” in general. 
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penetrated, not without resistance, academic research. Some intellectuals have highlighted the 
necessity of reflecting on French colonialism in the light of these present debates. They have 
enhanced the need to decolonize imaginaries and institutions. Concomitantly, growing 
pressures from civil society have voiced the realities of racial discriminations, shedding light 
on the legacies of French colonialism along with the demand for equal treatment. This context 
is conflictive but/and offers immense opportunities for change. Such a context opens spaces 
for transformation. The need for transforming postcolonial relations in a way that transcends 
race and embraces the plurality of stories/faces that make French society is critical. My thesis 
takes place within, engages with and contributes to, through an interdisciplinary input, the 
current academic and political debates on postcoloniality, race, and diversity in France. 
In order to narrow the scope of my research, I take the French descendants of Algeria 
as a case study. Postcolonial racism tends to be more consensual when it points at the French 
perceived as Muslims, most specifically Algerians. Yet, as I have said, it is, according to my 
research, a paradigmatic case of postcolonial racism in France. The implications of this 
research go beyond this case study. Postcolonial racism targets the descendants of the 
formerly colonized populations in general. French society needs a process of transformative 
decolonization in general – one that questions profoundly the imaginaries and representations 
that underlie institutional, media and political discourses and practices within the Republic.    
Research Question 
How do some of the major socio-political conflicts and discourses in Republican 
France camouflage a form of postcolonial racism? How does such a postcolonial racism 
remake the French colonial project of the civilizing mission through the relations of the 
Republic with the French of Algerian descent? How do I envisage a process of transformative 
decolonization of the Republic and relations within it? 
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Through this research, I am interested in how colonial imaginaries and representations 
are revived in dominant discourses and practices in the present-day within the French 
Republic. I identify the French descendants of the colonized, more specifically Algerian, as 
the target of such discourses and practices that reproduce the colonial racism within the 
nation. I want to look at how these discourses that rely on the values of the Republic 
camouflage the ways in which postcolonial racism is ingrained within this Republic. I intend 
to analyze how such postcolonial racism plays out in the everyday discourses and socio-
political conflicts surrounding postcoloniality and diversity. I want to explore how a process 
of transformative decolonization can rethink human relations across diversities in order to 
embrace all voices in plural France. 
Methodologies 
My guiding methodologies are feminist (Ackerly and True 2010; Luker 2008). 
Feminism for me does not limit itself to reflecting on gender relations in a way that liberates 
human beings from the chains of patriarchy. Feminism is engaged, epistemologically and 
politically, with making visible assumptions that stem from my location of power, my 
standpoint. Thus, it compels me to make a reflective effort on my own location, on my place 
in the world.  
A feminist ethic of research leads me to use a theory-seeking approach of 
methodology (Ackerly and True 2010). Instead of expressing a hypothesis that I prove right 
using existing literature, I intend to fill in gaps within existing theories in order to to add a 
piece to the interdisciplinary puzzle. I want to be surprised through the research process. The 
latter is dynamic, open, and non-linear. 
My research is theoretical with a qualitative approach. I mostly use secondary sources, 
books and journal articles published in the French colonial/postcolonial context as well in 
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other contexts of colonial and/or racist experiences, like the United States and Latin America. 
I stand in Peace and Conflict Studies as the main discipline of my research. I interweave it 
with the fields of Philosophy, History, Sociology, Feminist Studies, and Critical Race Studies. 
As primary sources, I mostly use newspaper articles for the sake of analyzing 
discourse as well as speeches and institutional documents. As I truly believe that de-
colonization breaks borders, I also rely on pieces of art such as French rap music texts and 
literature. Literature written in the colonial/postcolonial context reflects the trans-cultural 
hybridity, the beautiful ambiguity, the radical creativity that emerges out of human relations, 
even when they are colonial. Among these authors who radically mix the personal and the 
political, I cite Assia Djebar and Abd-Al-Malik. 
I am theoretically and methodologically influenced by poststructuralist and post-
colonialist literature. These lenses push me to systematically look beyond the visible, to 
search for the blind spots in practices and discourses, to unveil ideology and potential 
hegemony. They engage me with making silenced onto-epistemologies and knowledges 
visible. These lenses lead me to rely heavily on discourse analysis. For the sake of 
transformation, however, discourse analysis must be coupled with methodologies that open 
space for action and engage with the countless opportunities for change that surround us in 
any situation. This is why I weave these poststructuralist/post-colonialist lenses with the 
Peace Studies perspective. 
In addition, I embrace the methods rooted in the principles of Peace Studies, for they 
push me to go beyond the claim for positivist scientificism. They push me to be critical in a 
way that engages me with transformation and the creation of new spaces in which we might 
live together nonviolently. Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s “epistemological turn” resonates in me 
in my search for renewed and open lenses with which to look at the complexity of human 
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relations, that is, humans-in-conflicts. In intersubjectivity as a scientific method, I see the 
reflection of my own responsibility and vulnerability as a human being in interconnection 
with my environment. My humanity lies in the moving energies of life that surround me. 
Confronting Myself Within Research 
Identity is constructed, flexible, multiple, and messy. At the same time, it also is real. 
Politically, it positions me in a place from where I see and experience the world. My identity 
is conditioned by the intersection of my life choices and experiences, my agency, and political 
factors of my gender and sexuality, my skin color, “race,” language, and nationality, my 
social class, among other things. All co-constitute who I am. So, I am white and I am a 
middle-class heterosexual French woman. Deep inside me, I know that I am none of these 
things. And then, I also know that I am all of them due to the co-constitution of the subject, of 
myself. Locating myself leads me to acknowledging my privilege(s). I understand the 
acknowledgement of my privilege(s) as the responsibility to make my position visible because 
in this world “race” is socially constructed yet very real. My “race” conditions how I see the 
world. It conditions my realities. Being aware of my own position is useful for the sake of 
transformation. 
Indeed, starting from this position, I attempt to decolonize the imaginaries and 
representations which dominate the socio-political debate in France. The objective of this 
research stems from my own struggle for the consciousness of my place in France and in the 
world. I intend to raise my own consciousness to a level where I can be aware of the 
functioning of power, race, and politics in social relations – starting from myself – and 
simultaneously see beyond these conditioning factors in the way I apprehend the world.  
In doing so, I am concerned about reproducing dichotomies, which my research 
intends to transform in a plural conception of identity. In the process of decolonizing my 
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mind, I sometimes tend to analyze relations in a sweeping way that does not leave space for 
natural resistance or complexity. It is very important for me, as a white person, to explicitly 
acknowledge these tendencies, which are part of my struggle for consciousness because they 
may appear as a defensive discourse in the name of the colonized. This is very problematic, 
for such protectionist approach is part of the patriarchal/colonial order/relations and may 
appear as a remaking of the “white man’s burden.” This is not my intention. I do not want to 
“defend” or “be the voice of”. Rather, I only intend to speak for myself, from my place. In so 
doing, I intend to shift the dominant lens on postcolonial diversity in France from my own 
location as a privileged, yet not dominant, voice. My thesis is addressed to all people that 
inhabit France and contribute, in one way or another, to constructing realities in that place. It 
is most particularly directed towards those who do not question the state discourses that create 
a differentiation of citizens within the nation, and beyond, of human beings within this world. 
Furthermore, in my effort to deconstruct knowledge(s) and transform epistemology, I 
sometimes find myself trapped into universal, modern language. I am concerned about 
reproducing the very categories I attempt to undo. Thus, I try, as much as possible, to make 
myself visible and to clarify from where I speak. On the other hand, language offers endless 
possibilities and spaces of resistance and creativity to transform the realities it reflects. The 
choice I make to cite rap music authors, for example, reflects the shifting lens that I call for in 
this work. Through my plural language, the shift takes shape in real time. Besides the trap 
where language can get me, I also explore and use the creative power of language to act upon 
my own contradictions. 
Dancing Research 
I constantly find myself negotiating my position in relation to the discourse analysis of 
poststructuralist/post-colonial lenses and the call for a space of radical openness and 
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resistance of elicitive conflict transformation. Through the process of raising my own 
consciousness, I tend to deconstruct binary thinking in anger, and anger often sends it back at 
me. It locks myself in social structures and essentialist discourses of equality and justice, in 
my own blindness of the complexities of human relations and their opportunities for 
transformation. 
Yet, anger is part of my process. I do not have to settle myself – all my contradictions 
are part of myself and are part of the transformative process. In the power of dance lies power 
to transform. In between acting and reacting lie many third spaces in which I find myself, not 
in the struggle of one over the other, but rather as the creation of new spaces, constantly 
negotiating, unstable, vulnerable, here and now.  
This thesis reflects myself. What moves me academically arises from the experience of 
my multiple realities, all embodied in myself. This is why it is full of contradictions. I am part 
of my analysis. How do I balance expressing “rage” (hooks 1995) and transforming it? I am 
incompletely one, and incompletely the other, finding myself in the frontier of both. This 
frontier is a way-through, a bridge combining my multiple selves. My language is plural and 
my work is, too.   
Reviewing the Literature 
My journey starts in Peace and Conflict Studies. Peace Studies emerged in Europe 
after the Second World War when researchers realized that violence had been taken to another 
level of human barbarism. In his journey to make Peace Studies recognized in Academia, 
Vicent Martínez Guzmán elaborated the Philosophy for Peace, which constitutes the 
theoretical grounds that found the International Master in Peace, Conflicts and Development 
Studies. The central input of this Philosophy for Peace, in my view, is the epistemological 
turn (el giro epistemológico) (Guzmán 2009).  It is a new paradigm, which replaces human 
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beings in the center of science and aims at maintaining the sustainability of life (Comins 
Mingol and Paris Albert 2009). In this paradigm, objectivity does not exist. As human beings 
are interconnected with and within their environment, no one stands outside of conflict. In this 
new vision of science, the diversity of human beings and their subjectivities plays an 
important role in making peace(s). For Martínez Guzmán, there are as many (ways to make) 
peace(s) as there are people. Francisco Muñoz, from the University of Granada, has 
elaborated the concept of imperfect peace (2004). According to Muñoz, peace is everywhere, 
in everyone and in every moment, coexisting with conflict and violence (ibid.). In Peace and 
Conflict Studies, conflict is not negative; rather, human beings live in and within conflict 
(Martínez Guzmán 2001; Lederach 2003; Dietrich 2013). Everything is relational (ibid.). 
Conflict is, in fact, an opportunity for transformation (Lederach 2003; 2005; Dietrich 2013). 
Lederach is the key practitioner and theorist of the elicitive approach of conflict 
transformation, which also constitutes the foundation of the Innsbruck Universität MA 
Program for Peace Studies. In the elicitive approach, the only true moment available to us is 
the here and now because life, relations, energies are constantly moving. In this here and now 
lie endless possibilities – right in front of us – to transform our realities nonviolently and 
creatively. These Peace and Conflict lenses constitute the theoretical foundations of how I 
look at humans and conflicts, humans-in-conflict. 
However, if that is the case, how did I decide to write my paper on racism? I relate 
very much to the spaces that Peace and Conflict Studies open in order to understand the 
world. Yet, I see the violence of racism in its different forms and expressions as a major gap 
in the field. I think Peace and Conflict Studies fail to talk about race and in so doing, fail to 
locate itself. How do I talk about interculturality without discussing the destructive and very 
real effect of race – and nationality, spirituality, etc – in a world that is postcolonial and 
Eurocentric? How do I approach dialogue across cultures and religions without understanding 
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how race, as a factor of domination and subjugation across history, plays out within and 
between cultures? How do I speak about peace(s) across cultures and continents from my 
location in the white European world without recognizing my privileged position in my own 
context and in the world? To answer these questions, I turned to Critical Race Studies, 
Decolonial Studies, and Post-colonial Feminist Studies.  
Colonial Discourse, Power, and Representation 
In talking about race, I must talk about power. How does power function so that race, 
which is socially constructed, matters? The work of French philosopher Michel Foucault has 
been revolutionary in rethinking the ways that researchers undertake theory in the Social 
Sciences (Mills 2003). He shifts his point of departure in order to make visible blind 
theoretical spots and ask questions that have not been asked. He questions the rigidity of any 
theoretical/political position and sees the changing of position as an essential part of theory. 
He also breaks with binary-thinking for he claims that power is, always, everywhere, and that 
it circulates in ways that it gives opportunities for change. 
In teasing out how racism plays out in French society, I must analyze dominant 
discourses in the French context – how media, politicians, legal texts and practices, the 
institutions function in a way that reproduces colonial racism within French society and 
remakes the civilizing mission. In analyzing discourse, I must highlight the functioning of 
discourse in order to highlight the ideology that hides behind it and makes it appear as 
hegemonic – that is, as the only available truth (Gramsci, Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1972). For 
Foucault, the concept of discourse encompasses not only the actual language but also the 
institutional apparatus in which it is framed and by which it is legitimized as well as the 
different practices that follow from such discourse (Foucault and Gordon 1980; Hall 1997). 
Discourse is constructed through knowledge, and discourse produces knowledge. No 
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knowledge is produced outside the operating of power in social relations, and power is also 
reinforced through the creation of knowledge (Foucault and Gordon 1980).  
Highly influenced by Foucault, the feminist philosopher Judith Butler argues that there 
is no essential identity before discourse comes into play (Butler 1990). There is no such thing 
as dichotomy-based identities (ibid.). Rather, they are categories that are constructed by 
discourse and performed through discourse (ibid.). Like Foucault, she argues that the body is 
political (ibid.). It is the battlefield where constructed identities take place, the battlefield for 
the exercise of power (ibid.). Butler’s input is fundamental because she demonstrates that 
identity is political; it is flexible and opens spaces for transformation. 
Post-colonial Edward Said, who published Orientalism in 1979, is highly influenced 
by Foucault’s power/knowledge argument (Hall 1997). In Orientalism, Said analyzes the 
discourse of the dominant culture – of those who hold the power to look and represent – over 
the formerly colonized populations – those who are looked at and represented through the 
gaze of the dominant culture (Said 1979). He demonstrates how imperialism plays out 
through culture in post-colonial relations between “the West” and “the East” (ibid.). His text 
is important, not only because it is seminal in Post-Colonial Studies, but mostly to understand 
the continuities of colonialism after independence in the way the colonizers construct the 
“Other.” In France, a form of “Orientalism” constructs the French Muslims in particular as the 
exotic and threatening “Other.” 
Stuart Hall, from the field of Cultural Studies, writes, as a black Jamaican man living 
in Great Britain, about the inside Great Britain colonial/postcolonial context. He shows how 
the “racialized knowledge of the Other,” that is, how “race” is constructed through the 
operation of language, representation, and power (Hall 1997). He appears to me as a sort of 
bridge between Foucault and Said. According to Hall, stereotyping is the attempt of the 
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dominant discourse, through a typically binary representation of the Other, to fix the 
meaning/knowledge about this created Other (ibid.).  
Power, as Foucault demonstrates, circulates; in other words, it operates at all times in 
all relations (Foucault and Gordon 1980). This is why racism and colonialism are systems of 
domination. Feminist bell hooks, who talks about race in the US context, prefers the term 
white supremacy over racism in order to highlight that within the system of “white 
supremacist, capitalist patriarchy,” people of color also take part in reproducing their own 
domination through the internalization of white gaze (hooks 1995). Thus, the dominant 
discourse in France, in other words, the discourse that perpetuates colonial relations through 
representation, language, and practices, encompasses all people in the country even though we 
all have different positions of power in relation to such discourse and participate differently in 
reproducing it.  
Post-colonialists have often criticized Michel Foucault and other postmodernists-
poststructuralists for not engaging in a critique of the consequences of colonialism and its 
persistence in modern societies. Indeed, they lack critical reflection on their Eurocentric male 
location in a world where race, gender, and colonialism matter in relation to power. Post-
colonialism is an intellectual movement that originates from literary and cultural studies 
mostly through Third World authors who studied in former colonial Empires (Gregory et al. 
2009). Post-colonial studies are concerned with the different impacts colonialism has on the 
culture of the colonizing and the colonized peoples in terms of the continuities of colonial 
relations, practices, and representations between past and present (ibid.). It constitutes a 
conceptual frame that allows me to displace debate in France in order to make assumptions 
visible within dominant discourses. It allows me to critique the discursive and material 
legacies of colonialism as well as question the knowledges – permeated with colonial 
imaginaries – produced by these legacies. I resonate with their engagement – political and 
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epistemological – to make subalternized knowledges and marginalized historiographies 
visible. In doing so, colonial discourse analysis is at the core of their approach. One of the 
main critics of the post-colonial approach, however, is the tendency to homogenize post-
colonial realities, which are multiple and diverse (Loomba 1998; Omar 2008; Ait Ben 
Lmadani and Moujoud 2012). This is important for me as I apply international literature to a 
context that, beyond the similar patterns it presents with other racist and colonial contexts, 
bears its own specificities and histories. 
Thus, in analyzing colonial and racist discourse in France, I relate to Algerian 
philosopher Seloua Luste Boulbina. Yet, even though her work on the French 
colonial/postcolonial context is fundamental, she is widely ignored by mainstream newspaper 
and journal publishers. It is not surprising considering how subversive it is in France, where 
resistances towards the decolonial imperatives are strong, especially in the institutions of 
knowledge. If I had to define her, I would say that she is feminist, de-colonialist, and rooted in 
the French colonial and postcolonial context. In her book Le Singe de Kafka et autres propos 
sur la colonie, I identify two core premises that constitute the foundational arguments of her 
work. First, she points out that using the term “colonization” is problematic, for 
“colonization” can only be seen through the eyes of the colonizers (Luste Boulbina 2008). 
Thus, colonization becomes an indefinite process for submission can never be absolute (ibid.).  
Furthermore, she highlights that the colonization-decolonization paradigm reflects a 
historical, linear understanding of relational, dynamic, complex processes (ibid.). Just as the 
conceptualizations of Post-colonial Studies, she says that political independences have not 
been coupled with a decolonization of the representations constructed throughout French 
colonialism (Luste Boulbina 2008; Loomba 1998; Omar 2008). In addition, she understands 
philosophy as politics so that it becomes visible who speaks and who is absent in the telling of 
history (Luste Boulbina 2007; 2008). In this aspect she resonates with post-colonial 
17 
 
historiography thinkers like Ann Laura Stoler (2010). Stemming from this first major claim of 
hers, she displaces debate, as in the subject of debate. According to her, we must think “the 
colony” (Luste Boulbina 2008) and “the postcolony” (Luste Boulbina 2007). 
Second, because colonization is a multidimensional project that elaborates through 
relations and impacts the colonized as much as the colonizing people – even though it may do 
so differently – France also needs to decolonize (Luste Boulbina 2008). This second argument 
constitutes the raison d’être of my research. Indeed, the dominant discourse tends to place 
debate related to diversity, race, and postcoloniality in the “French of immigrant background.” 
In so doing, it divides society into insiders and outsiders and separates the colonial from the 
national imaginary (Luste Boulbina 2007; 2008; 2011). This is what I call epistemological 
violence, which is, in fact, part of the dynamics of racism. I choose to shift the debate in a 
way in that I look beyond the visible and the hearable – into deeply rooted assumptions – in 
order to open new spaces of understanding and transformation. The raison d’être of my 
research rests in the present-day France, which no longer is a colonial Empire. It presents a 
complex mixing of populations, which in large part is the result of France’s colonial projects. 
In such a context, decolonization transcends historical borders; it is the matter of the whole 
society, collectively and individually, even though differently.  
Decolonization 
Luste Boulbina analyzes French discourse in a way that shows the continuities of 
French colonial imaginaries, representations, and practices in the national consciousness, such 
as public discourses around the 2004 law on secularity and wearing of religious symbols in 
schools. She is very sensitive to the perpetuation of the colonial language in the colony and 
postcolony. She argues that a decolonization of knowledges and the institutions in which they 
are produced is necessary in France (Luste Boulbina 2012). Indeed, she highlights the 
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ingrained hierarchization of people, subjects, and disciplines, which systematically place the 
French white European male as the rational norm. Such hierarchization does not only take 
place in content – what appears and what does not/who is heard and who is not – but also in 
methodology – how things/subjects are represented. Luste Boulbina’s work is extremely 
important in the French context. She is the only one, among all authors I have read, who so 
brilliantly deconstructs the continuities of the colonial language, imaginary, and 
representations of institutional discourses in postcolonial France and how it conditions the 
relations of the Republic with its remade “subjects”. 
My perspective is transformation of conflicts. It aims at finding a place of encounter 
for people to be in harmony. In this framework, I resonate more with a de-colonial than the 
post-colonial critique which responds better to the specific context of France. Decolonial 
Studies emerged about fifteen years ago from the specific local contexts of Latin America 
echoing the global context of political and epistemological Eurocentrism. For Peruvian Aníbal 
Quijano, “modernity” and the “coloniality of power” are the two axes of “global, 
Eurocentered, capitalist power” inherited from the colonial/modern European project 
(Quijano 2000). In the coloniality of power, what is at play is a universal social classification 
of people in terms of “race” (ibid.).  Argentinian María Lugones critiques that the coloniality 
of power assumes patriarchy as the normative gender system regulating social relations 
(Lugones 2008). She shifts it to the “coloniality of gender” – the system in which gender and 
race are intrinsically intermeshed in a way that they mutually constitute each other: one does 
not exist without the other (ibid.). María Lugones, like many other women of color (Anzaldúa 
1990; Suárez-Navaz and Hernández Castillo 2008), is also known for her critical de-colonial 
position in relation to white feminists who, by not situating themselves within the world, 
homogenize the diverse experiences of heterosexism and silence women of color. 
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Sociologist Ramón Grosfoguel takes Quijano’s concept of global coloniality of power 
and bridges it with Critical Race Studies in the US context. He claims for a decolonization of 
white supremacist, capitalist, Eurocentric, patriarchal knowledges and political-economic 
practices of the modern/colonial system (Grosfoguel 2007). He introduces “transmodernity” 
as an alternative, based on a plurality of answers to modernity, in which “pluriversality” 
replaces universality (Grosfoguel 2011). Both Lugones and Grosfoguel connect with an 
intersectional understanding of systems of domination. Intersectionality was introduced by 
Kimberle Crenshaw in an article titled “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color” published in 1991. Crenshaw shows, in the 
US context, that isolating systems of subordination from each other reproduces political, 
structural and representational forms of violence against women of color (Crenshaw 1991). 
Indeed, they are entangled in a way that race, class, and gender operate in an intersectional 
way that conditions social existences differently. bell hooks refers to the system as “white 
supremacist, capitalist patriarchy” (hooks 1995). 
The idea of decolonization has recently been exporting to and transforming in the 
context of Europe through authors like Françoise Vergès in France or Grada Kilomba in 
Germany. I also think this is necessary. Race remains a blind spot in European thought – 
Achille Mbembe refers to it as “l’impensé de la race” in the French colonial/postcolonial 
context. The concept of race bears a strong symbolic meaning in the history of 20
th
 century 
Europe. Race is socially constructed and it is extremely important to know the devastating 
consequences that the invention of such a concept, the socio-political construction of race, and 
the legacies of scientific racism have had for humanity. However, race was created by 
Europeans for/in the colonial projects. Refusing to discuss race – given that it is socially 
constructed – is also a way to not deal with present racism. In fact, it is generally accepted 
that talking about “race” is racist, which serves to reproduce colonial legacies. Indeed, if I 
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distance myself from academic discourse and look at political discourses in Europe, I must 
say that, while it is not okay to talk about race within white Europe, it seems very okay to do 
so in a way that stigmatizes certain populations particularly Muslim, so-called “Arab.” Such 
an imaginary tends to reproduce the hierarchization of people on the basis of socially 
constructed yet very real “race.” In postcolonial Europe, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
race matters for the racial discriminations to which some populations are subjected. This must 
be a key element in the academic and political discussions on the legacies of European 
colonialism. 
In France, many authors have recently opened the door to a de-colonial perspective on 
French society by analyzing the continuities of the French colonial imaginary in the present. It 
is still very new and contested. The opening of Academia to post-colonial/de-colonial 
questions occurred via the discipline of history. Benjamin Stora is the well-known French-
Algerian historian who specialized in the relations between France and Algeria. He has long 
highlighted the ambiguities and complexities that make up these relations and critiqued the 
general politics of amnesia of the French state regarding its colonial history with Algeria. 
Pascal Blanchard and Nicolas Bancel are two key historians of the French colonial and 
postcolonial context who focus on the treatment within France of French colonial history in 
relation to its postcolonial, present face, that is, immigration. La fracture coloniale is the title 
of their book, published in 2005, which is both their most well-known and their most 
controversial. It in fact breaks with the French tradition that hides racial discriminations 
behind the mask of social inequalities. They highlight how the general negation of the 
“colonial fact” and “postcolonial fact,” both in political and academic discourses, contributes 
to creating a strong divide, a malaise, within the nation. Indeed, this bears the consequence 
that dominant French society keeps a rather colonial eye – white gaze – on their history and 
“identity,” which are in fact plural.  
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Thinkers like the socio-demographer Patrick Simon and the philosopher Achille 
Mbembe bring more pieces to the puzzle. They have critically shown how the universal 
discourse of the Republic that sells the equality-laïcité-diversity package as the mythical 
model of “integration” is a white patriarchal discourse unaware of its own colonial racism. 
Simon demonstrates how such ethnically blind discourse negates and thus perpetuates racial 
inequalities (Simon 2005; 2008). Mbembe, from Cameroon, is very critical of the French 
tradition of nationalistic universalism, which he claims to be narcissistic and ethno-racist, for 
it places the Republic on a white pedestal where the Other can only exist in a narcissistic 
image of self (Mbembe 2000; 2005). Part of the de-colonial project is to unveil race, which is 
for him a fiction yet a millstone (ibid.). Along the same lines, though with gender sensitivity 
added, María Lugones asserts: “Race is no more mythical and fictional than gender, both 
powerful fictions” (Lugones 2008, 12). 
Saïd Bouamama is an Algerian sociologist and activist who was born and lives in 
France. Pierre Tévanian is a French essayist and activist. They came up with the concept of 
postcolonial racism in a common article published in a 2006 book edited by Blanchard and 
Bancel. They highlight that a specific form of racism applies to the descendants of the 
colonized populations and reproduces discourses, practices, representations, and imaginaries 
of colonialism (Bouamama and Tévanian 2006). It is deeply rooted and does not seem to 
disappear throughout time like it does for other immigrant groups (ibid.). I find the concept 
interestingly relevant in the sense that it reflects the special place of ambivalence that the 
descendants of the formerly colonized, particularly from Algeria, hold in the national 
consciousness. It also highlights the intersectional continuities between colonization and 
immigration, which is a fundamental element in the French context. The blind spot I see in 
their analysis is the entanglement that colonialism and racism certainly have with sexism, 
much like Luste Boulbina shows in her analysis of French colonial/patriarchal institutional 
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discourses. I resonate with the concept of postcolonial racism and I add my own feminist 
lenses to it. I must understand postcolonial racism as intersectional if I do not want to 
reproduce, in my de-colonial process, other forms of domination. 
The idea of Bouamama and Tévanian takes from the great work of Algerian 
sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad, who studied how colonization and immigration are intimately 
tied in the French colonial/postcolonial context (Sayad 1991; 2006). He showed how 
colonization created the conditions for immigration, and consequently the very special place 
Algerian immigrants hold in postcolonial France (ibid.). He highlights the contradiction that 
while Algerian immigrants in France do not behave like any other immigrant, dominant 
French society still relates to them in a way that perpetuates colonial/patriarchal relations 
(ibid.). 
Sayad also shifts the mainstream understanding of immigration as a neutral fact to an 
understanding of it as a concept that necessarily reflects the gaze of the dominant society 
(Sayad 1991). Sayad’s work is seminal for the development of post-colonial/de-colonial 
studies in France. In their article on French intersectionality, anthropologists Moujoud and Ait 
Ben Lmadani critically show the necessity of de-colonial academics and activists rooting their 
reflection in context (Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 2012). It is a matter of the political and 
academic engagement they must have with the visibilization of marginalized voices (ibid.). 
This means, among other things, to engage with the work that has been done in the French 
context by existing yet often marginalized authors like Sayad (ibid.). This article was 
published in the alternative and interdisciplinary journal Mouvements in a 2012 issue titled 
“Decolonizing Knowledges” and edited by Luste Boulbina. It is a lightening issue, 
interdisciplinary and feminist, mixing different contexts and disciplinary perspectives of 
decolonization. 
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Most de-colonial literature in the French context has focused on the relations of 
domination in postcolonial France that the French Republic maintains with the French who 
descend from the formerly colonized populations, specifically in the context of exception of 
the banlieues populaires (marginalized spaces in the cities). Within the decolonial literature, 
Françoise Vergès identifies a blind spot: the place of the French overseas territories and 
populations within colonial history, thus within the Republic (Vergès 2006; 2007; 2010; 
2012). Indeed, she highlights, the national imaginary still limits its territorial understanding of 
France to the metropolis (ibid.). Part of the decolonial transformation, she says, is to open the 
conceptualization of French territory, memory, and identity (ibid.). It is also to view colonial 
history as a complex history where realities are entangled with present continuities in the 
colonial order (Vergès 2007; 2012). In her struggle for the visibilization of memories, she 
claims the droit de cité (power to speak and be recognized) of all French people (Vergès 
2006; 2007; 2010; 2012). The colonized must be subjects in the telling of history. This is also 
what Luste Boulbina means by thinking “the colony.” 
Françoise Vergès grew up in the overseas territory of Réunion. She also lived in post-
independence Algeria and did her doctoral research in the USA. She is both an activist and an 
academic, strongly feminist and committed to the history of slavery. Vergès and Luste 
Boulbina have very similar ideas, even though Vergès is more engaged with the memorial 
struggle and with the French overseas populations, while Luste Boulbina’s approach is more 
philosophical and is more engaged with the colony and postcolony, mostly Algerian, within 
France. Furthermore, Luste Boulbina’s approach is more discourse analysis, poststructuralist-
oriented and it often seems to come from a place of anger. On the other hand, Vergès’ view of 
decolonization brings me closer to the transformative nature of conflict where I can approach 
it in terms of human beings and spaces for dialogue. They complement each other and they 
both are necessary.  
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Structuring The Process 
I have articulated my work in three main chapters. Each of them aims at adding a piece 
to the puzzle that responds to my research question. My first chapter is a broad 
contextualization of my topic where I highlight the connections between the different 
elements that make up the present-day situation. It examines the colonial relation that the 
French Republic has established within itself with the colonized Other and remade with the 
immigrant Other in the present-day. I show how the Republic was constructed through the 
colonial times on a differentiation within the nation regarding who is citizen and who is 
subject of the Republic on the denied basis of the constructed “race.” I explore the ambiguity 
specific to the case of l’Algérie française, where nationality and citizenship were two 
different things for les français musulmans (the French perceived as Muslims). As I 
demonstrate the overlapping continuity between colonization and immigration, I look at how 
such relations have been perpetuated through the children of immigrants. Concomitantly, I 
highlight the strong connections/gaps between the tradition of nationalist universalism that 
makes the Republic untouchable and the negation of the history of colonialism and 
postcolonialism. I want to capture how the denial of the stories creates a colonial fracture 
within the nation that parallels social discriminations in a way that race/religion, memory, and 
class intersect in a system of domination of the French of Algerian descent. 
The second piece of my research puzzle relies heavily on the analysis of dominant – 
mostly media and institutional/legal – discourses. I aim at teasing out how a form of 
postcolonial racism, that is, a reproduction of the racist differentiation supported by colonial 
imaginaries, representations, discourses, and practices, functions. I show how this occurs in a 
way that remakes the colonial project of the civilizing mission of the Republic through a 
remaking of the position of the descendants of the formerly colonized as subjects of the 
Republic. I demonstrate how the elite, through white patriarchal discourses of “integration” 
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that rely on/hide behind the package of equality-laïcité-diversity of the Republic, remake the 
differentiation of who is fully French and who is not on the basis of intersections of 
“race”/religion with colonial background and class. The descendants of Algeria are, in the 
unconscious imaginary of the nation, the most targeted by such discourses, for they are the 
most “familiar” yet the most problematic of all “immigrants.” I highlight the banlieues 
populaires as the mystified construction of colonized “Other,” the reproduction of the colony 
where populations are “territories” and measures are “exceptional.” 
My third chapter argues in favor of a transformative journey of decolonization of 
French state and society. I understand it as a reflective process, epistemological and political, 
that encompasses all people living in France even though for all differently. I claim that the 
national consciousness must displace debate in order to see differently. I explore, using 
feminist theories, how situated knowledges and decolonial epistemologies can shift the 
hegemonic lens and open myself to critical and transformative visions. I place the 
development of contextualized post-colonial, feminist, intersectional approaches in academic 
research as the factors to decolonize knowledges, imaginaries, and institutions. I examine the 
need that we, as human beings in relation living in France, come to recognize the postcolonial 
condition of the Republic in a way that deconstructs the myth of the universal Republic 
through decolonial lenses. I argue for a transformative process that starts from the present-day 
and leads to rethinking openly identity, memory, and territory within the nation and within the 
world. I encourage new ways to see in plurality as a way to transform relations to find a place 
of harmony. 
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Chapter 1: Deconstructing (Post)Colonial Relations 
Explosion du Fort l’Empereur, le 4 juillet 1830, à dix heures du matin. La formidable 
détonation remplit de terreur tous les habitants d’Alger, et de joie triomphante l’armée 
française qui s’échelonne depuis Sidi-Ferruch jusqu’aux citadelles de la capitale.  
(Assia Djebar 1985, 45) 
 
Introduction 
In a postcolonial, multicultural nation like France, past and present are intrinsically 
tied in a way that transcends the borders of time and identity. Yet the dominant discourse of 
the nation does not seem to embrace this here and now. A few generations have passed since 
the time of France as a colonial Empire. Relations shift but do not disappear. Decades of 
shared experiences leave deep traces in multiple forms. Post-colonial migrations and a mixing 
of populations are one of them. In France, descendants of formerly colonized populations, les 
enfants d’immigrés, were born. Most of them are French. At the same time, French society 
has transformed, changed face, pluralized. It is visibly and completely postcolonial. Yet, it is 
not equal. The dominant imaginaries of the state and society seem to reproduce colonial 
differentiations within the nation. The French “issus de l’immigration” have thus become, in 
these imaginaries, the “visible” traces of French colonial past. In these imaginaries, they 
continue to “haunt” the very Republic that, in the dominant discourse, guarantees universal 
equality.  
Colonial-Postcolonial are two moving frames that overlap and recreate, just like time 
and space. The French Republic was built through its colonial glory. Colonial representations 
and discriminations have survived, reshaped through the relation with the enfants d’immigrés. 
In this regard, the banlieues populaires are a reality that is way too familiar in the light of the 
colony.  
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The French-Algerian relation has had a very special destiny that still holds a place of 
“exception” within the Republic. Algeria is the most “familiar” of all French colonies, yet it 
appears as the most “problematic” for the Republic. The French “d’origine algérienne” 
demand equality while the ethnic-blind Republic thinks it deserves gratitude. Postcolonial 
conflicts lie in this outward contradiction that the discourse of the Republic sees as an 
incompatibility. 
Through a post-colonial perspective, I want to analyze how these conflicts take shape. 
What sort of malaise lies within the Republic? More specifically, how does racism play out in 
the relation between the Republic and the colonial and postcolonial aspects of itself? How do 
discussions on “immigration,” memory, the French-Algerians, and the Republic reproduce 
colonial imaginaries? How are they constitutive of a form of postcolonial racism? This 
chapter teases out all these elements of conflict in complex, post-colonial, multicultural 
France today. It encompasses many different aspects of what constitutes relational existence 
within the Republic in terms of “race,” memory(ies), social life, and power.  
I begin by setting the stage for the complex historical context that constructed the 
French Republic through its colonial project. I endeavor to understand how such construction 
has fostered (colonial) racism within the Republic in a way that is blatant today. In the second 
part, I engage in a wide discussion on memory and attempt to tease out the colonial malaise 
perceivable within the Republic. I make visible how the question of memory, in relation with 
its citizens of colonized descent, interweaves with “race” and the need for recognition on the 
part of the enfants d’immigrés. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to weave the Algerian case 
study through my line of thought. I first provide the broader frame of French colonial/post-
colonial relational experience and then apply it to the French-Algerian case. 
Le Projet Républicain, Ou la Mise en Place du Racisme Colonial 
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L’Exception (Coloniale) Française 
In the 2005 foreword of his famous book De la Postcolonie, the well-known author 
Achille Mbembe explains that the French philosophical tradition of the Lumières has 
constructed the subject as universal and rational. Such principles were the philosophical 
cornerstone of the 1789 French Revolution and creation of the Republican regime. Thus, 
inherited from the tradition of modernity, the French Republic was built on a paternalistic 
understanding of equality (Mbembe 2005). In this context, identity results from “l’inutile 
tension entre républicanisme et différentialisme” (ibid.).3 Indeed, the French Republic has 
nationalized this “abstract universalism,” which is represented in its national motto: “Liberté, 
égalité, fraternité” (ibid.) It has become a form of “ethno-racist narcissism” that can only 
think of the Other as a reproduction of self (ibid.). “Il s’agit d’une forme d’universalisme qui 
“ne peut penser l’autre qu’en termes de duplication, de dédoublement jusqu’à l’infini d’une 
image narcissique” à laquelle est assujetti celui qui en est la proie” (Mbembe 2005, citing 
Hassoun).
4
 This racialized (and racist) arrogance is deeply internalized in “the French mind”. 
Consequently, equality only comes out of invisibility. In narcissistic racist terms, this involves 
the assimilation of the “racially visible” (and “culturally visible”) to the so-constructed (white 
Christian) “racial centre” (and “cultural centre”). 
Thus, the project of assimilation was a project of the negation of self. The work of 
Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from the French island of Martinique
5
 who fought for the national 
liberation of Algeria alongside the FLN, analyzes the pathological relationship that ties the 
colonizer to the colonized in the French Empire. He provides a strongly anti-colonial analysis 
of the political and cultural enterprise of colonialism. His seminal texts pave the way for the 
                                                          
3
 My translation: “the useless tension between republicanism and differentialism.” 
4
 My translation: “It is a form of universalism that ‘cannot think of the Other but in terms of an infinite 
duplication, a reproduction of a narcissistic image’ that enslaves its prey.” 
5
 La Martinique was part of the first French colonial Empire of the 17
th
 century. It remains French up to this day. 
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future development of Post-colonial Studies. Even though Fanon’s analysis of “colonial 
alienation” is too Manichean and fails to capture the deep complexity of co-constitutive 
colonial relationships, his texts remain powerful tools for understanding the present-day 
situation in the French-Algerian transnational context.  
In Pour la Révolution Africaine, he writes:  
Si la psychiatrie est la technique médicale qui se propose de permettre à l’homme de 
ne plus être étranger à son environnement, je me dois d’affirmer que l’Arabe, aliéné 
permanent dans son pays, vit dans un état de dépersonnalisation absolue.  
Le statut de l’Algérie ? Une déshumanisation systématisée (Fanon 2006, 60).6 
I understand his exploration of alienation as a psychological mechanism that reaches the 
colonized in their flesh, in the depth of their very beings, so as to make them hate the 
characteristics of their own selves. It is a process of destruction of identity, both personal and 
collective. It leads to a “dépersonnalisation absolue” or “déshumanisation systématisée,” 
which allows for the condition of submission that creates, and is simultaneously created by, 
the colonial relation. Through this process, the colonized assimilates her condition of 
inferiority to the extent that she no longer has an existence separate from her relation to the 
colonial centre. This dissociation of the subject from her natural and social environment is an 
extraterritorialization (Luste Boulbina 2008). This is to such an extent that one becomes 
foreign in her own territory, language and body (Thiong’o 1986). Through the systematic 
downgrading of her culture, language, traditions, customs and religion, the colonized is 
reduced to inferiority and primitiveness (Thiong’o 1986). Inasmuch as this configuration 
presents continuities within the postcolonial condition, which I explore later through the 
French-Algerian citizen in France, it is important to specify clearly that this is an 
interpretation of the colonial era. 
                                                          
6
 Translation from the 1967 English edition: “If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no 
longer to be a stranger to his environment, l owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his 
own country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization. 
What is the status of Algeria? A systematized dehumanization” (Fanon 1967, 53). 
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French colonialism anywhere has always relied on racist and hierarchical ideology. 
The French were actively involved in the European capitalist project of slavery and the slave 
trade, particularly from the 17
th
 century on to the middle of the 19
th
 century (M’Bokolo 
1998).
7
 It was a system, calculated and brutal, of subjugation of people. It impacted all aspects 
of life: economic, cultural, physical, psychological, emotional, and so on. In the case of 
France, slave companies took people from the coasts of West Africa, sold them, and enslaved 
them in the French colonies of America (M’Bokolo 1998; Astégiani-Merrain et al. 2007). 
There, the slaves worked on plantations for international commerce (ibid.). Anti-black racist 
ideology sustained slavery and the slave trade (ibid.). Christiane Taubira, current Minister of 
Justice, explains: “il [le maître] n’est pas seulement maître de plantation, il est le gardien de 
la civilisation” (Noirs De France - 1/3 - Le Temps Des Pionniers (1889-1940) 2012).8 The 
white man was superior, and it is through this ideology that he granted himself the right to 
subjugate people who he saw as savages. Slavery constituted and was constituted by race 
(Mbembe 2000). To discuss the complex process of how race was constructed socially is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, in my work, it is important to highlight how it was 
brought to the juridical realm at the time of slavery and the slave trade. Le Code noir, 
established juridically in 1685 in les Antilles françaises, institutionalized a racist organization 
of life through the subjugation of slaves who were, under such jurisdiction, “movables” 
(Vergès 2007).
9
 
In 1848, when slavery was eventually prohibited under the second Republic, 
abolitionists aimed at settling renewed social relations in the Antilles françaises through a 
“national reconciliation” movement so as to bring former masters and slaves to coexist 
                                                          
7
 It is important to specify that although the French government, under the leadership of Victor Schoelcher, 
finally made slavery illegal in 1848, forced labour, which was a renewed form of slavery, has only been 
prohibited since 1946 (M’Bokolo 1998). 
8
 My translation: “he is not only the plantation master, he is the guardian of civilization”. 
9
 First established in the Antilles françaises (French Caribbean islands), le code noir was then extended by the 
French government to other colonies such as Guyane, Réunion, and Louisiana.  
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equally (Cottias 2004). Antillais-e-s became citizens. On the other hand, in the rest of the 
French Empire, starting with Algeria in 1875, le Code de l’indigénat ruled the new colonies 
(Le Cour Grandmaison 2010; Mbembe 2000). The Constitution of the Second Republic 
already placed the new colonies outside the frame of common law. However, from 1870, with 
the beginning of the Third Republic, well-known political figures such as Jules Ferry and 
Arthur Girault elaborated on its “mission civilisatrice” (Le Cour Grandmaison 2010). In this 
way, colonial France concretized its colonial rule of domination in the new colonies (ibid.). 
Deemed inferior for the apparent “primitiveness” of their “race,” the so-called “indigènes” 
were granted the exceptional status of “subjects” of the Empire rather than citizens. From 
1875 to 1945, “les indigènes” were denied political and social rights, and subjugated to 
repressive and discriminatory procedures, including forced labor (ibid.). In the new overseas 
territories, colonial France ruled by decree, more flexible than law. On command, the 
centralizing figure of the “gouverneur” issued decrees in order to maintain the domination of 
the colonizer over the colonized and ensure stability and prosperity of the Empire (Le Cour 
Grandmaison 2010; Mbembe 2000).  
French colonial power justified these colonial ruling strategies through a profound 
belief in the superiority of the white man over any other so-constructed races. The Third 
Republic, at the time of the conquest of Algeria, engaged the whole domain of public 
representations, through popular culture and the mass education system, in the construction of 
the patriotic idea of the nation (Sessions 2011, reviewed by Zarobell). This was done through 
the figure of a colonized “Other,”10 essentially inferior to the (white) French (ibid.).11 
Likewise, the colonialist Jules Ferry advocated in the early 1880s for free, mandatory, and 
                                                          
10
 Part of the functioning of racism is the political construction of “Otherness” that holds identities in place and 
divides the “we” from “the others.” The “we” coincides with those who look, while “the Other” coincides with 
the one who is looked at by the gaze of those in power – the “we.” In the French colonial and postcolonial 
context, I understand the “Other” as a colonized “Other,” that is, as “subject”. Thus “Otherness” is relative to her 
familiarity (assimilation) with the white French center in the colonial order.  
11
 The stigmatization of Islam plays an important role in Tocqueville’s writings in asserting the “superiority of 
the French civilization.” 
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secular schooling for all – a political strategy to build French nationalism around the 
“Republican ideal” of the “mission civilisatrice” (Bancel and Blanchard 2005). Schooling had 
to be given in the French language in all French territories, including Algeria. “A 
universalistic outlook on the nation as a community transcending ethnic, religious, and class 
distinctions underlay the introduction of compulsory schooling in 1880” (Soysal & Szakács 
2010, 104). This quote shows how the institutionalization of the mass education system 
contributed to the construction of the Republican colonialist imaginary. The French value of 
laïcité (secularism), introduced in French schools in 1905, completed the Republican idealistic 
package of equality-laïcité, of which l’école de la République became the sacred guarantor. 
While it gave to the indigènes of Algeria the status of colonial “subjects,” Republican 
power granted citizenship to the inhabitants of the Antilles françaises. Such “privileged” 
treatment hid the ever-lasting institutionalized racism that maintained les Antilles françaises 
in a status of colonies (Dumont 2013). In addition, the remnants of slavery still made the 
organization of social, political, economic, and cultural life racist and hierarchical (ibid.). This 
equality in text did not exist de facto (ibid.). Following from their “privileged status,” in 1946 
les Antilles françaises became French départements, supposedly equal to the metropolis, a 
noticeable move in a context of growing demand for national liberation on the part of most 
colonies of the time.  
As the frequent revolts in the present-day départements et territoires d’outre-mer 
reveal, the foundations of the societies in the Antilles françaises still rely to this day on a 
social and racial hierarchy (Vergès 2010; Dumont 2013). Only three years after the 
“départementalisation,” Aimé Césaire from Martinique published his famous Discours sur le 
colonialisme (1955). Through this powerful text, Césaire demonstrates how French, and by 
extension European colonialism, has always relied on a racist and social hierarchy, despite 
claims to a civilizing higher motive. He explains that the “dehumanized bourgeoisie,” which 
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emerged out of capitalism, defends universal ideals by holding hegemony over science 
(western and rational), morality, and spirituality. In deconstructing the colonialist discourse, 
Césaire highlights the spectacular contradiction existing between the speech and the deeds of 
the so-called universal white man. The latter enslaves human beings, whom he regards as the 
Other of civilization, based on the pretense of naturalized superiority. 
Likewise, in Black Skin, White Masks, published in 1952, Fanon sheds light on the 
alienation of the black man by the white man in the context of his own location, les Antilles 
françaises.
12
 Through psychological lenses, he explores the feeling of inferiority (“sentiment 
d’infériorité”) of the black man, l’Antillais, who had always identified as white until he is 
faced with the European world. He argues that the white gaze (“le regard blanc”) makes the 
Antillais black and gives the Antillais his place in the world – his “race,” history, and body 
scheme. This racist colonial practice, whereby the “white man” places on the black man the 
objectifying objectivity (“objectivité écrasante”) of his enslaving gaze, triggers a 
psychological mechanism that creates in the black man the unconscious desire to be white 
(“désir inconscient d’être blanc”). The black man is faced with a dilemma: to whiten or 
disappear (“se blanchir ou disparaître”) (Fanon 1971, 80). He therefore develops strategies of 
resistance to save the race (“sauver la race”), (Fanon 1971, 38) through which he alienates 
himself. It is the manifestation of the “complex of inferiority/dependence” in front of the 
white man (Fanon 1971, chapter 4). 
The works of Césaire and Fanon bear great significance even today. They are caught 
in the binary logics that determine them to a degree. In teasing out postcolonial racism, I need 
to move beyond the binary that I try to undo in order to embrace the complexities of 
postcolonial relations. The works of Césaire and Fanon are foundational because they name 
                                                          
12
 It is important to clarify that “black man” and “white man” are social constructions. I am taking these terms 
from Fanon’s language to reflect on his ideas. Likewise, I am consciously using the male pronoun here, for 
Fanon’s analysis is male centred. 
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colonial racism. Through their own experiences as colonized and Other, they unravel how it 
functions in the context of the Antilles françaises. They are also evidence of the fact that 
colonial racism existed way before l’Algérie française within the French Empire. The 
colonization of Algeria emerged in a context of renewed colonialism, yet within a nation that 
was built on a long history of imposed colonial domination over its possessed, racialized 
Other. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that racism was constitutive of French 
colonialism, not only in the Algerian case, but also in other colonial cases. Indeed, at this 
point in my exploration, it follows that: “Enfin, dans cette logique coloniale, puisqu’il est 
impossible, tant qu’il reste encore des indigènes, que la domination soit entière, la guerre ne 
peut avoir de terme. La guerre est sans fin, la paix impossible. La colonisation, dès lors, est 
un processus indéfini.” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 135)13 Essential to my own exploration, 
decolonization is also an indefinite process in a common and complex effort of transformation 
involving all parties descending from the history of colonization.
14
 
L’Algérie Sera Française 
“1830, c’est aussi la conquête de l’Algérie, l’antidote que la France a trouvé pour 
vivifier ses passions et grandir ses intérêts. 1830, c’est le début du dernier empire colonial 
français” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 138).15 Alexis de Tocqueville was a political figure and 
philosopher in the first half of the 19
th
 century. He was in charge of the colonies (old and 
new), including Algeria for almost 10 years, from 1839 to 1847 (or 1849 if we include the 
time when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs). He was, on the French side, the central 
                                                          
13
 My translation: “Finally, within this colonial logic, as it is impossible, as long as a few indigènes remain, that 
the domination be total, the war [to colonize] does not have a term. War is endless, peace impossible. 
Colonization, therefore, is an infinite process.” 
14
 When speaking of descendants of colonialism, I refer to the descendants of the colonized as well as of the 
colonizers of the time. 
15
 My translation: “1830 is too the conquest of Algeria, the remedy France found to invigorate its passions and 
increase its interests. 1830 is the start of the last French colonial empire.” 
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political character and a strong advocate of the colonization of Algeria. He also is a 
paradigmatic figure of France’s relation of ambivalence with Algeria.  
For Tocqueville, in the national context of construction of the newly born Republic, 
patriotism was the inherent condition for the establishment of a free and powerful nation. This 
is what determined France’s political choices in Algeria in the 19th century. L’entreprise 
algérienne was a way to assert power and patriotic grandeur through sovereignty and 
citizenship within France (Le Cour Grandmaison 2001; Welch 2003). It was a way to build a 
sense of national identity from within, one that would enhance collective political liberalism – 
the idea of a grand civilizing nation.  
This national context echoed the international one. Algeria was envisaged as the 
playing ground for France in relation to its rivalry with the UK (Luste Boulbina 2008). At this 
time, the UK held an economic and political monopoly, and France’s position as a world 
power was on the decline.  Instability threatened the position of France on the international 
scene. Confronted by strong resistance led by Abd-el-Kader, it is precisely this position of 
grandeur that the French staked in Algeria. Indeed, Tocqueville was convinced that only 
through a vigorous politics of conquest through its colonies could France regain its position of 
Empire (Luste Boulbina 2008; Le Cour Grandmaison 2001). Luste Boulbina argues that the 
decline of France, according to Tocqueville, did not start with the defeat of Napoleon at 
Waterloo in 1815, but goes back to the traité de Paris. The latter, signed in 1763 with Great 
Britain, put an end to the French colonial Empire of the time, abandoning most territories to 
the British. For Tocqueville the politician, in this international and national context of 
uncertainty, the colonization of Algeria was an inevitable opportunity to re-assert the French 
grandeur and its powerful position in the world. 
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The conquest of Algeria took place in the founding era of the Republican regime, 
along with the establishment of its institutions and its enracinement in political and social life. 
The idea of the Republic – la République française et ses valeurs – clarifies France’s 
discourse and practice of colonialism in Algeria. Algeria was sacrificed for the sake of the 
Republic, for its identity and grandeur, both within and outside of France.  
Tocqueville, a strong advocate of human rights and recognized theorist of western 
democracy, recommended that colonialists use techniques of extreme violence against the 
people in Algeria (Welch 2003; Kohn 2008). In his view, the end justified the means.  
Democracy and political freedom in France justified depriving other men the very rights he 
called for in France. In his view, asserting domination over other peoples was inevitable.  
Telle est la différence entre une conquête et une colonisation. La conquête concerne le 
gouvernement des hommes, la colonisation l’administration des choses. La colonie, du 
reste, est peut-être tout territoire dans lequel l’ensemble des affaires relève de 
l’administration des choses. Ce n’est plus, dès lors la sensibilité du penseur qui 
s’exprime mais ce qui est censé être sa « raison ». En effet, si coloniser c’est 
déposséder des hommes et s’approprier des choses, seule la violence peut y parvenir. 
C’est pourquoi Tocqueville estime qu’il faut pour ainsi dire tailler dans le vif, une 
bonne fois pour toutes, et s’emparer, définitivement, des terres convoitées. (Luste 
Boulbina 2008, 110)
16
 
For Tocqueville, resorting to extreme violence was based on the “rationality” of the political 
enterprise. In order to achieve France’s (“rational”) political interests, there was no other 
choice but to colonize: Tocqueville “n’est pas inhumain s’il est réaliste” (Luste Boulbina 
2008, 126).
17
 Domination was only an incomplete enterprise for the grandeur of France: the 
Republic had to colonize (Luste Boulbina 2008). In addition, France had to succeed, at any 
cost (Welch 2003). 
                                                          
16
 My translation to English: “Therein lies the difference between conquering and colonizing. Conquering has to 
do with the governance of men, colonizing with the administration of things. The colony, consequently, may be 
any territory in which everything falls under the administration of things. It is, thus, no longer the thinker’s 
sensitivity that is expressed, but his supposed “reason”. Indeed, if to colonize is to dispossess men and 
appropriate things, nothing but violence can achieve it. This is why Tocqueville claims that it is necessary to 
somehow get straight to the point, once and for all, and seize the lands longed for.” 
17
 My translation to English: “is not inhuman if he is realistic.” 
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The colonization of Algeria has deployed an exceptionally high level of direct 
violence. Faced with the unexpectedly strong resistance led by Abd-el-Kader, the French 
colonial troops – led, among others, by bloodthirsty General Bugeaud, famous for his 
contribution to the “development of a new science: la guerre d’Afrique” – engaged in a 17-
year savage war of “terror and lawlessness,” which saw death, destruction, and extermination 
without limits (Welch 2003). “Transgressing settled notions of right, breaking promises, and 
engaging in murderous terror were the hallmarks of a Tocquevillean netherworld in which the 
French surrendered to the worst tendencies inherent in their history and social condition” 
(Welch 2003, 255). In 1848, Algeria became l’Algérie française, and thousands of French 
settlers were sent to colonize the land and spread (the “superiority” of) French civilization. 
Colonization had to be absolute, and the indigènes of Algeria became a minority in their own 
land. 
L’Algérie Française, ou le Rêve Assimilationniste 
To understand the colonization of Algeria, I need to examine and dig into the 
epistemology of the power that sustained it. I must combine philosophy and history in order to 
understand how the French Republic constructed itself in relation to – through a colonialist-
racist relation to – its Algerian “subjects.” I need to understand what it meant that Algeria 
became l’Algérie française, les départements français d’Algérie, instead of a colony or a 
protectorate like other colonized populations. 
Algeria constituted the “rêve assimilationiste” français (Martín-Muñoz 1994). It was 
the exception of the French colonial Empire. It was part of France, yet constantly (in) a “state 
of exception” within the French Republic. 
L’Algérie est ici l’exception qui confirme la règle. Elle est une colonie particulière 
dans la mesure où, précisément, elle n’est pas intégrée de facto dans les colonies. 
C’est – contradiction dans les termes – une colonie qui fait la France. Il n’y a rien de 
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plus criant que la négation du fait colonial en Algérie, la colonie la plus « assimilée », 
ce qui est affirmé constamment ; mais dans un régime d’exception qui, quant à lui, est 
constamment nié. (Luste Boulbina 2008, 150)
18
 
If Algeria is not a colony, France is consequently not a colonial state. This differentiation, or 
“state of exception,” carries an extreme level of psychological violence. Indeed, it is a total 
negation of the existence and rights of the local population. Furthermore, it means that the 
latter has no legitimacy whatsoever in claiming for national liberation. In fact, French elite 
envisaged the struggle for national liberation in Algeria as a social issue, not as a colonial 
issue (Luste Boulbina 2008). French elite even compared it to the quest for autonomy of the 
Alsace-Lorraine region (ibid.). This “négation du fait colonial” also means that they have no 
right to have a voice in deciding upon their future as a potential nation, because Algeria is not 
a colony.  
The extreme violence of French colonial politics is that national assimilation was, 
simultaneously, not political. Algeria was maintained as a “state of exception” whereby les 
indigènes had a particular status that fell outside the common law (Luste Boulbina 2008 
among others).
19
 As Mbembe demonstrates, in the colony, the state of exception needs no 
justification but itself since, by definition, the colony exists outside of the common law; law 
(droit) is conditioned to act (fait), and destruction itself makes the very existence of the 
colonial act: “[S]on droit suprême était simultanément le suprême déni de droit.” (Mbembe 
2000, 43)
20
  
However, Algeria was an exception within the exception. The difference lies in the 
fact that the politics of assimilation negated Algeria altogether. In Algeria, the politics of 
assimilation negated the state of exception characteristic of all French colonies. In other 
                                                          
18
 My translation: “Algeria is here the exception that proves the rule. It is a unique colony insofar as it is, 
precisely, not integrated de facto in the colonies. It is – contradiction of terms – a colony that makes France. 
There is nothing more blatant than the negation of the colonial fact in Algeria, the most “assimilated” of all 
colonies, which is constantly put forth, yet in a state of exception that is constantly negated.” 
19
 The state of exception was cancelled in 1958 and re-established 1962. 
20
 My translation: “Its supreme law was simultaneously the supreme negation of law”. 
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words, the French Republic legally saw Algeria as part of the national territory, that’s to say 
territory on which common law must apply. De facto, however, France ruled Algeria 
differently. This shows France’s colonial relation with Algeria. As I explore further below, the 
negation of the exception reinforced the exception. Assimilation was the negation of the 
existence of colonization, and by extension, of its objects (Luste Boulbina 2008). 
In a suggestive article titled, “Une République française « postcoloniale,” Todd 
Shepard recounts the evolution of the institutions of the French Republic in relation to 
Algeria. He highlights the present “traces institutionnelles et juridiques” of French 
colonialism, documenting that since 1848 and the creation of l’Algérie française, French 
Algerians have become “sujets de la République” (Shepard 2006, 49). Nationality and 
citizenship were two different things in colonial France. Until post-WWII, part of the nation 
was governed by what was called “le droit local,” a differentiated set of laws, because of its 
“statut civil local.” The attribution of the differentiated status was based on lineage (ibid), 
and lineage was based on first names: whether it “sounded” “Arabic or Berber” or rather 
“Christian or Jewish” determined whether they were “Muslims native of Algeria” or “French-
born natives of Algeria” (Simon 2006, 10). The nationals with a statut civil local were 
officially the “Musulmans d’Algérie” or “Français musulmans” or “Français musulmans 
d’Algérie,” also called “indigènes musulmans.” To become “citizens” (without citizenship), 
they had to give up on their statut civil local (their local judicial system), either Islamic or 
Jewish-based. In 1947, they were granted the status of French citizens without citizenship – 
without the political rights of citizenship (Shepard 2006). 
Despite its clear discriminatory practice, the French administration officially did not 
recognize the institutional racism at play in its colonial politics in Algeria. On one hand, 
colonial discourse of the time shows that French elite justified colonialism in Algeria (and in 
other places) and believed the French accurately represented a hierarchy of “races”. On the 
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other hand, however, in the official discourse the differentiation subject vs. citizen in Algeria 
was not based on any racial or religious feature of identity (Shepard 2006). By negating the 
intersection of racial and legal difference, the French Republic located its colonized subjects 
in a place of essential, un-transcend-able inequality in the name of equality. By negating a 
racial difference that it had produced, the French Republic reinforced the intrinsically 
contradictory, dehumanizing politics of assimilation.  
La “Race,” Ou Cet “Autre” Que L’On Ne Veut Pas Voir 
In the French tradition, “race” is taboo. As we have seen earlier, the Lumières-
grounded Republic establishes an ideal equality package that views (real) diversity as a threat. 
This discourse is fundamental for understanding the political practices and debates of the 
present-day. Indeed, as surprising as it seems, the French Republic still does not recognize the 
racist differentiation it has built throughout history. It still clings on to a politics of 
assimilation that is both intrinsically racist and an essential illusion. The French socio-
demographer and INED
21
 researcher on politico-ethnic discriminations in France, Patrick 
Simon, in an article titled “The Choice of Ignorance. The Debate on Ethnic and Racial 
Statistics in France,” depicts the strong French historical hostility towards recognizing “race” 
and “racial identity” in its national statistics, and consequently, in its policies.22 For example, 
there is an incredibly strong reaction of the French intelligentsia to the idea of potential 
affirmative action policies (Simon 2008; Mbembe 2005). In the French consciousness, the 
concept of “race” is not relevant; what’s more, it is an aberration, and equality can only be 
pursued through colorblind or ethnicity-blind policies. To give a few examples, in the French 
context, the terms “culture” and “identité culturelle” are preferred to racial identity. The 
French in general do not speak of Arab French or black French but rather of the “Français 
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 Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques (National Demographic Institute) 
22
 I use the phrase “politico-ethnic discriminations” to highlight that “ethnicity,” like “race.” is politically 
constructed and does not actually “exist.”  
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issus de l’immigration” to speak about (it is never to speak with) the French descendants of 
the colonized.  Finally, for a long time and still now sometimes, French people have 
commonly used the English term “black” instead of the French term “noir” to refer to black 
people. The latter example is paradigmatic of France’s ambivalence towards race. That is, 
most people in France do tag differences – identity is discussed in a way that makes these 
differences seem natural. However, the “tags” are dominantly associated with “culture”. 
According to Simon (2008), national surveys have long made a census of the sole nationality 
or place of birth around these three categories: “French”, “foreigners,” and “French by 
acquisition.” It is only in 1999 that the French government introduced the parents’ place of 
birth in national surveys (Simon 2008). This was a possible first step toward recognition of 
racial diversity brought about by immigration, and one may argue, the relation of certain 
immigration with the colonial past.  
However, in postcolonial multicultural France, there is a need to point to and define 
racism because, inasmuch as “race” is constructed, racism is a politico-social reality of the 
everyday. Thus, if discourse does not officially provide the space to talk about “race” in terms 
of the ways in which power plays out in society, it silences minority groups. Furthermore, it 
deprives them from raising collective issues arising from their subjective experiences as 
ethno-socio-historical groups. This is why the equality through invisibility ideology is highly 
problematic – not for race as a paradigm, but instead, to make racism visible. In the politics of 
assimilation, life opportunities are conditioned in a differentiated manner by ethnicity or 
“race,” and such oppression is reinforced by the non-recognition of ethnicity or “race” as 
conditioning factors (of oppression). It is what Simon names the “choice of ignorance” 
(Simon 2008). It allows the French state to “erase the heritage of immigration and reinforce 
assimilation into the nation” (Simon 2008, 8). In other words, on behalf of equality, the 
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French state inevitably makes invisible, institutionalizes, and enhances racial inequality and 
“historically crystallized relationships of power” (Simon 2008, 18).  
Interestingly enough, this remaining hostility towards recognizing “race” (racism) 
increasingly collides with the growing matter that it represents in the French context today. 
More specifically, a growing reference to and stigmatization on the basis of “race” 
characterizes recent public discourse. This may be, to some extent, evidence that there is a 
growing need to recognize racial diversity in France today. As Simon argues, “[t]he gap 
between the statistical categories and the terms used in everyday discourse is huge” (Simon 
2008, 12). 
Achille Mbembe writes: 
Il se trouve que dans ce vieux pays, la France, une imprenable tradition héritée de la 
révolution de 1789 et de la Terreur et opérant par nationalisation de l’idée 
d’universalisme, n’a cessé de nier le fait brutal de la race, sous le prétexte que la 
revendication du droit à la différence – peu importe laquelle – contredit le dogme 
républicain d’égalité universelle. Que la poursuite aveugle d’un idéal aussi noble 
dans des contextes du multiculturalisme objectif, de pluralisme racial et religieux, et 
d’une histoire coloniale toute récente, produise, en fin de compte, exactement le 
contraire de ce que cet idéal stipule : voilà qui tarde à faire l’objet d’une prise de 
conscience conséquente. (Mbembe 2005)
23
 
 
In this regard, it is relevant to note that, as surprising as it looks, most members of the French 
elite strongly resist the institutionalization of Post-colonial Studies in France.  
White Republic 
The French Republic is profoundly colonial in the way the elite has thought and 
constructed it. It has built national identity on a self-centered, paternalistic relation with its 
colonized Other. L’Algérie française, the colonial experience that the French government 
                                                          
23
 My translation: “In this old country called France, there is an untouchable tradition, inherited from the 1789 
Revolution and the Terror and operating through the nationalization of the idea of universalism, which never 
ceased to negate the brutal fact of race on the account that claiming one’s right to difference – whatever that may 
be – contradicts the republican dogma of universal equality. Pursuing blindly such a noble ideal in the present 
contexts of objective multiculturalism, racial and religious pluralism, and a just-ended colonial history, produces, 
after all, exactly the opposite of what such an ideal proclaims. This has not yet become the object of real 
consciousness.” 
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carried out to the extent of negating the existence of Algerians as a people, has played a 
foundational role in this. Additionally, the Republic was created with Algeria. It was founded 
on the differentiation of the figure of the Other, or subject, from that of the Republic. France 
was built with Algeria because Algeria was (thought of as) part of France while not really part 
of it. This differentiation is at the core of French political identity. Nationalist-universalist 
discourse built national identity on a racial inequality engraved in the Republic. The French 
grandeur, or identity, is because the differentiation from the colonized other, the subject of the 
metropolis – part of the territory but politically outside the space of the Republic – constructs 
the frontiers of what is French (grandeur). In my understanding, this colonialist/patriotic 
arrogance is at the core of today’s political “debates” (discourse) involving French cultural 
and racial diversity, and particularly targeting the French of Algerian descent. France was 
coconstituted through its relation with Algeria. The whole population in France, even though 
the whole population differently, descends from “la France-Algérie”, the ambiguous relations 
between France and Algeria and the relational differentiation within the Republic. It strongly 
influences today’s politics.  
It appears very clear that à travers l’enterprise française en Algérie, the French 
Republic was constructed on the internalized differentiation of a white center and a racialized 
other. Yet, Todd Shepard (2006) claims that even les institutions de la Vème République, in 
other words the institutions of the postcolonial Republic, were constructed with Algeria.  
Indeed, in 1958, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic officially granted national 
citizenship to all Musulmans d’Algérie. The Accords d’Evian, signed in March of 1962, 
ensured that such a status would remain after the declaration of independence of Algeria. Yet, 
when confronted with the exodus to the metropolis of thousands of Musulmans d’Algérie in 
April-May 1962, most of who had fought to defend l’Algérie française and were trying to 
seek protection in the metropolis, France treated them as foreigners, as a wave of mere 
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immigrants. The status of “rapatriés” (that granted them French citizenship) stated by the 
Accords d’Evian dropped. They were from then on called les Musulmans or les harkis and 
became refugees. Furthermore, French government distinguished between those who deserved 
the status of rapatriés, that is to say deserved to keep citizenship, and those who did not. 
French government based such distinction on perceived affiliation to Islam, determined as it 
was during the colonial era by what the first name “sounded like.” On July, 25, 1962 
President de Gaulle stated clearly: “le terme rapatrié ne s’applique évidemment pas aux 
musulmans. Dans leur cas, il ne saura s’agir que de réfugiés” (cited in Shepard 2006, 52).24 
In doing so, French government naturalized a separation within the nation. It institutionalized 
postcolonial racism towards (perceived) French Muslims. Thus, par association 
(inconsciente) d’imaginaires (coloniaux), it also constructed postcolonial racism in France 
towards people of Algerian descent. 
 
la [Vème] République institutionnalisait l’idée que les « Français musulmans » 
d’Algérie étaient différents des autres Français. […] La délimitation de nouvelles 
frontières territoriales, suite à l’abandon des départements algériens, s’est donc 
accompagnée d’une redéfinition majeure des limites de la nation française, 
consacrée par la refonte des institutions républicaines sous l’impulsion du général 
de Gaulle. (Shepard 2006, 52-53)
25
 
 
Furthermore, although 9.5% of the Parliament, including its vice-president, was “of color” at 
the time, de Gaulle deliberately evicted all of them from political life and transformed the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic in such a way that there would no longer be any (Shepard 
2006). For that matter, the presidential election became an election by direct suffrage for two 
reasons: on one hand, it could not have taken place earlier than 1962, since the Constitution of 
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 My translation: “the term repatriate obviously does not apply to the Muslims. In their case, they can be nothing 
but refugees.” 
25
 My translation: “the Fifth Republic was institutionalizing the idea that the ‘French Muslims’ of Algeria were 
different from the other French. […] The delimitation of new territorial borders, following the surrender of the 
Algerian départements, came along with a major redefinition of the frontiers of the French nation, sanctioned by 
the re-foundation of the Republican institutions under the impulse of General de Gaulle.” 
45 
 
this new Republic granted citizenship to all “musulmans d’Algérie;” on the other hand, by 
direct suffrage there was no risk that a “musulman” would be elected (Shepard 2006). 
French power has built its Republic on this historical/colonial differentiation – on the 
basis of race, on what/who is French, and on what/who is not in its very national territory. La 
République est fondée sur un déni d’égalité.26 A racism of state was established, perpetuated 
and remade in the postcolonial era. Finally, Shepard contends:  
Par ailleurs, les institutions républicaines, mises en place pour gouverner la France et 
l’Algérie en tant qu’entités politiques, ont été redéfinies en occultant une réalité 
essentielle et aveuglante, en l’occurrence que la République française s’était bel et 
bien construite avec l’Algérie et que des structures et dispositifs, initialement mis en 
place aux marges de la République (c’est-à-dire dans les départements algériens), 
avaient été importés en « métropole » et notamment une certaine définition de la 
nation, de ses frontières, des populations ayant accès à la citoyenneté et de celles qui 
en sont exclues. (Shepard 2006, 49)
27
 
 
 
Algeria became a symbol of anti-Imperialist struggle. As opposed to most former 
African colonies of France, Algeria was an exception of la Françafrique, France’s 
neocolonial politics in Africa. This, along with other factors such as Algeria’s strong pro-
Palestinian position and the “importation” of the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s on to the 
French metropolis, contributed to the enracinement (establishment) of postcolonial racism 
towards the French-Algerians in France. Yet, France could and can no longer escape from the 
deep-rootedness of more than a hundred years of relations and the consequences it implies – 
the mixing of populations, cultures, practices and the responsibility that goes with such 
history. 
La Fracture Coloniale 
                                                          
26
 The Republic was founded on a negated equality. 
27
 My translation: “Likewise, the institutions of the Republic, established to govern France and Algeria as 
political entities, were redefined in a way that hid a necessary and blinding reality – that the French Republic had 
undoubtedly been constructed with Algeria and that some structures and mechanisms, initially implemented in 
the margins of the Republic (i.e. the Algerian departments), had been imported to the metropolis, more 
specifically a particular definition of the nation, of its frontiers, of the populations who have access to citizenship 
and those who are excluded from it.” 
46 
 
As Mbembe points out in his foreword to De la Postcolonie, the remaining reticence 
over the recognition of “race” and multiraciality in France denotes a refusal to deal with the 
colonial past through a constant and pathological negation of its history (Mbembe 2005). 
Indeed, many authors of the French colonial/postcolonial context, in history, political science, 
and sociology, such as Patrick Simon, Françoise Vergès, Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, 
and many others, have written on the intimate relation between colonialism and the Republic. 
In particular, they highlight the persistence/re-creation of the colonial and racist imaginary in 
contemporary French politics. One of the ways in which this imaginary persists is in the 
negation of the colonial (national) history through the systematic subalternization of a certain 
part of its population, les enfants d’immigrés. This “fracture coloniale” is a major 
impediment to the peaceful construction of post-colonial, multiracial France today.
28
  
The year 2005 is a turning point in the discourses involving colonial history, 
“immigration,”29 and simultaneously the social realities of the banlieues populaires. The 
intensity of those discourses had already reached a peak a year earlier in the context of the 
laws on laïcité that revolved around the place of the Islamic veil in schools. In these 
discourses, the question of memory seems to be a crystallizing point of debate. Indeed, the 
2005 law on the “positive role” of colonization “particularly in North Africa” (cited in Luste 
Boulbina 2008, 91) to be taught in schools was the trigger of what is commonly referred to in 
the discourse as “war on memories.” In the same year, the decolonial movement “Indigènes 
de la République” was created. It was the first time the enfants d’immigrés, descendants from 
the colonies, explicitly united in a collective voice to demand recognition for the colonial and 
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 La fracture coloniale is the title of a major book, edited by Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire in 2005, that 
combines most French authors on the perpetuation of colonialism in postcolonial France. 
29
 The term immigration, often used as the signifier of a fact, is, as Sayad shows, the signifier of a concept, 
which, in fact, always and only reflects the perspective of the receiving society and hides the existences of the 
subjects of the complex dynamics of migration. In the French context, “immigration” bears a rather negative 
connotation and is often part of a blaming and hateful discourse. The use of inverted commas is an expression of 
contestation. 
47 
 
postcolonial past and present, condemn the colonial Republic, and call for a decolonizing 
struggle (Les Indigènes de la République 2005). Finally, in the “banlieue populaire” of 
Clichy-sous-bois on October 27, 2005, two young boys trying to escape from a police control 
died. This traumatic event triggered three full weeks of revolts in the banlieues populaires, 
resulting in a massive ethno-geographic stigmatization of the “jeunes de banlieues” and in the 
government calling out for the “state of exception.” These events led to an ever-growing 
discourse of hate and domination towards the so-called “français issus de l’immigration.” 
Simultaneously, there has been a growing political pressure, on the part of the 
descendants of slavery and colonialism in France, for the recognition of plural memorial 
voices. This decolonial move has given the opportunity to the “sacred guardians of French 
universality” to purposefully reduce all debates down to a question of memory, of 
“repentance” on behalf of history. As discussed in this section, it is not just a question of 
memory. Memory does matter for the sake of recognition, in the past and in the present, and it 
matters in the light of the politics of the present day. The contemporary “traces” of French 
colonialism are not only symbolic, “imaginaires ou fantasmées,” but also material, real, and 
strongly perceived (Vergès 2006, 9). Claiming that it is a mere question of memory is a 
(colonial) strategy that enforces power and systematically wipes off plural voices and the 
collective needs for present recognition. Rather, if indeed history and memory are a recurrent 
aspect of debate in multicultural France, it is because they have symbolically and materially 
constructed today’s social realities. The hegemonic discourse, through the rhetoric of 
“communautarisme” (ethnic separatism), “concurrence des mémoires” (memorial 
competition), or “procès de l’histoire coloniale” (historical trial), tends to blame a 
“conspiracy” against the “universal” history of the Republic, or at best, the “ethnicization” of 
the latter. Such a white-centered look is the sign of a deep colonial racism engrained in 
French society and of the long decolonization process that has yet to be carried out.  
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La Fracture Coloniale 
The point of malaise, or fracture, seems to be located in immigration as the historical 
continuity of colonization and the present face of race in the Republic. Many authors in the 
French/francophone context have demonstrated the exceptionality, in many aspects, of this 
historically contextualized immigration. The most prominent of them is the French-Algerian 
sociologist, Abdelmalek Sayad, who extensively and critically studied immigration in the 
context of France. Sayad decolonizes the way people commonly think immigration. It is 
always, he contends, a state ethnocentric perspective. Immigration, portrayed in the dominant 
discourse as a fact, is a concept that only exists through the “problems” – constructed by the 
state – which it brings up in the eyes of the host society. To start with, he says, we need to 
critically question why immigration is thought as a problem as if it was naturally one (Sayad 
1991). In this regard, the expression “français issus de l’immigration,” widely used in the 
discourse to refer to the enfants d’immigrés, appears very problematic to me if I am meant to 
shift the colonial lens. Such naming categorizes certain people and represents them as a 
problem. It also hides socio-historical realities that make it possible to understand the mixing 
of populations that make up French society. It appears as a re-creation of the colonial practice 
through which white France objectifies its historical indigène Others. 
In the French public sphere, the political “debates” over “immigration” are dominated 
by an internalized racism of a specifically (post)colonial nature. The discourse associates 
“immigration,” as in the problems of immigration, to a certain type of immigrés. It refers to 
these people as “minorités visibles,”30 “français d’origine immigrée,” or “issus de 
l’immigration.” Such discourse points at the citizens who are French and descend from the 
ex-colonized in Africa and North Africa (Bouamama and Tévanian 2006). An imagery clearly 
inherited from the colonial era dominates national consciousness and veils/negates this very 
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 I want to point at the term “visible” as a way to refer to people in order to highlight the cultural violence that 
such use of the term carries. 
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connection. Further, in the imagined hierarchy of “integration,” French Muslims (or perceived 
as such) are more strongly associated with (“the problems of”) immigration. Bouamama and 
Tévanian write:  
En d’autres termes, il convient de distinguer le stigmate xénophobe, qui n’existe sous 
une forme exacerbée que pour les nouveaux arrivants, et le stigmate raciste, qui 
cristallise des représentations beaucoup plus profondément enracinées, et qui par 
conséquent ne perd pas – ou très peu – de sa force avec le renouvellement des 
générations et leur enracinement en France. (Bouamama and Tévanian 2006, 243-
244)
31
 
 
Bancel, Blanchard, and Lemaire led an investigation in 2003 in and around the city of 
Toulouse on colonial memory in order to evaluate the reality of the colonial fracture. Even 
though it is now ten years old, it does provide useful information for understanding the 
colonial malaise perceivable in French society. Considering the intensification of “debates” in 
the last decade, I do expect, however, that opinions expressed in 2003 have generally shifted 
towards more extreme stances today. The outcomes of this investigation confirm Bouamama 
and Tévanian’s argument. It appears, on the one hand, that the younger the generation, the 
stronger the feeling of an “ethnicisation” of society, particularly in the banlieues populaires 
(Bancel et al. 2005). On the other hand, it appears that the fracture is stronger towards the 
French of colonized descent, whose integration is imagined as “difficult” or even 
“impossible” (ibid.). In particular for those of a North African, specifically Algerian descent, 
French people seem to think integration to be “impossible” (ibid.).32 This is (supposedly) due 
to history, rather than ethnicity (ibid.). This differentiation of history and ethnicity is 
dangerously problematic, a distinction that the investigators themselves surprisingly did not 
critically raise. This differentiation, said to be solely based on history regardless of ethnic 
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 My translation: “In other words, it is important to distinguish the xenophobic stigma, which only manifests 
strongly towards the newly arrived, and the racist stigma, which crystallizes representations that are rooted way 
deeper and consequently do not – or barely do – lose strength from generation to generation along the process of 
their stabilization in France.” 
32
 The questions of debate commonly raised in the mass media about whether or not Islam is “compatible with 
the Republic” are significant in this regard. 
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background, appears to me as a clear negation of race as a factor of discrimination, in the 
same way that French government said to have founded the so-called category Français 
musulmans d’Algérie on a differentiation of law that had nothing to do with “race” (racism). 
This is a manifestation of the French universalistic construction of equality as invisibility that 
reinforces racism through negation or invizibilization of “race.” Thus it does not allow for a 
necessary discussion on racist actions – in all forms. In the French colonial and postcolonial 
context, history and ethnicity are two sides of the same coin.  
This particular immigration is not like any other because these particular immigrés are 
not like any other. There is, indeed, a strong and ambivalent connection between colonization 
and immigration for the intersection of the realities of le fait colonial (the colonial fact) – la 
colonie – and le fait postcolonial (the postcolonial fact) – la postcolonie. Indeed, as Sayad 
wrote in 1991, colonization inevitably conditioned immigration.  
Si on s’attaque plus précisément à l’immigration qu’on dit « non européenne », n’est-
ce pas, dans une certaine mesure, en raison du passé colonial qui a produit cette 
immigration et dont elle constitue une manière de survivance : colonisés comme n’ont 
pas été les autres sujets coloniaux, les immigrés algériens se comportent en France 
comme ne se comportent pas les autres immigrés. […] La colonisation que 
l’immigration prolonge et fait survivre d’une certaine manière, constitue comme le 
« laboratoire » dans lequel se donne à voir, à l’état expérimental (sur intervention), 
les conditions génératrices, les conditions de perpétuation et, peut-être, aussi les 
conditions d’extinction du phénomène migratoire. Si, « réguliers » ou « irréguliers », 
mais facilement « régularisables » tant qu’on en avait besoin, les émigrés avaient 
répondu en masse à l’« appel » qu’on leur faisait, c’était parce que l’état des rapports 
de force entre, d’une part, les pays, les sociétés d’émigration et leur économie et, 
d’autre part, les pays, les sociétés et l’économie qu’ils venaient servir, avaient déjà 
produit les conditions objectives de leur émigration. (Sayad 1991, 76-77)
33
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 My translation: “If most precisely an immigration called “extra-European” is targeted, isn’t it, to some extent, 
because of the colonial past that has produced such immigration and of which it constitutes an expression of 
survival? Colonized like no other colonial subjects were, Algerian immigrants behave in France like no other 
immigrants do. […] Colonization, that immigration extends and allows to survive to some extent, constitutes a 
sort of “laboratory” in which one can observe, at an experimental stage (by intervention), the driving conditions, 
the perpetuating conditions and, perhaps, also the extinguishing conditions of the dynamics of migration. If, 
“regular” or “irregular” but easily “regularized” as long as they were needed, emigrants massively responded 
when “called” in, it is because the condition of balance of power between, on one hand, the emigration countries, 
societies and their economy, and on the other hand, the countries, societies and the economy they were going to 
serve, had already produced the objective conditions of their emigration.” 
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Most importantly, dans les réalités d’aujourd’hui se retrouvent les réalités d’hier.34 Post-
colonial immigration has led to continuities in the (colonial) relations, representations, and 
power. Les enfants d’immigrés are the second-class citizens of a racist postcolonial Republic. 
En la matière, on sait à quoi s’en tenir. La colonisation nous a familiarisés déjà avec 
cette discrimination et, somme toute, s’il fallait prolonger le parallèle entre 
colonisation et immigration, statut de colonisé et statut d’immigré, tout laisse penser 
que l’immigré d’aujourd’hui est le colonisé d’hier. Il n’est qu’un colonisé nouvelle 
manière, un colonisé d’au-delà de la colonisation. (Sayad 2006, 29)35 
To bring the ambivalence further, the “immigré” is a postcolonial “indigène.” By definition, 
l’indigène cannot speak, as she cannot be heard (Luste Boulbina 2008). Kery James is a 
French Muslim black man who grew up partly in his native Guadeloupe Island
36
 and in the 
Paris suburb of Orly. He is a descendent of slaves and the colonized. To be heard, he raps a 
“Lettre à la République”:  
Lettre à la République/A tous ces racistes à la tolérance hypocrite/Qui ont bâti leur 
nation sur le sang/Maintenant s’érigent en donneurs de leçons/Pilleurs de richesses, 
tueurs d’africains/Colonisateurs, tortionnaires d’algériens/Ce passé colonial c’est le 
vôtre/C’est vous qui avez choisi de lier votre histoire à la nôtre/Maintenant vous devez 
assumer/L’odeur du sang vous poursuit même si vous vous parfumez/Nous les Arabes 
et les Noirs/On est pas là par hasard/Toute arrivée a son départ !/Vous avez souhaité 
l’immigration/Grâce à elle vous vous êtes gavés, jusqu’à l’indigestion/Je crois que la 
France n’a jamais fait la charité/Les immigrés c’n’est que la main d’œuvre bon 
marché/Gardez pour vous votre illusion républicaine/De la douce France bafouée par 
l’immigration africaine/Demandez aux tirailleurs sénégalais et aux harkis/Qui a 
profité d’qui ?/[…]/On ne s’intègre pas dans le rejet/On ne s’intègre pas dans les 
ghettos français, parqués/Entre immigrés, faut être sensés/Comment pointer du doigt 
le repli communautaire/Que vous avez initié depuis les bidonvilles de 
Nanterre/Pyromane ou pompier, votre mémoire est sélective/On n’est pas venu en 
paix, votre histoire est agressive/Ici, on est mieux que là-bas, on le sait/Parce que 
décoloniser pour vous c’est déstabiliser/Et plus j’observe l’histoire beh moins j’me 
sens redevable/Je sais c’que c’est d’être Noir depuis l’époque du cartable/Bien que je 
n’sois pas ingrat, j’n’ai pas envie de vous dire merci/Parce qu’au fond c’que j’ai, ici, 
je l’ai conquit/J’ai grandi à Orly dans les favelas de France/J’ai « fleury » dans les 
                                                          
34
 The realities of today meet the realities of yesterday. 
35
 My translation: “As far as it is concerned, we know where to stand. Colonization already got us used to this 
kind of discrimination and, all things considered, if we had to extend the parallel between colonization and 
immigration, status of colonized and status of immigrant, everything converges so as to think that the immigrant 
of today is the colonized of yesterday. He is nothing but a renewed type of colonized, a colonized from beyond 
colonization.” 
36
 Guadeloupe is the neighboring island of Martinique in the Caribbean. It has the status of French département 
(administrative division of French territory). 
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maquis j’suis en guerre depuis mon enfance/Narcotrafic, braquage, violence… 
Crimes ! (Kery James, “Lettre à la République”, 2012)37 
 
Colonial racism carries strongly felt “collective humiliation” (Bancel et.al 2005, 251). As one 
can sense in Kery James’ text, a denied memory reinforces such humiliation resulting from 
marginalization and lack of recognition. Thus, “[m]arginalisation sociale (vécue et/ou 
ressentie) et sentiment d’une marginalisation ou d’une négation de l’histoire personnelle et 
de la mémoire semblent aller de pair” (Bancel et al. 2005, 251-2).38 
The philosopher Albert Memmi provides an interesting portrait of the “pathological” 
relationship, to echo Fanon’s words, that connects the descendants of our colonial history – us 
– in contemporary multicultural France. 39 In taking on the point of view of the “metropolitan” 
French over the (North African) immigrant, he says: 
Pour l’ex-métropolitain, sauf chez quelques esprits d’avant-garde, il est le rappel 
vivant de la défunte entreprise coloniale ; de l’époque où le drapeau français flottait 
sur des terres immenses, où la France régnait sur des peuples nombreux et divers. 
Même s’il n’a pas été un adepte de ces aventures, la présence de l’immigré est le 
résidu d’un deuil collectif, d’une séparation faite dans la violence, où les siens ont 
perdu la partie. […] [L]a présence de l’immigré l’empêche d’oublier une histoire 
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 My translation: “Letter to the Republic/To all these racists with hypocritical tolerance/Who built their nation 
on blood/Now set themselves up as lesson givers/Looters of resources, killers of Africans/Colonizers, torturers 
of Algerians/This colonial past is yours/You were the ones who chose to tie your history up to ours/Now you 
need to take responsibility/The smell of blood haunts you even if you use perfume/We Arabs and Blacks/We are 
not randomly here/Whoever lands departs from somewhere!/You wanted immigration/You stuffed yourselves 
with it until you had indigestion/I think France never did give a handout/Immigrants are nothing but cheap labor 
force/Keep the Republican illusion for yourselves/Sweet France spoiled by African immigrants/Ask tirailleurs 
sénégalais (African corps of the colonial army) and harkis (Algerians pro-Algérie française)/Who took 
advantage of whom?/[…]/No one integrates through exclusion/No one integrates in the French ghettos, penned 
in/Among immigrants, just think/How can you point fingers at ethnic separatism/When you initiated it from 
Nanterre shantytowns/Pyromaniac or firefighter, you have a selective memory/We didn’t come in peace, your 
history is aggressive/Here, we are better off than there, we know it/Because for you to decolonize is to 
destabilize/And the more I observe history well the less I feel I owe anything/I know what it’s like to be Black 
since I go to school/Even though I’m not ungrateful I don’t want to thank you/Because after all what I’ve got 
here, I earned it/I grew up in Orly in the French favelas/I “flowered” (Fleury-Mérogis is a famous prison located 
in Paris suburbs) in the undergrounds/I’ve been at war since I was a child/Drug trafficking, holdup, violence… 
Murders!” 
38
 My translation: “(experienced and/or felt) social marginalization and the feeling of marginalization or negation 
of personal history and memory seem to go hand in hand.” 
39
 By “descendants of the colonial history” in France I refer to the whole French society today, even though we 
all are descendants of the French colonial/postcolonial history differently – occupying very distinct positions of 
power. Indeed, as Boulbina (2008) argues, as much as colonization is a bilateral and multidimensional process, 
decolonization is too, and colonial history is national history. In my attempt to de-center the French Republic and 
decolonize the minds, it is necessary to consciously think decolonization in an inclusive way locating the whole 
society as descending from, as the object and subject of our present history.  
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glorieuse pour certains, scandaleuse pour d’autres. Le Maghrébin n’est pas un 
immigré russe ou roumain, un étranger venu là par hasard, il est le bâtard de l’affaire 
coloniale, un reproche vivant ou une déception permanente. (Memmi 2004, 97)
40
 
I partly agree with Memmi. As many rap singers express in their texts, within the national 
narcissist consciousness, the French of Algerian descent embodies a sort of ‘historical 
complex.’ She is the living witness (le témoin vivant) of the colonial enterprise, of its wounds, 
shames, and nostalgia (Béru, 2011). 
However, as Sayad would argue, this is to envisage l’immigré through the gaze of the 
society of immigration. In the light of Sayad (2006), and Bouamama and Tévanian (2006), 
postcolonial racism goes beyond a mere bitterness of the past made of guilt, nostalgia, and 
resentment. It is also the result of the continuities of a “natural,” unquestioned inferiority 
inherent to the colonial/postcolonial relation – a relation that is at the core and roots of the 
construction of the Republic and its national identity. Consequently, in a context of a growing 
“visibility” in the public space, the immigrant “noir” (black) or “Arabe” (of Maghreb origin) 
embodies the failure of the model of integration based on a mythical Republican equality. She 
seriously questions and unsettles the Republic itself and its foundations. 
At this point, one can see how the telling of history(ies) is a key element for 
decolonizing French society. French society can only overcome the challenges of creating a 
better here and now if we, as a national whole, know ourselves, our strengths and failures, and 
recognize them. How could French society equally embrace its components without taking 
into account its differentiated conditioning by history? Today, the banlieues populaires 
function as the material “black hole” of French history and present, as spaces of exception 
                                                          
40
 My translation: “For the ex-metropolitan, except in a few minds of avant-garde, he is the living reminder of 
the lost colonial enterprise; of the time when the French flag was flying over immense lands, when France reined 
over many and diverse peoples. Even if he has not been an avid follower of these adventures, the presence of the 
immigrant is the remnants of a collective mourning, of a separation that ended in violence, in which his fellows 
lost the game. […] [T]he presence of the immigrant prevents him from forgetting a history that is glorious for 
some, outrageous for others. The Maghreb Arab is not a Russian or Rumanian immigrant, a stranger that came in 
randomly. He is the illegitimate child of the colonial business, a living reproach or an ever-lasting 
disappointment.” 
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within the (colonial) Republic.
41
 How can French society understand, and possibly transform, 
the social, cultural, geographical, racially complex place held by the banlieues without a post-
colonial approach to history? Likewise, how can the descendants of the indigènes understand, 
and possibly transform, the place they hold in the French historical landscape? Stories – 
memories – transcend time; they are the bridge between intersecting colonization and 
immigration, immigration and colonization. Didier Lapeyronnie, in his account of a long-term 
sociology fieldwork in the banlieues, argues: 
Bien au-delà des discours, la dimension coloniale inscrite dans la République est 
aujourd’hui au cœur de l’expérience des habitants des quartiers issus de 
l’immigration. Et c’est à partir de cette expérience que l’urgence de la 
réincorporation des mémoires et de l’histoire se fait sentir : elle est la seule façon de 
lui donner sens et de permettre à ceux que l’universalisme républicain a niés, et 
continue de nier, d’accéder à la reconnaissance et de pouvoir enfin construire leur 
intégration. (Lapeyronnie 2005, 11)
42
 
 
A social fracture emerges along the lines of the memorial fracture. This malaise is, latent and 
without borders. Like many political artists say, for the inhabitants of the banlieues 
populaires, it is often felt as a “war.” It is radically there, and it divides, undoubtedly. As any 
conflict, it is relational. Divisive malaise might sound like pleonasm, but it is not. Discourse 
unilaterally points to the “français issus de l’immigration” – particularly the inhabitants of the 
banlieues populaires – for performing a so-called “repli identitaire et communautaire.” As 
surprising as it seems, this (power) rhetoric is the sole and only one hearable in the public 
space. Yet, the “repli identitaire” is not one of the sole banlieues, but rather of the society as a 
whole. Is racism not “communautarism?” Is the absence – non-representation – of the 
banlieues in the spheres of power not “communautarism?” Is, this France who keeps blaming 
                                                          
41
 Most immigrants from the colonies came to France after the political independences as cheap labor force. 
They were placed in outside spaces, off cities – the banlieues – where, later, their descendants grew up.  
42
 My translation: “Well beyond discourses, the colonial dimension engraved in the Republic is today at the core 
of the experience of immigrants inhabiting the poor neighborhoods. And it is from this experience that the urgent 
need to reincorporate memories and history is felt: it is the only way to make sense of it and to allow those who 
have been, and are still, negated by Republican universalism, to achieve recognition and be able to build their 
integration at last.” 
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that France, an example of “integration?” Est-ce que la France pourrait arrêter de se 
regarder le nombril ? 
 
La Présence Absente 
Despite the central role a full recognition of colonial and postcolonial history would 
play in the necessary decolonization of French society, it has been greatly negated. Sandrine 
Lemaire, in “Histoire nationale et histoire coloniale: deux histoires parallèles”43 analyzes 
colonial memory based on school educational programs. She provides an exhaustive look into 
the mechanisms of negation – highly significant in perpetuating the colonial mindset in the 
national consciousness (Lemaire 2006). Benjamin Stora is a well-known historian of the 
Algerian Liberation War. Both thinkers, among others, highlight how colonial history is 
marginalized, located at the “periphery” of the “grand French national history” (Lemaire 
2006; Stora 2005). It is striking to observe how very little knowledge French people generally 
have of their colonial and immigration history (Bancel et al. 2005; Vergès 2006)
44
. It appears 
as “une histoire virtuelle,” a vague idea, general and unclear, in which state-centered 
traumatic events appear first and last (Bancel et al. 2005). It is a feeling of a lointaine (far-off) 
history that does not resonate within the national consciousness in the present (ibid.). It 
sustains the idea that colonialism is not a national matter, but rather one of the sole colonial 
subjects, taking place far from the national territory. Authors such as Luste Boulbina (2008; 
2011), Lemaire (2006), and Bancel (2005) have critically shown the “césure” (schism) that 
exists in the dominant imaginary between colonial history and national history. The 
investigation carried out in Toulouse demonstrates that “l’héritage [de la colonisation] est 
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 My translation: “National history and colonial history: two parallel histories” 
44
 It is necessary to mention that slavery is, without any doubt, part of this historical silence, which maintains the 
overseas territories of France in a state of second class territories, marginalized from the French national 
citizenship, as Vergès demonstrates in her article. 
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bien loin de participer à la construction d’une histoire commune” (Bancel et al. 2005, 250).45 
A clear division exists between what (who) is really part of France, its history and identity, 
and what (who) is not, which is highly problematic vis-à-vis the postcolonial dynamics of 
society. 
This configuration of colonial history appears as an “épistémè” in the sense that 
Foucault gives to it – one that constructs knowledge in a way that “certaines frontières” 
apparaissent “comme naturelles, certains territoires comme limitrophes, certaines regions 
comme éloignées” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 83).46 Nicolas Bancel analyzes the “historiographie 
du fait colonial et postcolonial” in the French academic world. He documents how, since 
1830, the incorporation of colonial history in the national narrative has faced huge resistance 
(Bancel 2005). Thus, the Algerian Liberation War only appeared in French university and 
research programs in the 1990s, about 40 years after it started (Stora 2005). Then as today, 
French Academia has not recognized colonial history as a legitimate object in itself (Bancel 
2005). 
Mais il est encore plus marquant de constater qu’aucun équivalent aux postcolonial 
studies anglo-saxonnes, appliquées à l’histoire des métropoles, n’existe en France. De 
fait, l’histoire coloniale en métropole reste marginale et l’histoire postcoloniale en 
métropole n’existe tout simplement pas. C’est une histoire qui n’a pas voix au 
chapitre, perçue comme lointaine – puisqu’elle s’applique d’abord aux ex-colonies –, 
en aucun cas une histoire qui pourrait s’intégrer, de plein droit et de pleine légitimité, 
à l’histoire nationale. C’est là le signe manifeste d’un blocage, ou, au mieux, d’une 
indifférence (Bancel 2005, 86).
47
 
 
The strong separation between national and colonial has to be looked at in the light of 
contemporary French politics. It is the clear manifestation of the (modern) idea(ology) that 
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 My translation: “the legacy [of colonization] is far from contributing to the construction of a common history” 
46
 My translation: “some borders” appear “as natural, some territories as borderline, some regions as distant.” 
47
 My translation: “But it is even more striking to note that no equivalent to the Anglo-Saxon Postcolonial 
Studies applied to the history of the metropolis exists in France. In fact, colonial history in the metropolis 
remains peripheral, and postcolonial history in the metropolis just does not exist. It is a history that has no say in 
the matter, perceived as far-off – since it first applies to the ex-colonies - and in no way, shape or form a history 
that could be integrated, in full right and legitimacy, into national history. It is a clear manifestation of a 
blockage or at best of indifference.” 
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some histories count more, that some citizens count more – a differentiation that recalls the 
racist (post-)colonial state of exception. It is a clear expression of the negation, on the part of 
the French state, to see certain components of the nation (as I will explain in chapter 3, this 
stems from the inability to see itself). 
Beyond all resistances to inclusion, the way history has been approached matters. Yet, 
it is also constitutive of a strong negation of colonial and post-colonial history. It prevents a 
full comprehension of the complexity of its deeply rooted dynamics. The crystallization of the 
colonial era in traumatically symbolic events, particularly related to Algeria (such as the 
Liberation War), denies access to a more complete understanding of it as the actual 
implementation of a colonial system, un fait total, une institution absolue, rooted in racism, 
inequality and a state of exception (Lemaire 2006; Bancel et al. 2005). It disconnects colonial 
history from the historical continuity of the nation and construction of the Republic (Lemaire 
2006). This chosen simplification of the realities of the colonial experience maintains a vague 
and unclear condemnation of the colonial system, like a section of history that French state 
and society should not be proud of but still are, the continuities of the colonial “mission 
civilisatrice” (Lemaire 2006; Bancel et al. 2005).  
Car là est l’essentiel : la guerre d’Algérie permet de reformuler un “consensus 
républicain” cristallisé autour de la condamnation des aspects les plus visibles et 
révoltants de la colonisation, mais pose simultanément un masque sur le système 
colonial en lui-même. […] [L]es élèves ne sont dès lors pas à même de comprendre 
pour quelles raisons les colonisés se sont révoltés, ni pourquoi la France s’est 
opposée violemment à leur « émancipation », comme disent encore pudiquement 
quelques rares manuels. Du coup, ce sont chez certains élèves le « fanatisme » ou l’« 
ingratitude » des colonisés qui en viennent à expliquer les désirs d’indépendance 
(Lemaire 2006, 65).
48
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 My translation: “Because there is the essential point: the War of Algeria is used as a tool to reformulate a 
“Republican consensus” through the condemnation of the most visible and outraging aspects of colonization, but 
simultaneously puts a mask on the colonial system itself. […] [A]s a result, students are not able to understand 
why the colonized revolted, nor why France violently opposed their “emancipation,”,as a few rare school 
manuals still modestly say. Thus, it becomes for some students fanaticism or ungratefulness that explain why the 
colonized happened to hope for independence…” 
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In Lemaire’s words, this “fragmented history” dislocates colonialism from its contemporary 
expressions, forms, and “traces.” In the minds of the majority, if colonial history is not the 
story of a total system, how can it still be such a point of debate today? Furthermore, if it is a 
story, far-off in space and time, why it is such a big deal to the national territory of France? In 
the contemporary debates involving les enfants d’immigrés, the hegemonic discourse blames 
a tendency to be “stuck in the past.” This memorial position is fully integrated in the 
“ideological apparatuses” of the state (Althusser 1971). Yet, as ideology of power, it appears 
“naturally” non ideological, as only and absolute truth.  
The question of colonial memory is a delicate one in the political debates, one that 
upsets, because the story it tells opens up the debate about our postcolonial history and 
present. It can be felt as “mise en danger de l’histoire contemporaine” for it will unveil “les 
aléas de la politique coloniale républicaine, les discours universels et les politiques concrètes 
de puissance et d’oppression coloniales et postcoloniales, les politiques migratoires, les 
discriminations et le racisme” (Bancel 2005, 90).49  
In fact, le récit de l’histoire coloniale is greatly disconnected from the dynamics of 
postcolonial history, as well as the presence of immigrés on the colonial territories. Thus, in 
school programs,  
What is surprising, however, is the extent to which immigration is left out of the 
nation’s symbolic makeup. The history textbooks are rife with symbolism about the 
United States as a country of immigration, but France’s own immigration history is 
nearly invisible (Soysal and Szakács 2010, 106-107). 
 
Immigration is presented as a global dynamic, as a geography subject or, at best, through a 
human rights approach; however, it is always distant from history and from the specific 
history of France (Soysal and Szakács 2010). Likewise, French diversity, even though it has 
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 My translation: “endangering contemporary history” for it will unveil “the unforeseen details of Republican 
colonial politics, universal discourses and concrete colonial and postcolonial force and oppression policies, 
migration policies, discriminations and racism.” 
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appeared in the textbooks as an actual subject, is by no means related to immigration and even 
less to the specific historical context of immigration of the French/francophone world (ibid.). 
The authors further note that “[t]he lack of an adequate historical and contemporary 
discussion of immigration in France, and its cultural and political implications, is remarkable” 
(Soysal and Szakács 2010, 107). The inclusion of these topics into the curriculum does not 
translate into their incorporation into the present debates on France’s specific diversity and its 
challenges. 
As mentioned earlier, the politics of negation perpetuate the colonial mindset and 
relations. The marginalization of history builds up to the social marginalization faced by the 
enfants d’immigrés. Indeed, the latter perceive colonial memory as the “metaphor” of the 
“oppression” that they face today – one that carries the feeling of being (seen as) “children of 
indigène” or “children of colonisation” – a “representation of self” that is inferiorizing and 
foreign (Bancel et al. 2005, 250). In this way, colonial memory has become “une ressource 
négative” pour les enfants d’immigrés, “qui se sentent rejetées par la société d’accueil” 
(ibid.).
50
  
The oppression is, like in the colony, ambivalent. Les enfants d’immigrés never escape 
from this very (self-)image. Yet, even though postcolonial racism is due to their exceptional 
affiliation with France, it is never stated explicitly. It is not said. In other words, it is not 
recognized. Thus, the exceptionality of their political existences, such as the realities of the 
banlieues, cannot be understood. This is French colonialism. It is precisely because there is no 
recognition of the colonial fact that the latter is felt and perpetuating itself. The politics of 
negation reinforce the object of negation, in this case, colonialism. 
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 My translation: “a negative recource” for the enfants d’immigrés “who feel rejected by the host society”. 
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In the historical narrative, it is remarkable and remarkably colonial that the indigènes 
are radically absent. The colony is absent. Colonial memory only exists through the eyes of 
the colonizing actor, the French state. The need to de-center is indisputable.   
Par ailleurs, les autochtones, les colonisés sont totalement absents du récit, ou alors 
réduits à des « masses » qui subissent cette histoire sans y prendre part. Les opinions 
publiques, la culture coloniale ou l’impact idéologique sur les élites ne sont pas ou 
très peu étudiés. Ce traitement n’accorde toujours pas de place à l’Autre, celui qui a 
partagé cette histoire, si ce n’est en tant que « victime » anonyme, « leader » 
charismatique tel Gandhi ou « ennemi ». (Lemaire 2006, 63)
51
 
 
Luste Boulbina places philosophy at the center of the discussion on history. She contends that 
decolonization of memory is still to come. Language is beautiful and a creative site of 
resistance (Luste Boulbina 2007), yet language, she says, is coconstitutive of the colonial 
domination (Luste Boulbina 2008). Through lexicon and syntax, the subject of (colonial) 
history is a subaltern – s/he is the third person, the absent actor of her/his reality (Luste 
Boulbina 2008). “Les contradictions se résument à une contradiction fondamentale : celle de 
deux mondes contradictoires logés en un seul, celle de deux mondes, l’un existant, l’autre 
inexistant, logés dans le même monde réel” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 97).52 In the colonial 
imaginary, “l’élision du sujet” plays a fundamental role in constructing the representation of 
the latter – one that is but is not, that exists but does not. About the 2005 law53, she asserts: 
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 My translation: “Besides, the natives, the colonized are absolutely absent from the narrative, or reduced to 
“masses” who suffer from the story without taking part. Public opinions, the colonial culture or the ideological 
impact on the elites are not or barely are subjects of study. This treatment still does not give a place to the 
“Other,” the one who shared the story, if not as anonymous “victim,” charismatic “leader” like Gandhi or 
“enemy”.” 
52
 My translation: “Contradictions come down to one fundamental contradiction: that two contradictory worlds 
inhabit one sole world, two worlds, one that exists, the other that does not, inhabiting the same real world.” 
53
 The controversial article of the law said: “Les programmes de recherches universitaires accordent à l’histoire 
de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord, la place qu’elle mérite. Les programmes 
scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique 
du Nord, et accordent à l’histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l’armée française issus de ces territoires 
la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit.” (Boulbina, 2008: 91) - My translation: “University research 
programmes grant to the history of French presence overseas, particularly in North Africa, the place it deserves. 
School programs recognize in particular the positive role of French presence overseas, particularly in North 
Africa, and grant to the history and the sacrifices of the combatants of the French army from these territories the 
eminent place they deserve.” 
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C’est bien pourquoi le langage dans lequel cet article est formulé est si révélateur : 
c’est tout simplement le langage de la colonie. Dans la colonie, on ne dit pas 
occupation (péjoratif), on dit présence (laudatif). On ne dit pas pays, on dit territoire. 
On parle de « territoires placés antérieurement sous souveraineté française ». On 
parle d’« outre-mer ». On dit « rôle positif », mais on ne dit pas pour qui ce rôle est 
positif. Ce qui a lieu, c’est l’élision du sujet. L’élision du sujet colonial, l’élision du 
colonisé, l’élision de l’indigène. S’il a fait partie « intégrante » de la République, c’est 
en tant qu’absent. Quand il s’agit d’évoquer le « rôle positif » de la colonisation, 
c’est, en fait, à propos des colonisateurs, non des colonisés. Là, il n’y a point de 
clivage qui tienne. (Luste Boulbina 2008, 91-92)
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She adds: “Dans ce langage, la colonie n’existe pas. Le mot ne fait pas partie du vocabulaire 
politique. Autrement dit, on veut bien parler mais sans rien dire” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 93).55 
The focus placed in and through language on colonization is a way not to think the colony 
(“penser la colonie”). In other words, colonization necessarily reproduces the perspective of 
the colonizer and objectifies the subject, whose reality is inexistent, subaltern.
56
 In the 
colonial imaginary, la colonie is “une réalité fantôme”, a ghost reality in which “[l]a 
troisième personne est fantôme. […] Elle est de fait un subalterne” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 
99). The historiography of the colonial fact is colonial. In the name of “natural” objectivity, 
the perception of the colonial state is normalized as the only existing eyes and its language as 
the only existing word. It is precisely because the language of the colony is “familiar” that the 
colony seems to be and the subalternization of the colonized seems normal (Luste 
Boulbina 2008). Yet, who can speak? History takes place without le colonisé and so does the 
story of (his)story.  
In the national consciousness, colonial memory is an obvious non-obviousness – 
visible but invisibly colonial. It is an absent presence, une présence absente – which does not 
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 My translation: “We speak of ‘territories formerly put under French sovereignty.’. We say ‘overseas.’ We say 
‘positive role,’ but we do not say for whom this role is positive. What happens is the subject elides. The colonial 
subject elides, the colonized elides, the indigène elides. If he has been ‘fully’ part of the Republic, it is, in fact, as 
absent. When it turns to the ‘positive role’ of colonization, it is, in fact, about the colonizers, not the colonized. 
In that case, there is no doubt whatsoever.” 
55
 My translation: “Within such language, the colony does not exist. The term does not belong to the political 
lexicon. In other words, it is okay to speak, but only if it says nothing.” 
56
 We can draw a parallel here with Sayad’s analysis of immigration: “immigration” hides the existences of the 
subjects, les immigrés. 
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allow for understanding the place the enfants d’immigrés hold in France today. The dominant 
lens needs to shift the epistemological foundation of the way it has looked at colonial history 
and its heritage, and by extension, the way it sees society today. The French state decided to 
colonize, and whether it wants it or not, this (his)story will continue to “haunt the Republic” 
(Vergès, 2006) because it cannot escape from movement and the deep mixing of lives 
colonization supposes.  
Algeria 
Inasmuch as it is scoffed at, the questions of memory around the relations between 
France and Algeria remain widely unspoken and need-to-be-spoken ones. These questions 
seem to hold in them an explosive mix of resentment and lack of understanding in relation to 
colonial/national history. L’Algérie française ended with a savage war that did not separate 
who was going to be part of it or not
57
. Algeria was the first and last colony of a declining 
Empire in a moving world and became an international symbol for national liberation and 
independent (non-aligned) politics. Algeria in France, and 132 years of a crossing destiny, had 
to be wiped off the national mind in past, present, and future. This political refoulement 
(pushing away) failed to take into account that these relations pushed well beyond any fixed 
notion of what was thought of as colonial versus national, French versus indigène, for versus 
against, inside versus outside. It failed to take into account that 132 years had built intimate, 
multiple ties interweaving the existence of all descendants of la France coloniale/l’Algérie 
française who need to understand who they are. It failed to take into account the millions of 
people whose destiny had been thrown, willingly or not, into a bloody war of terror, leaving 
whole sections of society traumatized, crying out for the recognition of their stories.
58
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 Such savage war is representative of the exceptional level of violence deployed all along the history of 
l’Algérie française. 
58
 It is only with the June 10, 1999 law that the so-called “évènements d’Algérie” (events of Algeria) were 
officially recognized as “guerre d’Algérie” (War of Algeria). 
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For long, France refused to see, to feel, and to hear. Today, amnesia remains under a 
different form. Algeria has become “the tree hiding the forest,” the obvious non-obviousness. 
L’Algérie est l’arbre qui dissimule la forêt des colonies françaises. De par sa position 
paradoxalement « privilégiée », elle constitue en réalité un « obstacle 
épistémologique ». Pour des raisons de proximité historique, de proximité 
géographique, de migration, de mixité, bref, pour des raisons de (fausse) familiarité, 
l’Algérie, « inquiétante étrangère », est un écueil pour la pensée. Le jour où cet 
obstacle sera parfaitement surmonté, la « science » et la politique seront (enfin) 
décolonisées. (Luste Boulbina 2008, 71)
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The Toulouse investigation shows that colonial history in general is “crystallized” in Algeria, 
particularly in its Liberation War, to the extent that there is a systematic confusion between 
colonial history, immigration history, and the so-called “Algerian War” (Bancel et al. 2005). 
Likewise, in the schools of the state, the war occupies more than the entire colonial history 
(Lemaire 2006). Concomitantly, the imaginary over the realities of immigration is crystallized 
in the North African, particularly Algerian, representation of immigré or “Arabe” (Bancel et 
al. 2005). Yet, as I have mentioned previously, there is an exceptional hostility towards the 
image of immigré Arabe – the feeling of incompatibility. Therefore, visible (history) seems to 
mean problematic (present). It is the ambivalence of the colonial and postcolonial relations 
with Algeria: the memory of Algeria is more “familiar” because through les immigrés 
d’Algérie it is more “visible” and present. Simultaneously, les immigrés d’Algérie are more 
“problematic” because the memory of the war is more traumatic. 
Moreover, like in the colonial era, this status of exception is ambivalent. It is precisely 
because memory is (or appears as) exceptionally obvious that the comprehension of its 
complexity in the past and the present is exceptionally not. The “contradictions,” in Luste 
Boulbina’s words, inherent to the colonial fact, are pushed to an extreme. To start with, the 
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 My translation: “Algeria is the tree that hides the forest of all French colonies. For its ambivalently 
“privileged” position, it, in fact, constitutes an “epistemological obstacle.” For reasons of historical closeness, 
geographical proximity, migration, ethnic mixing, in short, for reasons of (fake) familiarity, Algeria, “strange 
foreigner,” is a pitfall for the brain. The day this obstacle will be fully overcome, “science” and politics will 
(finally) be decolonized. 
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crystallization of the memory of colonial and postcolonial Algeria in the “War of Algeria” 
(“la guerre d’Algérie”) veils the colonial system of l’Algérie française. Beyond that, if we do 
focus on the Liberation War itself, the memory of the latter is crystallized in the trauma that it 
has represented. In other words, the “Algerian War” is known for the violence that has been 
displayed on both sides, triggering feelings of shame and resentment, but not on the actual 
war in its contextual complexities (Lemaire 2006). The memory of the war has widely been 
the object of negation – un “refoulement” (Stora 2005) whereby “on veut bien parler mais 
sans rien dire.”60 It is “la nostalgéria” (Stora 2005, 62) – only seen through state ethnocentric 
emotions, so as to hide the atrocity of the colonial system. In the meantime, it is still 
“assimilée à un conflit externe,” et à “une mémoire ‘périphérique’,” qui “ne concerne que 
les groupes porteurs de la mémoire de la guerre coloniale, lointaine : les immigrés, les 
harkis, ou les soldats” (Stora 2005, 63).61  
While the memory of the war is not located within the bigger framework of history, its 
violence cannot be understood outside the more general context of the colony. Beyond official 
data, it is important to openly define war in order to understand l’Algérie française. This 
allows for situating, for example, the 17 years of “terror and lawlessness” to “consolidate the 
French victory” against Abd-el-Kader (Welch 2003, 254), or the Setif massacre on May 8, 
1945, in which thousands of Algerians were killed (Harbi 2005). Commenting on the work of 
Raphaëlle Branche on the use of torture in French Algeria, Elbaz (2009) highlights that le vrai 
visage (the real face) of torture in the Algerian Liberation War was: “celui d’un instrument 
politique au service d’un discours de domination : « Jusque dans le corps des prisonniers, 
l’électricité peut être considérée comme une marque de civilisation française… ».”62 It is 
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important to see the massive use of torture and rape not as weapons of the sole Liberation War 
but as systematic tools for domination over the 132 years of colonial rule, as weapons of war.  
Likewise, Alexander and other authors (2002) explain how the debates over the human 
cost of the war illustrate the complexity of the actors of the conflict and question its memory. 
It makes visible the holes and ambiguities within the official memories. In other words, it 
makes visible the absence of ambiguous memories, of those who do not fit on either side of 
the political binary. The harkis are Algerians who fought alongside with the French army to 
maintain French Algeria. The pieds-noirs are the French residents of Algeria, most of who 
were in favor of French Algeria. Both of them in particular embody the complexity of the war 
in relation to identity and politics. Yet, they do not appear in the official récit de guerre 
(McCormack 2008). The negation of their memory(ies) is the negation of their identity(ies) in 
relation to France, where many of them migrated. Thus, how does French society relate today 
with their French children, with itself? 
The history of colonization, and particularly of l’Algérie française, goes well beyond 
dichotomies and boxes. The chosen simplification of the war essentializes political and racial 
identities in a way that negates the ambivalence of French-Algerian relations as well as the 
consequent cultural ambivalence of our national identity. Further, it justifies the exclusion of 
les enfants d’immigrés Algériens in France, as if they were “not really French” – sort of 
foreigners in their own country, displaced in their own place. The divisive malaise, les replis 
identitaires, emerges in and from the contradiction that we are one plural community yet the 
dominant gaze divides a “we” from an “Other.”  
These debates on the war itself and the knowledge that has been constructed around it 
bring us back to a central question, already raised but pending: who tells the story? 
History Is Politics. And “White” Is A Color. 
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This debate on colonial memory leads us to the heart of the reflection – decolonizing 
knowledge, decolonizing history and how it is told. Colonial memory shows an apparent 
contradiction: it is the object of an “excès,”63 yet it is still negated. In Luste Boulbina’s words, 
“on veut bien parler mais sans rien dire”64 – and we remain enchained within the narcissist, 
abstract universalism à la française. Indeed, the debates on colonial history are dominated by 
a “culture of history” (“culture historique”), whereby discourse takes (pretends to take) 
history outside its philosophical and political nature (Luste Boulbina 2008). This culture of 
history, by definition, does not have any historical depth. It promotes a récit de mémoire that 
pretends to be objective, just like French colonialism. It thus reproduces the inequality 
characteristic of the colonial relations. At the core of this argument lies our central question: 
who tells history/the story? Memory, for it tells a story of history, is the subjective account of 
lived experiences; it is, de facto, plural. It compels us to constantly make visible who is part 
of the story, and most importantly, who is not. This is a debate about representation. It is 
about re-placing politics at the centre of the debate on history. It is about re-thinking critically 
the very foundations of debate. It is about de-centering the universality and shifting the 
colonial lens on memory – because what is at work in the politics of negation is the politics of 
subalternatization. 
In an article for Le Monde, the greatly known theorist of memory, Pierre Nora (2011), 
claims that the debates created by the “minorités issues de l’immigration antillaise et 
africaine” on colonial history represent des “explosions mémorielles” (“memorial 
explosions”). Yet, why are these debates “explosions” only if they deal with colonial history, 
when the memory of the Shoah, omnipresent, is not a political problem? Nora claims that to 
demand an effort of memory of “colonial history” is “faire le procès de l’histoire nationale” 
(to put national history on trial) and criticizes the “politisation” of colonial history (and of 
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 “la colonie entre l’abus d’histoire et l’excès de mémoires” (Boulbina, 2008: 70) 
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 “it is ok to speak, but only if it says nothing.” 
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slavery). Nora’s intellectual position is representative of the French (power) majority. Luste 
Boulbina replies to him in médiapart (2011). She challenges his colonialist-racist arrogance. 
“Quels critères permettent, à coup sûr, de faire la part du colonial et du national? Le mineur 
et le majeur? La périphérie et le centre? Le réel et l'idéal? Le mauvais et le bon?”65 Is history 
only politisée when it displaces? History is, by definition, always political. And if it is not (or 
if it pretends not to be), it compels one to question her own position in the political landscape. 
While hiding behind a modernist science of history, Nora justifies, and hence reinforces, the 
colonial lens on history and his own privileged position in society. Unaware of his own 
location, Nora applies a form of colonial racism that creates a hierarchical distinction within 
the nation.  
The debate on memory is more an epistemological question than a historical one, un 
débat qui “soulève moins, en tout cas, des questions factuelles que des questions 
conceptuelles”66 (Luste Boulbina 2008, 77). History needs to be (re-)thought in a way that 
responds to the “soucis de justice” because “[l]’objectivité de l’historien, pour finir, c’est sa 
barbarie.” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 75-76).67 Claiming a (fake) apolitical objectivity draws the 
frontier between legitimate and illegitimate knowledge (Vergès 2006) – making invisible the 
very position of power that gives the privilege to discriminate. Like in the colony, the neutral 
universalist-positivist understanding of history says it is objective, but it does not say for 
whom. 
The “truth” (“vérité”) of (just) history lies in unveiling les réalités absentes, les 
“choses rendues “invisibles, immatérielles” (Vergès 2006, 72). It appeals to radically 
decolonize. De-center. Open the path towards a new place for relations to be. It is a critical, 
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continuous, and dynamic effort to let go of power and reach a new level of consciousness. 
“La vérité procède en effet, toujours, d’un changement de terrain. C’est pourquoi elle peut 
blesser. Elle peut blesser en faisant apparaître une autre image de soi en révélant un autre 
visage des choses” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 77).68 
The debate on memory is about representation. Hence history is political, and memory 
is even more so. L’absence participe du maintien de la colonialité. This is why, Luste 
Boulbina says, les “postures ne sont pas décolonisées” (Luste Boulbina 2008).  
Il existe aujourd’hui des citoyens français dont les ancêtres furent esclaves, engagés, 
colonisés. Ils portent en eux une histoire singulière qui interroge le récit universaliste 
abstrait. Revendiquer cette histoire, c’est chercher à donner droit de cité à une 
histoire qui est une part centrale de celle de la France. (Vergès 2006, 10)
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Conclusion 
In this first chapter, I have attempted to thoroughly contextualize my central question 
in French history – past, present, future. What – quels impensés, what assumptions – hides 
behind the “debates” on “immigration” and “diversity” today? From where does the malaise 
in the relation between the enfants d’immigrés, most specifically French-Algerian citizens, 
and the Republic come? 
To answer these questions, I choose to take on a post-colonial approach in my analysis 
of history. Colonialism is not a mere section of French history – told in school books – that, 
from the day of the independences, becomes obsolete and turns page. Colonialism, or rather 
colonial relations, has built the nation and the Republic throughout history in such a way that 
our national roots are profoundly racist, constructed on a differentiation with the colonized, 
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inferior Other. What’s more, les enfants d’immigrés, the descendants of the former colonized, 
appear as the living traces of this relational experience which is, in fact, very present.
70
 The 
need for a post-colonial approach is steep. 
France, however, has pathologically negated its memorial duty on account of a 
systematic and illusionary separation between the national and the colonial. As the indigènes 
who were the “subjects” of the grand Republic, the memorial approach of colonization 
remains peripheral, far-off. It is only there as a way to reinforce the “universal” history, 
inevitably white, racist and patriarchal. It is une présence absente and a self-supply of power. 
Yet, France is a postcolonial nation. And its inability to deal with its multiracial 
condition is symptomatic of the negation of its postcolonial condition. Indeed, as I have 
demonstrated, the Republican malaise, or “colonial fracture,” manifests specifically in 
relation to particular minority groups – the “visible” traces of a long and deeply rooted 
colonial relation.  
France-Algeria is a symptomatic example of such ambivalence. In the colonial Empire 
l’Algérie était française mais les indigènes (algérien-ne-s) n’étaient pas citoyen-ne-s 
(français-e-s). Algeria was French, yet the (Algerian) indigènes were not (French) citizens. 
“Race” was denied as a factor of differentiation. Colonialism has built a tradition where 
“race,” as in racism, is denied and, consequently, safe. 
Colonialism has contributed to creating a mixing of populations that share decades of 
years of history. Such assemblage is beautiful. But the need to understand who we are is huge 
– it is the condition to confront and embrace ourselves in conflict. Today, a whole portion of 
the nation, longing for equality, feels at war. The ethno-political divide tends to parallel the 
socio-political divide. The question of memory is a question of the present. It is a question of 
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recognition in the present. It is to confront the “French colonial forest,” but also all the beauty 
that comes out of it. It is to face ourselves, to look in the mirror. Memory is plural and we are 
too. If we imagine…let go like the flowing river and dance in the sounds of drums. 
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Chapter 2: Teasing out Postcolonial Racism through Discourse 
Il faut par conséquent être prudent et ne pas se précipiter dans des raccourcis qui, s’ils ont 
l’avantage d’être facilement compris, masquent la complexité du réel.  
(Vergès 2006, 5) 
 
Setting Tone 
Today’s France is facing a social malaise for multiple intersecting reasons. What I am 
particularly interested in is how the discourse on “immigration” and “diversity” in the specific 
context of France constructs national divisions along racial and religious lines. How does it 
remake the French colonial project through the racist construction of the figure of the 
“français musulman,” specifically “d’origine algérienne”?  
In the previous chapter, I have claimed that a form of colonial malaise is tearing at 
French society today. I have attempted to demonstrate that France has not undone its colonial 
project in the nation and state. I have argued that such a situation has led to the perpetuation, 
or rather the perpetual remaking, of colonial relations and the national imaginary that sustains 
such relations, through the construction of the “français-e-s issu-e-s de l’immigration” in the 
citizens of Algerian descent. 
In this chapter, I attempt to look deeply into the dynamics and functioning of racism as 
a set of dominant discourses and practices in legal/institutional, political, and media 
discourses. My aim is to tease out postcolonial racist discourse in France. It is imperative that 
French society (myself included) rethink national community as part of a common effort to 
decolonize. In this way, we can begin to honestly discuss the different forms of 
postcoloniality within France and its relations with identity(ies) and diversity(ies). So, what 
makes such re-thinking effort, which I explore in chapter three, necessary? How does 
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postcolonial racism function and how is it normalized in media, as well as legal/institutional, 
and political areas of public life? 
The legal, institutional, and academic discourse on “immigration” and “diversity” in 
France tends to highlight such issues as the so-called ghettoïsation des quartiers populaires 
(ghettoisation of the working-class neighborhoods), l’intégration des minorités visibles (the 
integration of visible minorities), la perte des valeurs républicaines (the loss of republican 
values), Islam, “the French Muslim,” laïcité (French secularism), the so-called “jeunes de 
banlieues” (youngsters from the banlieues), “national identity,” and “français issus de 
l’immigration.” However, there is a tendency for these discourses to hide assumptions and 
take positivist approaches, thereby overshadowing subjective realities. In this way, these 
discussions assert truths that claim universality and are not located. Therefore, I want to look 
at this discourse in order to make visible the invisible.  
The debate that I have engaged in the first chapter on the visibilization of the colonial 
relations and its contemporary traces brings me to one main obstacle in the building of healthy 
postcolonial relations: racism. It is a racism of exception, de l’exception (post)coloniale, that 
targets the French citizens of Algerian descent today. I intend to highlight the historical 
continuities of such racism and to understand the remaking of the colonial relations in light of 
the multiple factors characteristic of the present national and international socio-political 
contexts that enter into the functioning and re-formation of the French colonial project of the 
civilizing mission.  
In order to do so, I will thoroughly engage with the political debates of the last ten to 
fifteen years. The racist discourse that I am willing to tease out takes its place in ten years of 
intense stigmatization of Islam and the French Muslim – starting in 2004 with the ban of 
religious symbols in public schools, confusingly coupled with a great mystification of the 
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banlieues populaires. This discourse has appeared as a constant and (sometimes not so) 
hidden reminder to the French citizen of Algerian descent that she is not “fully French.”71  
I divided this chapter into two main parts. The first one teases out the remaking of the 
colonial mission civilisatrice through the construction of the enfant d’immigrés algériens as 
the Other, or as the subject of the Republic. The second part articulates the multiple elements 
that enter into the functioning of an (extra)ordinary postcolonial racism. Using rhetoric that 
assimilates immigration, the banlieues populaires, and the so-called Muslim French, public 
discourse normalizes and systematizes stigmatization against citizens perceived as Muslim, 
particularly of Algerian descent. 
Mission Civilisatrice, République et Assimilation 
Un Racisme d’Exception, Le Racisme Postcolonial 
I understand racism as the act of treating someone differently on the basis of her/his 
perceived “race,” or of any number of multiple arbitrary factors such as skin color, 
religion/spirituality, language, nationality, ethnicity, and social class. Racism is a marker of 
social relations that conditions lives differently. It constructs a hierarchy of human beings. It 
leads to the collective domination of certain human beings, constructed as superior, central, 
and normative, over “others,” constructed as inferior, peripheral, and deviant, in such a way 
that multiple factors play out and intersect with one another. “Race” is constructed by the 
dominant group(s) through the representation of (a) minority(ies) (in a political sense) 
subjected to stigmatization. As it is relational, racism functions concomitantly through 
different forms of discrimination of the political minority and different forms of privilege of 
the majority. It constitutes multiple forms of violence – physical, psychological, emotional, 
cultural/symbolic, structural, epistemic – and it manifests “ordinarily” in all aspects of life. 
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Racism constructs an “Other” on the basis of an identity perceived from the outside and 
subsequently essentialized.  
Racism is inherently tied to the historical backgrounds in which it was constructed. 
Indeed, I cannot understand racism separately from power, that is, from the system of multiple 
constructed hierarchies, which structure the world and the positions of human beings in the 
world. Racism takes place within a system whereby patriarchy, capitalism, and modern 
colonialism are one single project. In particular, racialization plays out and intersects with 
gendering.  
The human beings who live within a system of racist hierarchies often internalize 
racism in its everyday expressions. The violence of racism lies in the fact that it tends to be 
invisible, particularly to those who belong to the political majority. Yet, as racism is 
entrenched with power, the political majority is the one that, through the exercise of power 
and the functioning of racism, has the dominant, most hearable, collective voice. 
Consequently, racism is often deeply ingrained and normalized in public discourse, as well as 
in the minds of the human beings who live within a system in which racism applies. 
Moreover, it is reproduced by the privilege it gives to the majority as well as the 
unconsciousness of such privilege. 
It is important that I keep in mind the heterogeneity of the constructions of “race,” and 
therefore, of the forms of racism across different historical and social settings. Specifically in 
the French colonial/postcolonial context, racism, as it targets the populations who descend 
from postcolonial immigration, cannot be separated from the French colonial projects 
involving Africa, the French Caribbean, and North Africa. By French colonial project(s), I 
refer to the different imbricated – intersectional and overlapping – projects of French 
colonialism, from slavery starting in the 17
th
 century to the “grand civilizing mission” of the 
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19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries that followed from the abolition of slavery up to the different processes 
of formal decolonization of the 20
th
 century. Throughout the different episodes of French 
colonialism, “race” has been constructed differently, and racism has taken different shapes. 
Yet, in the present colonial/postcolonial context within France, where immigration ensures the 
continuity of colonization, the functioning of racism intersects with colonialism.  
To voluntarily speak of a “postcolonial racism” is not a mere association of words. It 
is the inherent relation between two key ideologies that have constructed the French 
imaginary over its national identity through the image of the inferior, colonized Other. It is a 
strategic claim that aims to highlight the intersectional and inseparable relation, in the 
French/Algerian context, between colonialism and racism. French racism inherits from and 
inherently relates to a specific set of institutions, discourses, representations, and practices 
elaborated in a specific context: colonization, for a specific population: les indigènes. On the 
other hand, a set of racist institutions, discourses, representations and practices supporting 
French colonialism constantly reshape the latter in the present. Saïd Bouamama (Algerian 
sociologist and political activist) and Pierre Tévanian (French essayist and political activist) 
introduced this term in an excellent article published in 2006. They open up the discussion 
with the following claim: 
À cette question de savoir si l’on peut parler d’un racisme post-colonial, nous 
répondons par une autre question : comment peut-on ne pas en parler ? Comment 
peut-on parler des formes contemporaines du racisme sans évoquer deux de ses 
principales généalogies : les systèmes esclavagiste et colonial ? Comment peut-on 
nier qu’existe aujourd’hui un profond racisme qui trouve son fondement dans des 
institutions, des pratiques, des discours et des représentations qui se sont élaborés 
dans le cadre de l’Empire colonial français ? Comment peut-on le nier, par exemple, 
alors que les enquêtes d’opinion mettent en évidence une forme de mépris ou de rejet 
spécifique, plus fort et plus durable, à l’encontre des immigrés originaires de pays 
colonisés ? (Bouamama and Tévanian 2006, 243)
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Pierre Tévanian also calls it “racisme républicain.”73 The association of the two terms 
“racisme” and “républicain” points at the schizophrenic, pathological nature of the French 
Republic on which lies a paradox, an inextricable tension between what it wants to be (the 
ideal of universal grandeur) and what it is (colonialist and racist).
74
 The Republic is a dream – 
the imagined projection of a grand France that governs many peoples and in which all 
individuals are “libres, égaux et fraternels.” I see such a project as inevitably colonialist 
because French power imposes its rules over peoples whom it uses as subjects of its own 
expansion. I see it as racist because behind the ideal of equality hide rules of exception 
imposed by a white power, unaware of itself, on to peoples who, because they are inferior in 
the Republican imaginary, can be ruled by exception within the supposedly equal grand 
Republic. The ideal is such that the subjects will become real (equal) citizens through 
assimilation to the French, that is, white, race called culture.
75
 It is, by definition, an absolute, 
an infinite project, and one of extreme violence.  
When I speak of a racism of exception, I refer to a particular type of racism targeting 
the French descendants of Algeria. Such racism both negates and justifies itself through the 
French concept of laïcité (secularism) and the Republican value of equality – constructed in 
hierarchical opposition to the colonized Other. Indeed, the Republic or, rather, the abstract 
idea of untouchable Republican values is central in public discourse. It is even more central in 
discourses involving immigration and diversity as it legitimizes patriarchal discourses of 
“integration” (assimilation). The Republic appears as a myth. It appears as the image of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
specific form of contempt or casting out, stronger and more enduring, towards immigrants coming from 
colonized countries?” 
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 Tévanian published Le racisme républicain in 2002 and – because it is still relevant twelve years later – 
reiterated his ideas last year with Chronique du racisme républicain. 
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sacred, superior figure that is timeless and needs to be worshipped; it appears as the ultimate 
Truth. In fact, it is interesting, activist Houria Bouteldja points out, how Republican laïcité, 
which tends to equate religion to oppression, functions as a religious, possibly oppressive, 
discourse (Robine 2006). The Republic appears as the idea of a grand mothering nation in 
which all of its children have equal chance. Such discourse frequently represents a 
“successful” French “issu-e de l’immigration” as the example of the “French Republican 
model.” The story is told in a way that praises la grande école de la République, laïque et 
égalitaire, and “confirms” that France is not racist. 
I use the expression “racism of exception” as an analogy of the exceptional 
colonialism of Algeria, one that is filled with the imperialist arrogance characteristic of the 
French colonialist project of grandeur. It is a deeply engrained form of racial inequality 
claimed in the name of equality. It is a racism that negates itself (and reinforces itself through 
its own negation) on account of the universalist Republican model. As it claims equality, la 
patria does not recognize “race” as an issue. Thus, the French intelligentsia negates that socio-
spatial questions are also racial ones (Cohen 2012). This is a racist claim precisely because it 
claims that it is not. In negating the existence of “race,” the discourse negates racial 
specificities (the real effects of “race”), as well as the differentiated, unequal treatment of the 
French citizens of Algerian descent along the lines of ethnicity, religion, class, 
gender/sexualities and history. 
Postcolonial racism is racism inherited from colonial France, the one France that 
thinks of herself as the center of the world. Postcolonial racism allows such an imagined 
grand position to live on. This colonial imaginary is not only the matter of an elitist discourse; 
it is deeply rooted in the minds of the people of France. Pascal Blanchard, in words that recall 
Mbembe’s, argues: 
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Il faut aujourd’hui décoloniser ces mentalités pour entrer dans une nouvelle 
temporalité. Ce processus de transformation sera long. Mais s’il ne l’était pas, il 
serait anormalement court pour un pays tel que la France qui se prend très souvent 
pour le centre du monde, qui l’a par ailleurs prouvé, et qui est à l’origine de ce 
modèle de citoyenneté reposant sur la laïcité et l’abstraction faite des particularismes. 
(Blanchard 2009, 125)
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La République française a institué en son sein un complexe de supériorité autour de ce qui est 
pensé comme français, ou normalement français, c’est-à-dire autour de l’homme blanc. The 
French Republic has established within itself a complex of superiority on what is thought as 
French, or normally French, that is to say, the white man. In a discourse held in 2006 while he 
was Minister of the Interior and running for presidency, Sarkozy declares, “On en a plus 
qu’assez de devoir en permanence avoir le sentiment de s’excuser d’être français. Et 
d’ailleurs, si y’en a qu’ça gène d’être en France, je l’dis avec le sourire mais avec fermeté, 
qu'ils ne se gênent pas pour quitter un pays qu'ils n'aiment pas” (Le Huffington Post 2012).77 
Who is “on” (we) and who is “ils” (they)? By not locating himself, Sarkozy uses the position 
of power from where he speaks to declaim a hateful, arrogant, and paternalist discourse that 
pretends to know for the communities he scolds and silences. 
The Remaking of The Civilizing Mission: Égalité, Laïcité, Diversité 
The dominant discourse on immigration and diversity relies on an unsaid 
differentiation whereby the French citizens of Algerian descent are systematically thought of 
as non-French. They are tolerated if they remain invisible. In fact, French minorities 
(specifically postcolonial) are increasingly referred to as “minorités visibles” (visible 
minorities). How can people be invisible? The term “visible” is culturally and 
epistemologically violent because it assumes that these specific minorities are a problem. It is 
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racist because it homogenizes and essentializes a group of people as deviant. It systematically 
places people outside the constructed norm so that they are not legitimately French and 
therefore cannot be political agents of and within the Republic. “Visible,” in this sense, refers 
to the problematic contradiction, in the eyes of the majority, between the acquisition of power 
– due to their settlement in the Republic – and the fact that the colonial/postcolonial Republic 
sees them as subjects who should “stay where they are” (rester à leur place). Through this 
paternalist-racist colonial gaze, it seems that les indigènes, who used to be “les populations à 
civiliser,” are now “les populations à discipliner.” 
Seloua Luste Boulbina, in Le singe de Kafka et autres propos sur la colonie (2008), 
brilliantly analyzes the discourse that recalls the “mission civilisatrice.” In doing so, she 
presents the political “debates” over the 2004 ban of religious symbols in public schools as a 
paradigmatic example of what I call postcolonial racism. For the sake of argumentation, I 
focus on this particular case of the remaking of the “mission civilisatrice.”  
Returning to the philosophers of the Lumières, Luste Boulbina deconstructs the 
Republican principles of égalité and laïcité. The latter emerged from the concept of tolerance 
that in the French context was constructed by Voltaire and Romilly as the “absence of 
persecution” of a “fault” – the Other, her religion, her culture (Luste Boulbina 2008). 
Tolerance, therefore, is not the acceptance of difference, but rather the correction of the latter. 
Tolerance is prompted by the paternalist benevolence, the complex of superiority of the 
“French white man,” representative of the colonial order. Subsequently, the state and its 
apparatus make decisions related to the “visibility” of “musulmans Français” on the basis of 
(arbitrary) fact rather than law (ibid.). As their religion is a fault, their visibility constitutes a 
threat to public order. Thus, the state administration ought to protect (against the fault) and 
correct (the fault) in the name of equal tolerance of all religions (laïcité).  
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I acknowledge that my analysis comes from Luste Boulbina’s place of anger, which I 
tend to reproduce as guilt. My point is not to demonize the “French white male.” Ultimately, I 
do think that these conflicting realities are more multilayered than I picture them in this 
specific analysis. So, are these emotions useful for transformation? I do not know, but I do 
know that it is important for me to acknowledge the different places in which I find myself 
throughout the process. A tension lies in my process of deconstruction between the location 
from which I speak, the guilt that comes along the awareness of such a location, and the 
transformative energy I want to create. 
The 2004 law is written as follows:  
[T]he wearing by students, in the schools, of signs whereby they believe to be 
manifesting their adherence to one religion is itself not incompatible with the principle 
of laïcité, since it constitutes the exercise of their liberty of expression and 
manifestation of their religious beliefs; but this liberty does not permit students to 
exhibit [d’arborer] signs of religious belonging which, by their nature, by the 
conditions under which they are worn individually and collectively, or by their 
ostentatious or combative [revendicatif] character, would constitute an act of pressure, 
provocation, proselytizing or propaganda, threatening to the dignity or liberty of the 
student or to the other members of the educational community, compromising their 
health or their security, disturbing the continuation of institutional activities or the 
educational role of the instructors, in short, [that] would disturb proper order in the 
establishment or the normal functioning of public service. (Benhabib 2006, cited in 
Weil 2009a)
78
 
 
Patrick Weil, international scholar, was member of the Commission Indépendante sur la 
Laïcité that initiated the law. He argues that the law aimed at protecting the girls’ freedom of 
conscience against any pressure from religious groups (Weil 2009a). Yet, the law shows more 
concern for public order than for the supposed subjects of freedom. In addition, it is striking 
to note that the text of law does not decide anything, but rather gives power to the state 
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 Stresses are mine. 
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administration (school directors) to decide when the veil, and by extension, the girls, is/are a 
threat to public order.
79
 
La bienveillance que l’on connaît pointe le bout de son nez : quand il est question de 
liberté (de jeunes musulmanes), l’institution (scolaire), est habilitée, per se, à décider 
de la limitation de la liberté (des jeunes élèves musulmanes) pour leur propre bien, 
dans leur propre intérêt. Cet intérêt propre est, comme on peut s’en rendre compte, 
dérivé du « bon fonctionnement de l’école ». La boucle est bouclée. Des sujets de droit 
sont ainsi devenus entièrement dénués de droits et soumis, comme au bon vieux temps 
(des colonies), à l’appréciation discrétionnaire de l’administration française. (Luste 
Boulbina 2008, 34)
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Weil dares to assert that this law, and the debate surrounding it, contributed to the recognition 
of the French Muslim community, as “for the first time in its history the French state and 
French society have decided to fully integrate an important Muslim minority into its common 
frame” (Weil 2009a, 2712). Likewise, Bernard Stasi, president of the same Commission, 
states:  
L’application de la loi doit se faire dans un esprit de dialogue et de pédagogie. 
Lorsque la médiation n’aura pas réussi, alors la loi sera appliquée. Je plains les 
jeunes filles qui refuseront de s’y plier. La république aura tout tenté pour les 
accueillir. J’espère qu’elles ne seront pas nombreuses. (20minutes.fr 2006)81 
 
This colonial discourse displaces the subject: what is a matter of right becomes a 
matter of fact; what is a matter of protection of the girls’ freedom becomes a matter of 
tolerance and security of the school; what pretends to “integrate,” excludes. Most importantly, 
what was about the young girls is now about the Republic (Luste Boulbina 2008).  
N’est-ce pas à l’intérieur de ce schème que le foulard des jeunes filles musulmanes a 
été appréhendé ? Comme la manifestation éclatante d’une erreur à corriger, en toute 
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 The same ambiguity exists in the “lois de naturalisation” (naturalization laws): the Islamic veil does not 
systematically but can represent “un défaut d’assimilation” (according to the French administration) and whether 
it does or not is left to be judged by the civil servant in charge (Hajjat 2010; Vosdroits.service-public.fr 2014). 
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 My translation : “So-called benevolence comes pouring out: when liberty (of the young Muslims) is at stake, 
the institution (of the school), is entitled, per se, to decide over the limitation of liberty (of the young Muslim 
students) for their own good, in their own interest. Such self-interest derives, as we see, from the “well 
functioning of the school.” It all comes full circle. Subjects of the law have been fully denied of their rights and 
subjected, just like in the old days (of the colonies), to the French administration’s discretionary appreciation.” 
81
 My translation: “The application of the law has to be carried out in a mindset turned towards dialogue and 
pedagogy. Once mediation does not succeed, then the law will be applied. I feel for the young girls who will 
refuse to abide by it. The Republic will have tried everything it could to welcome them. I hope they will not be 
many.”  
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tolérance, puisque correction ne signifie pas persécution ? […] Dans la tolérance, il 
n’est pas question, ici, de liberté, mais de vérité, il n’est pas question de droit, mais de 
fait. Voilà la condition intellectuelle de possibilité de l’exclusion. Mais voilà qui 
éclaire les « troubles de l’ordre public » et l’« atteinte au bon fonctionnement de 
l’école » que le port de ce fameux foulard était censé provoquer. (Luste Boulbina 
2008, 41)
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Therefore, la laïcité becomes the tolerance of the fault committed in private and the defense, 
against the fault of public order – a “public order” that is constructed as French, white, and 
Christian. Beyond all consideration of opinions, the government brought about the debate on 
the Islamic veil in order to stigmatize the French Muslim community and assert their 
differentiated status (legitimacy) within the Republic. A woman demonstrating against the 
law in January 2004, who also disagreed with wearing the veil in schools, declares: “Je suis 
venue voir comment on nous oblige à devenir la caricature de nous-mêmes” (Hancock 2008, 
citing Libération 2004).
83
 There is no “problème de l’Islam en France.” Rather, through the 
representation of les “musulmans français” as inferior (dans l’erreur), and through the 
construction of an image of an Other to civilize/discipline, postcolonial racist discourse 
remakes and revives the colonial/patriarchal project of a superior French (white and Christian) 
grandeur. Dans le discours raciste postcolonial, les personnes perçues comme les “français-e-
s musulman-e-s” sont les sujets de la République, ils servent la grandeur de la France.  
As subject, l’indigène is part of the Republic in her essential condition of servant, as 
opposed to and in relation to citizens, who are recognized as having political agency within 
the Republic. She is therefore “not fully French,” granted an exceptional place based on her 
“indigénéité” – her religion, her traditions, the color of her skin. She is, in the imaginary of 
the universal Republic, too visible, too sexual, too irrational. The girls were not françaises but 
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 My translation: “Isn’t it within such a framework that the scarf of the young Muslim girls was apprehended? 
As the resounding manifestation of a fault to correct, with great tolerance, since correction and persecution are 
two different things? […] When it comes to tolerance, it is not, here, about liberty, but truth, it is not about right, 
but fact. There stands the intellectual condition of the possibility of exclusion. But there clarifies the “trouble to 
public order” and the “disturbance to the well functioning of the school” that wearing the so-called veil was 
supposed to provoke.” 
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 My translation: “I came to see how we are forced to become the stereotype of ourselves.” 
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“musulmanes françaises,” that is, in the collective unconsciousness, also descendants of 
l’Algérie française.84 It is on such grounds that “la France laïque” can “civilize” them.  
There is historically a strong symbolic association in the expression “musulmans 
français,” literally the French Muslim, to the descendants of Algeria. In 1962, the French 
government negated French citizenship to the Algerian “rapatriés” (violating the accords 
d’Evian) and gave them the status of “Algériens d’origine musulmane.” In doing so, the 
government established, institutionally, culturally, epistemologically, the notion of “origine” 
within the imaginary of the Republic (Luste Boulbina 2007; Shepard 2006). On top of that, 
the term “français-e-s musulman-e-s” became, in the colonial unconscious, the equivalent to 
“d’origine algérienne” (ibid.).  
Why is this racism exceptional? If an Indonesian woman wore the veil in France, she 
would not be a threat because she would not be une étrangère (an outsider) but a mere 
inconnue (an unknown). However, an Algerian woman, “une indigene,” is naturally suspect. 
For her, it becomes a “visible fault” because it threatens to displace the norm, fundamentally 
white and Christian. It threatens to unsettle the colonial order. It constitutes the threat that the 
indigene has full rights, that is, the right of agency, the right to be invisibly visible, whereas 
she is, by definition, un animal assimilable. L’indigène, essentially Muslim, essentially Other, 
is not French; however, she is the subject that makes France. Thus, her “visibility” is a threat 
to the grandeur of national identity because she is no longer a subject, that is, she is no longer 
the narcissistic image of the French Republic. She represents, on the contrary, la présence 
visible, the visible presence, la marque, the trace, de l’illusion du rêve républicain, of the 
illusionary nature of the Republican dream, de son immatérialité, of its immateriality.  
Le port du « foulard islamique » a d’autant plus dérangé les consciences qu’il a 
dérangé l’impensé de ces consciences. A suivre celui-ci, il serait normal que, dans 
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 As if we were not all, in France, descendants of l’Algérie française. 
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leur propre intérêt – c’est-à-dire par soucis de normalisation - les très jeunes filles qui 
ont défrayé la chronique ne soient pas musulmanes. Il serait normal qu’elles sortent, 
partout, tête nue. Il serait normal qu’elles ne se fassent pas remarquer. Il serait 
normal qu’elles deviennent invisibles. A ce moment-là, on les tolèrerait. (Luste 
Boulbina 2008, 43-44)
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Thus, in the national unconsciousness of the dominant discourse, the Islamic veil is 
“un coup porté contre l’assimilation, un crime contre l’acculturation et, de fil en aiguille, un 
refus de la France (terre d’accueil)” (Luste Boulbina 2008, 41).86 Since laïcité is thought as 
the tolerance of a fault and Republican values as the ultimate Truth, assimilation is progress, 
and resistance to assimilation is “unintelligible, unthinkable, unhearable” (ibid.). Thus, behind 
the discourse on “intégration républicaine” lies the deeply rooted assumption that cultural 
assimilation is the norm, and a lack of it can only be due to lack of willingness (“mauvaise 
volonté”) (Luste Boulbina 2008, 42).  
When I, as “white French,” deconstruct in anger something for which I am the 
representative, I risk reproducing colonial power. I do feel anger mixed with guilt because in 
the colonial/postcolonial society in which I live, I have, in spite of myself, been conditioned 
to reproduce white/colonial privilege and postcolonial racism. The process of deconstruction 
can only come from my own story. I am responsible for taking responsibility of my location 
of power, for taking a clear stance in front of society and, most importantly, in front of the 
majority to which I, in a political sense, belong. I do so not as a sort of spokesperson in the 
name of specific populations, but rather to raise awareness of the dynamics of colonialism and 
racism that permeate the very broad majority of discourses, practices, and representations 
hearable in public space. 
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 My translation: “That the young girls wear the ‘Islamic scarf’ has made it all extremely disturbing for the 
minds, for it has disturbed the blind spots of these minds. Following these, it would be normal that, in their own 
interest – that’s to say for the sake of normalizing – the young girls are not Muslim. It would be normal that they 
do not draw attention to themselves. It would be normal that they become invisible. Then they would be 
tolerated.” 
86
 My translation: “an attack against assimilation, a crime against acculturation and, one thing leading to another, 
a negation of France (land of refuge)” 
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De La Diversité N’est Pas Français 
French political discourse has, in the last years, tried to shift paradigm from the 
integration discourse to the notion of “diversity” as a new way to look at the challenges of a 
multicultural and postcolonial society. This new rhetoric establishes the racial and racist 
differentiation of what/who is normally “français-e” and what/who is “représentant-e de la 
diversité française.” In this dichotomized thinking, where one can either “represent” France 
or “represent” diversity, France is, by definition, not diverse. Am I not representative of 
French diversity?  
In the dominant discourse, the political ideology of “intégration républicaine” has, 
supposedly, been replaced by the promotion of “diversity” (Soum and Geisser 2009). First of 
all, considering the language used by the French administration on the “contrôle 
d’assimilation aux valeurs de la République” (Vosdroits.service-public.fr 2014), one is 
compelled to observe the immense gap that exists between the discourses and practices of the 
state. Second, the concept of diversity did not break with/still rests on the differentiation of 
“français de souche” versus “français issu de/d’origine” (Soum and Geisser 2009). It does not 
break with the old French tradition of universal abstractism, a form of universalism 
constructed in opposition to the exceptional – a universalism that is not “universally shared” 
(Luste Boulbina 2007). Decolonization has yet to occur (Blanchard 2009). 
Enfin, cela pourrait devenir la conséquence la moins bien maîtrisée et la plus « 
perfide » du succès de la thématique de la diversité : au nom de la lutte contre les 
discriminations ethniques, elle finit elle-même par induire, légitimer et conforter une 
frontière imaginaire entre les « vrais Français » et les « Divers », entre le noyau 
central de l’identité française et ses périphéries exotiques. En somme, la diversité 
contribuerait indirectement à renforcer une vision ethnique de la société française 
avec, d’un côté, l’ethnicité dominante (les Français dits « de souche ») et, de l’autre, 
les ethnicités minoritaires (les fameuses « minorités visibles »). (Soum and Geisser 
2009, 106)
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 My translation: “Eventually, that could become the least under control and the most ‘perfidious’ consequence 
of the success of the subject of diversity: in the name of the struggle against ethnic discriminations, it ends up 
leading to, legitimizing, and comforting an imaginary border between the ‘real French’ and the ‘diverse,’ 
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In fact, the promotion of “diversity,” instead of rethinking French society, has taken 
the form of symbolic measures. Thus, the introduction of “représentants de la diversité” in 
the leading circles of the nation appears more as a political strategy than an impulse for real 
equality – “a superficial colorization” (Soum and Geisser 2009). Likewise, I am 
uncomfortable with the media coverage of the “success” of French people (re)presented as 
“de la diversité.” As it pretends, in words (content), to break with stigmas, such coverage 
actually reproduces them in acts (form). Inasmuch as such media discourse pretends that 
“origine” is unimportant, it seems important enough to be mentioned. And, it is mentioned in 
a way that she – the immigrant – appears as the “ambassador” of all minorities, that is, of all 
Others. Overall, this differentiated coverage implicitly and paternalistically reinforces the 
unsaid assumption that she is the exception that proves the rule (Liberation 2013a; Le Nouvel 
Observateur 2014 for example; Beyala 2009; Deltombe and Rigouste 2005). Tibault Baka, 
labeled as a “writer from the banlieues,” claims: “Quand un écrivain a grandi dans le XVIe, 
on n’en fait pas un porte-parole du XVIe. Moi, c’est pareil” (Liberation 2013a).88  
“Diversity” is not thought. “Diversité à la française” does not break with the paradigm 
of “égalité à la française.” The unsaid remains unsaid and the invisible remains invisible. The 
rhetoric of “diversity” takes equality for granted and hides discriminations that are 
specifically ethno-racial (Cohen 2012). The promotion of “diversity,” in fact, silences 
discussions around “race” and even negates racism. It maintains the status quo. Just like la 
parité, la “diversité,” “c’est l’affirmation de l’égalité impossible, c’est la « négation » de 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
between the central nucleus of French identity and its exotic peripheries. Overall, diversity seems to contribute 
indirectly to reinforcing an ethnic perspective of French society with, on one side, the dominant ethnicity (the so-
called ‘purebred French’) and, on the other side, minority ethnicities (the so-called ‘visible minorities’).” 
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 My translation: “When a writer grew up in the 16th arrondissement (well-off area of Paris), we do not make of 
him a spokesperson for the 16
th
 arrondissement. Same thing with me.” 
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l’égalité” (Luste Boulbina 2007, 14).89 It appears as a void political strategy. Beyond the fact 
that the acts do not follow the words, it uses the rhetoric of recognition of diversity as a way 
to elude the socio-political stakes lying behind diversity, that is, mutual recognition, harmony, 
and reciprocity. Indeed, the discourse on “diversity” does not carry any intention to share 
political power (Soum and Geisser 2009). In fact, it hides an inexistent political representation 
of minorities. Les “Français-e-s de la diversité” are imprisoned in a decorating concept that 
they are subjected to “represent” au service de the ever-living grand Republic. Diversity does 
not mean a diverse voice. 
Dans un tel contexte, « intégration » et « diversité » sont des mots qui ne sont pas faits 
pour durer. Pire ils ne signifient plus rien aujourd’hui. Ils ont trente ans de retard sur 
les mutations sociétales. Si notre société ne s’assume pas, nous traverserons des 
crises, telles que les émeutes de 2005 qui demeurent une vraie « révolution 
républicaine », celle de personnes qui s’expriment différemment pour marquer leur 
appartenance à la France et faire accepter leur « différence ». (Blanchard 2009, 
126)
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The promotion of “diversity” has not accompanied a radical decolonization of the minds. 
What’s more, diversity appears a ceremonial dress to revive the national grandeur. In doing 
so, it pertains to the colonial imaginary and perpetuates postcolonial racism. 
Assimilation and Ascétisme: The Violent Rhetoric of “Good” and “Bad” 
L’enfant d’immigré-e-s algérien-e-s is expected to “assimilate.” Only then, if she 
drops her “origine,” if she drops herself and puts on the mask of assimilation, can she be 
invisible, “tolerated,” and (almost) “French.” This is what Luste Boulbina refers to as 
“ascétisme” (ascetics) (Luste Boulbina 2008). As introduced in chapter one, the psychological 
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 My translation: Just like la parité, “diversity” “amounts to making equality impossible, it amounts to the 
‘negation’ of equality.” (The term parité is commonly used to refer to gender equality, but it refers to a narrow 
understanding of gender equality, one based on numbers and statistics.) 
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 My translation: “In such a context, the words ‘integration’ and ‘diversity’ are meant not to last. What’s more, 
they no longer mean anything today.  They are thirty years behind societal mutations. If our society does not 
come to terms with itself, we will encounter crises, such as the 2005 revolts which are a true ‘Republican 
revolution,’ of people who express themselves differently to engrave their belonging to France and ensure the 
acceptance of their ‘difference.’” 
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process of (post)colonial racism, the “complexe du colonisé,” leads to alienation. Ascétisme 
recalls, to some extent, Anzaldúa’s “masks of oppression” (Anzaldúa 1990). Gloria Anzaldúa 
speaks from her experience as a woman of color in the US context. She explains that the 
multiple masks of oppression are strategies that women of color are forced to use in order to 
resist (survive from) the multilayered oppressions they face. Likewise, ascétisme is, for the 
colonized (la minorité “visible”), the condition of a human life (ibid.). It is the negation of 
self in order to suit the representation of self expected by the dominant, that is, to suit the 
colonial patriarchal-racist gaze and, in the rhetoric of the discourse, become the “good 
immigrant” (ibid.). 
As I have argued earlier, in the colonial and postcolonial imaginary, the Algerian is 
naturally not fully French. She is naturally visible and sexual; she is naturally an exception 
and naturally a fault. To become a “good immigrant” (yet still immigrant) – that is to say, if 
she wants the receiving society to tolerate her presence in the national body, she needs to 
“integrate” and, in the rhetoric of the state, show “unconditional willingness” to “integrate” 
(Luste Boulbina 2008; Deltombe and Rigouste 2005; Hajjat 2010). Yet, only the receiving 
society, based on its racist understanding of what is French, is entitled to make this judgment 
call. The rhetoric of “integration” is, in fact, an assignation to assimilation. 
Le classement se fait par cercles concentriques du plus « proche » au plus 
« lointain », de l’« assimilable » à l’« irréductible ». […] Un exemple : les Kabyles 
sont placés sur le premier cercle, les Nord-africains sur le second, les Arabes sur le 
troisième. Manière de signifier la place rêvée de la France dans le monde […] Qu’est-
ce alors que l’assimilation? C’est le passage d’un cercle à l’autre jusqu’à arriver au 
centre même : au  « noyau dur » français. (Luste Boulbina 2008, 22-23)
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 My translation: “The classification is set through concentric circles from the ‘closest’ to the most ‘far-off,’ 
from the ‘assimilable’ to the ‘irreducible’. […] Example: Kabylians are placed in the first circle, North-Africans 
in the second, Arabs in the third. A way to express the dreamt-of place of France in the world. […] What, then, is 
assimilation? It is the upgrading from one circle to the next until its gets to the very centre: the French ‘hard 
core.’” 
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In the gaze of colonial/patriarchal power, the “good immigrant” – the “française d’origine…” 
for whom the discourse will, dans son exceptionnelle bonté civilisatrice
92, drop the “origine” 
– is une immigrée disciplinée, un bon sujet de la République. C’est l’animal discipliné, 
l’animal assimilé, et dans l’inconscient collectif, l’assimilation est l’unique condition de son 
humanité.
93
  
A l’instar de la colonisation, qui est un fait total, la négation de soi, l’entreprise 
ascétique, doit être absolue. L’ascète doit faire table rase de sa mémoire (Luste Boulbina 
2008).
94
 “[l]’Etat ne peut se satisfaire d’une assimilation inaboutie” (Vosdroits.service-
public.fr 2014).
95
 Plural identities are not allowed and the responsibility of a non-ambiguous 
“willingness to assimilate,” a non-ambiguous belonging to the “national community” is 
exclusively the ascète’s (Deltombe and Rigouste 2005). Mustapha Harzoune reports: “Et Ivan 
Rioufol, […] apostrophe le célébrissime joueur : ‘Oui, on aimerait que Zinedine Zidane, qui 
ne cache pas sa tendresse pour l’Algérie [le devrait-il ?] de ses racines, se dise clairement, 
c’est-à-dire uniquement [sic] français.’” (Harzoune 2003, 57)96  He comments “cette pensée 
dualiste revient à mettre à l’écart, à tenir à distance, à refuser une appartenance pleine et 
entière à la communauté nationale” (ibid.).97  
Through the rhetoric of good/bad immigrant, real/fake French, successful/failed 
integration, as well as the separation between a borderline “them” and a national/normal “us,” 
the enfants d’immigrés algériens thought as non-assimilated, are, openly or subtly, held 
responsible for their supposed non assimilation (Deltombe and Rigouste 2005). In addition, 
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 in its exceptional civilizing kindness 
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 She is the disciplined animal, the assimilated animal, and, in the collective unconscious, assimilation is the 
only condition of her humanity. 
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 Just like colonization, which is a total fact, the negation of self, the ascetic enterprise, has to be absolute. The 
ascète has to start again from scratch.  
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 My translation : “[the] State cannot be satisfied with a half-way assimilation” 
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 My translation: “And Ivan Rioufol, […] calls out the notorious player: ‘Yes, we would like Zinedine Zidane, 
who does not hide his tenderness for the Algeria [should he?] of his roots, to define himself clearly, that’s to say 
as exclusively [sic] French.’” 
97
 My translation: “this dualistic thinking amounts to putting aside, keeping distance, refusing his full and 
complete belonging to the national community.”  
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the latter can only be a “lack of willingness” and proves the immigrant’s daughter/son’s 
“superficial belonging” to the “national community” (ibid.). During the 2001 France-Algeria 
football match held at the national stadium, initially presented as a symbolic act of 
“reconciliation,” a minority of the French spectators of Algerian descent “stormed” the pitch 
in the second half of the game. In a brilliant article published in 2003, Harzoune shows how 
public comments made after the game are a conspicuous example of the colonial discourse I 
have just mentioned. Indeed, comments gushed out to blame “these youngsters” (“ces 
jeunes”) who were probably manipulated, like the young girls who refused to uncover their 
head probably had been as well. It blamed them for their attitude – like a dad scolds out his 
undisciplined kid (Harzoune 2003). Again, the paternalist gaze takes any form of agency off 
them. In addition, it establishes, right away, an arbitrary connection with their double 
national/cultural belonging (ibid.). Thus, by such attitude, immediately interpreted as a 
disavowal of the nation, not only do they “confirm” their “non-full belonging” to the “national 
community” – that the colonial/patriarchal unconscious already assumed, but they also show 
the impossibility of a “full belonging” to the nation and the impossibility of their assimilation 
(ibid.). Abd Al Malik, powerful(ly) writes: “C’est parce qu’ils ne se sentent pas français […] 
c’est [donc] parce qu’ils ne sont pas français […] C’est le choc frontal du signifié et du 
signifiant, de l’avouable et de l’inavoué, de l’audible et de l’inaudible. C’est alambiqué, mais 
ça fait du bruit, l’ambigu” (Abd Al Malik 2010, 62-63).98 
Yet, even though l’indigène or enfant d’immigrés is responsible for her own ascétisme, 
the latter is, like colonization, an infinite enterprise, an ideal, an illusion. The ascetic ideal 
(“ideal ascétique”) is a narcissistic, reinforcing image of the dominant. Thus, the belonging to 
the French nation always remains virtual, superficial. C’est “la recherche implicite d’une 
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 My translation: “That is because they do not feel French […] that is because they are not French [then] […] It 
is the head-on shock of the signifier and the signified, of the confessable and the yet-to-be-confessed, of the 
hearable and the unheard. It is tortuous, but it resounds, the ambiguous.” 
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reconnaissance impossible” qui “s’apparente à l’impossibilité de se défaire de soi” (Luste 
Boulbina 2008, 23; 19).
99
 
Therefore, the receiving society always has the right to bring her down to her “origin,” 
and it is this society alone who can judge her “degree of assimilation” (or “degree of 
Frenchness”). In this regard, it is striking to observe that the top of the citizenship application 
form asks whether the person wishes to demand “la francisation de [s]es nom et prénom” 
(Vosdroits.service-public.fr 2014).
100
 Beyond the immense coloniality of such an “offer,” I 
wonder whether an affirmative answer raises the imagined “degree of willingness to 
assimilate” and consequently the chances to access citizenship. 
Not only does the slightest “error,” or “défaut d’assimilation,” bring her back down to 
her “origin,” but the slightest “error” appears as a confirmation of her superficial belonging 
to the nation. In his last game with the French National Team, which was also the 2006 World 
Cup Finals, the footballer Zinédine Zidane headbutted the Italian player Materazzi after the 
latter insulted him on the pitch. Immediately, the national hero who had permitted the 1998 
World Cup victory was brought back down to his “Algérianité.” He was, then, “Pied-noir” 
and “kabyle.” It is precisely because it is an ideal that l’idéal ascétique does not allow the 
“citizen of origin” to make “mistakes.” If she does, white gaze does not forgive because it 
perceives it as a confirmation of her naturally assumed deviance and periphery within the 
nation on account of her “origin.” These words published in Le Monde are an example of the 
violence of the media commentaries: 
Il a raté sa sortie, comme un enfant trop gâté et mal élevé. Dimanche 9 juillet, lors de 
la finale de la Coupe du monde en Allemagne, Zinédine Zidane a terni la fin de son 
histoire de footballeur de génie par un coup de tête inadmissible, intolérable, 
inexcusable. […] Un coup de tête, tout s’écroule, et ses précédents écarts reviennent 
en mémoire. […] Un coup de tête, et c’est le versant sombre du personnage qui 
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 My translation: “the implicit pursuit of impossible recognition” that “is like the impossibility of getting rid of 
oneself.” 
100
 My translation: “the ‘French-like-ization’ of my last and first names” 
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réapparaît, sa face noire, revers de l’image colportée de l’un des hommes publics 
préférés des Français. Dimanche, les Italiens ont battu les Bleus en finale de la Coupe 
du monde. La France a surtout perdu Zizou. (Causset 2006 in Luste Boulbina 2008, 
19)
101
 
There is good Zizou, the national hero – the one who loves and serves the country, and there 
is bad Zidane, – le sale gosse, le mauvais élève (bad kid), the one that French white gaze had 
almost forgotten yet that always threatened to reappear. Everything happens as if, in his 
attitude that day, Zidane showed his real nature; this marks the point of no return. In 2001, 
there was no sign whatsoever of a religious motive or character in the intrusion of spectators 
on the pitch, yet they were labeled “jeunes Français musulmans,” those who “stormed” the 
football pitch (Harzoune 2003). Likewise, girls who refuse to uncover their heads, in this case 
françaises “musulmanes,” through their “provoking attitude,” were “disloyal” to the Republic 
(Hajjat 2010). This “attitude” places them on a circle (Luste Boulbina’s concentric circles of 
“familiarity”) far from the “French” “noyau dur,” which is dans “l’impensé des consciences,” 
the white heterosexual male. It becomes the evidence of the expected “inassimilability” of the 
“musulmans français,” who, “once again,” in a hegemonic pensée impensée, “confirm” their 
position as “Arabes.” 
The French of Algerian descent, like the indigène in the past, has to do more than any 
other. She does not have the right of the “fault.” However, she cannot complain about this 
unequal treatment. Le “bon immigré” est celui “qui ne montre pas sa plaie”102 (Luste 
Boulbina 2008). “On n’est pas protégé parce qu’on est issu d’une minorité, parce qu’on est 
d’origine maghrébine ou africaine. On doit [faire] comme les autres, et je dois même dire, 
                                                          
101
 My translation: “He failed his ending, like a child too spoiled and ill-mannered. On Sunday 9th of July, in the 
World Cup Finals against Germany, Zinédine Zidane stained the end of his history as a genius football player in 
a head-butt inadmissible, intolerable, inexcusable. […] A head-butt, everything falls apart, and his previous 
misbehaviors come back to mind. […] A head-butt, and it is the dark side of the character that reappears, his 
black face, the backlash of the hawked image of one of the French’s favorite public figures. On Sunday, the 
Italians beat the Bleus in the World Cup Finals. France mostly lost Zizou.” (Stresses are mine) 
102
 My translation: The “good immigrant” is the one “who does not show her wound.” 
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plus que les autres” (Nadine Morano103 2008, cited in Geisser and Soum 2009, 103).104 To 
pretend that a form of reverse racism privileges the immigrant is a typical strategy that aims at 
establishing racism. In addition, this discourse is fueled by the illusion that through ascétisme 
(assimilation) the immigrant becomes normal French. But in fact, as Akli Mellouli
105
 says to 
his child: “Ne te casse pas la tête mon fils ! Tu ne seras jamais assez bien pour eux ! Tu ne 
seras jamais au bon endroit ! On se demande d’ailleurs ce que tu fais là !” (Akli Mellouli 
2007, cited in Geisser and Soum 2009, 103).
106
 
Does discourse analysis inevitably trigger in me a response that reproduces the same 
binary logic of violence? This is a complex question because the transformation process does 
require consciousness of the conditioning of constructed racial identities in the colonial order. 
At the same time, transformation compels me to go beyond these dichotomies to a place 
where I can approach conflicts in terms of human beings, relations, and transformational 
energies. This is where I find myself, in the negotiation of these places. They are conflicting 
and I take them as an opportunity to create my own journey towards a moving consciousness. 
Islam, République et Banlieues Ou la Rhétorique d’un Racisme Postcolonial 
Islamisation, Ghettoïsation et Stigmatisations 
The dominant discourse and its representations make the figure of the “French Arab” a 
threat to “national identity” as well as “Republican identity,” in which Islam is presented as a 
key factor of threat and “la banlieue” its stage.  
Tout se passe comme si, également, l’État français postcolonial s’élevait sur un champ 
de ruines tel qu’il faille réhabiliter d’abord la république (qui ignore les différences et 
                                                          
103
 Nadine Morano is a politican who belongs to the conventional right-wing party (UMP). In 2008, she was 
Secretary of State in charge of family issues. 
104
 My translation: “One is not protected because she is part of a minority, because she is of Maghreb or African 
origin. One should [work] like any other, and I shall say, more than any other.” 
105
 Akli Mellouli is Deputy Mayor of Bonneuil-sur-Marne. 
106
 My translation: “Don’t put yourself out, my son! You will never be good enough for them! You will never be 
in the right place! In fact, they even wonder what you’re doing here!” 
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les «communautés »), puis la laïcité (qui réprouve le voile), ensuite l’identité nationale 
(qui cache la « diversité culturelle ») pour exister pleinement. (Luste Boulbina 2007, 
13)
107
 
 
Thus, Luste Boulbina sarcastically notes, the “Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity, and Co-development,” created in 2007, could be re-baptized “ministère du 
redressement national” (ministry of national recovery). A few scholars, united in a petition 
for the elimination of the aforementioned ministry, argue:  
Réfugiés et migrants, notamment originaires de Méditerranée et d’Afrique, et leurs 
descendants, sont séparés d’un «nous» national pas seulement imaginaire puisque ses 
frontières se redessinent sur les plans matériel, administratif et idéologique. 
(Libération 2009)
108
  
Hence, in less than two years, the government raised, at two different times, what it called 
“debates” on “national identity” and on “Islam and laïcité,” respectively. In fact, it very 
clearly did so in order to target the French Muslim community in a binary logic of us/them, 
vrai/faux français, musulmans intégrés/non intégrés, immigrés assimilés/inassimilables and to 
subtly re-claim that le caractère français is proudly “white” and Christian. For the 
implementation of the “debates on national identity,” the then minister of the Interior, Eric 
Besson, delivered a guide to local authorities. In the first point of “debate” titled “quelles [sic] 
sont les éléments de notre identité nationale?” (what are the elements of our national 
identity?), he makes direct references to “our wine” and “our churches and cathedrals,” for 
example. It appears as a clear message sent by French elite to signify that some human beings, 
regardless of their citizenship, are not part of the politico-socio-cultural community of France. 
The violence of such postcolonial racism has reached a critical level in the last few 
years. In 2011, Claude Guéant, successor of Eric Besson, wrote to the préfets (local 
                                                          
107
 My translation: “Everything happens as if, as well, the French postcolonial State stood on a devastated 
battleground in a way that the Republic (which ignores differences and ‘communities’), then laïcité (which 
condemns the veil), and national identity (which hides ‘cultural diversity’) need to be rehabilitated in order to 
exist fully.” 
108
 My translation: “Refugees and migrants, particularly from the Mediterranean and from Africa, as well as their 
descendants, are separated from a national ‘we’ that is not solely imaginary since its borders are reshaping at 
material, administrative, and ideological levels.” 
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authorities) a letter titled “Circulaire du 24 août 2011 relative au contrôle de l'assimilation 
dans les procédures d'acquisition de la nationalité française” (Vosdroits.service-public.fr 
2014). In very explicit language, this letter specifically targets the persons of Muslim faith, 
origin or culture, yet without naming any community. It could be renamed “witch-hunting of 
non assimilated Muslims.” Listing all reasons of “indignité” and “défaut d’assimilation,” the 
minister clearly establishes how being granted citizenship constitutes the exception, and 
having it denied, the rule. “Muslim men,” represented as essentialized misogynists, are 
particularly targeted by a castrating discourse. It does not defend the rights of women who are 
represented as the unconscious victims, yet accomplices, of the Muslim male phallus; 
however, it deprives the “Muslim man” of the power related to his constructed maleness. 
Quite significantly, the minister ends his letter with the following words: “Je vous demande 
d’accorder la plus grande vigilance à la mise en œuvre de ces instructions afin d’assurer un 
suivi particulier des dossiers présentant un défaut d’assimilation” (ibid.).109 
Furthermore, looking at the dominant discourse, it seems that for the last ten years the 
Republic has been constantly under the overwhelming threat of ethnic separatism. Terms such 
as “communautarisme” and “ghettoïsation” are repetitively used. Last year, the then Prime 
Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault ordered a report to elaborate strategies for the “re-foundation of 
the politics of integration” in France. The report radically unsettled the established colonial 
imaginary of the Republic in a way never seen before. It triggered an incredible wave of 
violent reactions (Le Point 2013a), often rigged out in an “(extra)ordinary racism” ('Racisme 
(Extra)Ordinaire' 2014), which led the Prime Minister to immediately abandon the project. 
The report aimed at “répondre à l'attente des personnes immigrées et de leurs descendants: 
être considéré comme n'importe quel Français,” “faire France en reconnaissant la richesse 
des identités multiples,” “reconnaître toutes les migrations comme constitutives de la nation” 
                                                          
109
 My translation: “I am asking you to devote the biggest vigilance in implementing these instructions in order 
to ensure a particular follow-up to the cases that show an assimilation defect.” 
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(Le Figaro 2013a; Le Point 2013b). It argued that “[l]a France devrait assumer la dimension 
"arabo-orientale" (comme afro-antillaise, océanindienne, mélano-polynésienne ou sud-est 
asiatique) de son identité et sortir de son attitude postcoloniale” (ibid.).110 Politicians and 
intellectuals rose up to defend the Republic against what they labeled as a “provocation,” the 
promotion of “communautarism,” the “negation of the Republic” of its values, of “Republican 
integration” and “national unity.” They qualified it as “la négation nationale” (Le Figaro 
2013b), and beyond this, their language suggests that they perceived it as a personal attack. In 
the national unconscious, the model of the Republic is undoubtedly and proudly superior to 
the Anglo-Saxon multicultural paradigm. The violence of these reactions shows how deeply 
the Republican model is ingrained in the commonly understood sense of national patriotism 
and how difficult it is to challenge the model of the Republic in public debate. This is an 
example of the reactions I mention: 
Comme les bons élèves, qui sont souvent la cible des railleries de leurs petits 
camarades, l'homme blanc et hétérosexuel pourrait bientôt être obligé, dans notre 
pays, de se cacher. Ce propos n'est pas celui d'un odieux réactionnaire. Il s'impose à 
la lecture du rapport commandé par le premier ministre pour nourrir sa réflexion sur 
la refonte de la politique d'intégration française. (Le Figaro 2013b)
111
 
These right-minded owners of “national identity” have become the defenders of a 
“national identity” “de souche” associated with a constructed “whiteness” that is European, 
French, Christian, and loyal to the laic-Republican package. Thus, the recognition of all 
migrations and multiple identities as part of the nation is not a threat to “national identity,” but 
rather to its white narcissistic foundation. Likewise, the threat to the Republican identity 
                                                          
110
 My translation: The report aimed at “responding to the expectation of the immigrants and their descendants: 
to be considered like any other French,” “consolidating France by recognizing the richness of multiple 
identities,” “recognizing all migrations as constitutive of the nation.” It argued that “France should come to 
terms with the ‘Arab-oriental’ (and Afro-antillaise, Oceanian, Malayo-Polynesian and south-east Asian) 
dimension of its identity and break with its postcolonial attitude.” 
111
 My translation: “Like good students, who are often the target of mockery by their little friends, the white 
heterosexual male could soon have to hide, in our dear country. These words are not ones of an obnoxious 
reactionary. They inevitably follow when one reads the report ordered by the Prime Minister to nourish his 
reflection on how to remake French integration politics.” (stresses are mine) 
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model is not a threat to the Republic, but rather to the national/racial differentiation on which 
the Republic rests.  
La laïcité, continuously waved as the sacred Republican value to defend, untouchable, 
and last guarantor of “Republican equality” is fundamentally “white” and Christian. In the last 
ten years, this so-called laïcité, meant to keep any kind of religious “ostentation” in the 
private sphere, has become the public defense of the “white-Christianness” of “national 
identity.” In other words, laïcité has become the avatar of Republican racism. It has become 
the Republican justification of a racism rooted in the Republic – in the myth of egalitarian 
Republic. It has become the racist instrument of la grande exception française – white, 
superior, and colonial. 
L’Islamophobie Ou la “Haine Respectable” 
The expression of postcolonial racism, coupled with the post-9/11 international 
context directly inherited from the Clash of Civilizations doctrine, has led in the last years to a 
frightening expansion and normalization of racist acts and acts of speech. This is confirmed 
by the 2013 report of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 
(CNCDH), published earlier this year. Particularly, the CNCDH points out an overwhelming 
rise of a specific form of racism: one that is explicitly directed towards Islam and Muslim 
people. The great rise of the Front National (FN), the main nationalist/racist party who digs 
its votes in a growing anti-immigration, anti-Muslim rhetoric is noticeable. Yet, it is important 
to spell out that such racist explosions, taking place in the wider European context, are partly 
the consequence of a constant and constantly growing politics of fear that conventional parties 
have ruled by for the last ten years or so.  
Concomitantly, Christine Lazerges, the president of CNCDH, also notes the rising use 
in public discourse of the term “islamophobia.” It refers to the fear of Islam that translates into 
acts of violence against the Muslim community. This term is important for what it signifies – 
98 
 
for the recognition of a violent reality, a specific form of racism that is increasingly sneaking 
into all aspects of public life. It is even more so because there is a sort of unsaid yet palpable 
resistance from the state towards such a recognition (Libération 2013b).  
However, the rising hegemonic discourse that has emerged around the term 
“islamophobia” tends to fuel the reality it is supposed to tackle. Indeed, the systematic use of 
the term appears as a way not to name what the matter really is: RACISM.  
Dès lors, comment comprendre qu’on puisse parler de xénophobie ou d’islamophobie 
? Est-ce pour en faire des attitudes relevant de la pathologie, dont on n’est pas 
responsable, pour en faire des troubles de l’inconscient, des «maladies» que l’on subit 
donc, et que l’on ne choisit pas, comme on ne décide pas un jour d’avoir la phobie des 
objets tranchants ou des araignées ? Les mots ne sont jamais neutres : parler 
d’islamophobie (ou d’homophobie ou de xénophobie…) évite en fait de dire qu’on 
peut volontairement, intellectuellement, culturellement, idéologiquement, 
politiquement, refuser l’altérité, rejeter l’autre - non pour ce qu’il fait, mais pour ce 
qu’il est -, bref, être raciste. (Maggiori 2013)112 
Marwan Mohammed, spokesperson of the Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF), 
endorses the legitimacy of the term but condemns its dominant use in discourse (Libération 
2013b). It appears as a softer reality, “un racisme acceptable” (ibid.), or in the words censored 
by Le Monde and reproduced by Alain Gresh, of Thomas Deltombe, un “racisme sans race,” 
une “haine respectable” (Gresh 2013).113 Islamophobia does exist; it is the fear of Islam as a 
religion and it is increasingly tangible in society. However, beyond Islamophobia, what I 
think exists even more is a form of anti-Muslim racism, that is, the production and 
reproduction of racist acts, discourses, and practices targeting communities of Muslim faith, 
origin, and culture. 
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 My translation: “Therefore, how are we to understand that we are able to talk about xenophobia or 
islamophobia? Is it to turn them into attitudes that fall under pathology, of which one is not responsible, to turn 
them in unconscious trouble, ‘illnesses’ that we, thus, suffer from, and that we do not choose, like we do not 
decide one day to have an aversion to cutting items or to spiders? Words never are neutral: to talk about 
islamophobia (or homophobia or xenophobia) prevents one from saying that one can willingly, intellectually, 
culturally, ideologically, politically, refuse otherness, negate the other – not for what she does, but for what she 
is –, in a word, racist.” 
113
 My translation: “racism without race,” “respectable hatred” 
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Furthermore, by naming the religion whose believers are targeted, “islamophobia” 
points at Islam as the specific “factor” of such racism. In doing so, it almost makes Islam the 
cause of its own racism. In a context of growing normalization of anti-Muslim racist acts and 
acts of speech in a global, post-9/11 context, it appears as if Muslim people, for their “obvious 
tendency towards fundamentalism” are the cause of their own racism (Gresh 2013). Likewise, 
Lazerges notes that racist acts qualified as “islamophobic” are legally less sanctioned by 
criminal law than are similar acts qualified as “racist” (Commission Nationale Consultative 
des Droits de l’Homme 2014). 
Beyond that, it almost appears, in the national unconscious, as if “islamophobia” was 
an act of freedom of expression, the expression of laïcité (ibid.). I dare to say that in 
“l’impensé des consciences,” anti-Muslim racism is the consequence of the “incompatibility” 
of Islam with the Republic, and also of the “inassimilability” of “les musulmans français”– to 
the possible extent that it might exist as unconsciously legitimate. Indeed, the hegemonic 
discourse on “islamophobia” shall not make us forget about the unrecognized (but well and 
truly existing) postcolonial racism, exceptionally directed towards the “musulman français,” 
who is not any Muslim French but rather “le rappel vivant de la défunte entreprise coloniale” 
(Memmi 2004, 97).
114
 In fact, the discourse on “islamophobia” contributes to the negation of 
this particular form of racism that this thesis aims to tease out. It turns a blind eye to the 
racism of exception that impacts the citizens of Algerian descent. I am not denying here the 
existence of a racism targeting all so-called “Muslims” in France – one that is dangerously 
expanding in Europe. However, I do argue that in the persons of the French citizens of 
Algerian descent, racism is more complex. It operates in a way that this general revulsion 
against a community constructed as Muslim intersects with an exceptional form of racism 
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 My translation: “the living reminder of the lost colonial enterprise” 
100 
 
directly inherited from colonialism and filled with representations, discourses, institutions, 
and practices of the colonial imaginary.  
In France, “Islamophobia” is part of the hegemonic discourse – pronounced by the 
state to legitimate a reality that it has created. Indeed, while they are condemning so-called 
“Islamophobia,” many political leaders keep on stigmatizing Muslim communities by 
perpetually creating controversies around such things as the Islamic veil or halal restaurants, 
which in fact are not topics of debate until said politicians represent them as questions of 
“national identity.” These strategic nationalist discourses, sociologist Marwan Mohammed 
argues, have played a huge role in constructing a “problème musulman” (Muslim problem) 
(Libération 2013c). “[O]n ne peut pas comprendre les réactions hostiles à une femme portant 
le hijab sans le mettre en rapport avec vingt ans de discours politique et médiatique sur ce 
sujet.” (ibid.)115 Alain Finkielkraut is an openly anti-Muslim racist thinker who writes about 
“the threat that the refusal of integration of French youth represents for national identity.” Yet 
he was recently given the national recognition, supported by many “respectable figures” of 
the French elite, of being elected at the Académie française – a highly recognized national 
institution composed of 40 “immortal” scholars and authors. To me, this political decision 
appears as the establishment and normalization, by the state, of an anti-Muslim racism 
directed towards les “français musulmans,” the descendants of postcolonial immigration. It 
targets specifically the descendants of Algeria – “the most inassimilable of all” – who carry, 
on top of ethnicity, religion and coloniality, l’exception d’un colonialisme inachevé.116 
Les Banlieues Ou La Production de l’Altérité  
The exceptionality of the racist construction of the French of Algerian descent in a 
system of (post)colonial representations, discourses, and practices, is pushed to an extreme in 
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 My translation: “[O]ne cannot understand hostile reactions towards a woman wearing hijab if one does not 
put it in relation with twenty years of political and media discourse on this topic.” 
116
 the exception of a living colonialism 
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the dominant imaginary on the “banlieues de la République” or in Lapeyronnie’s terms, “le 
théâtre colonial” (Lapeyronnie 2005).  
The banlieues populaires (working-class banlieues)
117
 are postindustrial spaces 
located in the outskirts of big cities such as Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Lille, which are 
characterized by their poor housing projects implemented a few decades ago and their high 
unemployment rate (Dikeç 2006). They are sites of high cultural, ethnic, and religious 
diversity. However, they “are the repositories of the second generation of mass 
unemployment before they are the crucible of the second generation of immigrants” 
(Wacquant 2008). The security-oriented “politics of the banlieues,” in place particularly since 
the 1990s, has strengthened discriminatory representations, discourses, and practices towards 
the inhabitants of the banlieues populaires, particularly young “black” and of Maghreb 
background men, indifferently labeled as “les jeunes de banlieues.” There is great racial and 
territorial discrimination in accessing jobs and accommodation (Weil 2009b; Abd-Al-Malik 
2010; Observatoire des discriminations 2004 among others). Furthermore, the legalization of 
repetitive identity checks and the reinforcement of the policing of the “cités” have been 
coupled with widespread racism among the police and have led to overwhelming police 
violence and impunity (Dikeç 2006; France: Des Policiers Au-Dessus Des Lois ? 2009; Abd-
Al-Malik 2010 among others). 
 Mustafa Dikeç, a Professor in Human Geography at the University of London, 
explains: 
[S]tarting particularly with the 1990s, there has been a strong stigmatisation of 
banlieues with reference to the formation of ghettos, ethnic separatism, and Islamic 
fundamentalism. When the ‘threat’ of banlieues was articulated in the 1970s, it did not 
involve ‘ethnic’ and religious connotations. Starting in the 1980s, however, the 
banlieues were associated with the ‘problem of immigration’, the problem being the 
‘integration’ of non-European immigrants and their descendants into French society, 
and, starting in the 1990s, Islam became a dominant theme. (Dikeç 2006, 161) 
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 Even though the dominant discourse uses the term banlieues to refer to the working-class banlieues as a 
stigmatizing strategy, there are also many upper-class banlieues. 
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Indeed, the inhabitants of the banlieues are the object of a hyper-stigmatizing discourse that 
associates such different and wide topics as Islam, immigration, and insecurity. Through these 
politics of representation, the banlieues populaires have become the image of the threat to the 
Republic, for the security of its national territory and for the integrity of its national identity. 
In addition, the banlieues are constructed as off spaces – des territoires de non droit. 
They are located at the periphery of socio-political and geographical existence – territoires de 
seconde zone avec des citoyens de seconde classe – des territoires d’exception.118 “Est-ce 
qu’on parle des banlieues ou est-ce qu’on parle de la France ? Est-ce qu’on parle d’une 
partie ou est-ce qu’on parle d’un tout ? De quoi parle-t-on ?” (Abd-Al- Malik 2010, 19)119 
This representation of a far-off reality, une réalité lointaine, recalls the colony. 
La banlieue est un espace mystifié. Comme la colonie, c’est un espace imaginaire et 
imaginé, une réalité immatérielle, qui ne vit qu’à travers la représentation. Comme la 
colonie, la banlieue n’est pas “pensée”. Ce qui est pensé c’est l’“immigration” ou la 
“sécurité,” c’est-à-dire que la banlieue, en tant que discours, n’existe que par sa relation 
avec la société dominante. Non défini, hors du temps, ce territoire de non-droit se justifie par 
sa propre existence et se caractérise par son extraterritorialité et son exceptionnalité.
120
 
Through the hegemonic discourse of the elites and its mechanisms of postcolonial 
domination, the banlieues populaires are “deviant spaces” that the state ought to “discipline.”  
En France aujourd’hui, les individus des « quartiers sensibles » sont réduits au 
silence sur le plan politique, maintenus dans une très forte dépendance économique et 
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 Second-rate territories with second-class citizens – territories of exception 
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 My translation: “Are we talking about the banlieues or are we talking about France? Are we talking about a 
portion or are we talking about a whole? What are we talking about?” 
120
 The banlieue is a mystified space. Like the colony, it is imaginary and imagined, an immaterial reality, which 
only lives through representation. Like the colony, the banlieue is not “thought.” What is thought is 
“immigration” or “security,” in other words the banlieue, as a discourse, only exists through its relation with the 
dominant society. Undefined, off time, this off-law territory justifies itself through its own existence and 
characterizes itself by its extraterritoriality and its exceptionality. 
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dominés socialement et culturellement par un véritable « système » 
d’institutionnalisation du racisme et de rapports coloniaux. (Lapeyronnie 2005, 3)121  
 
This “deviant character” is a collective and homogeneous assignation from outside – 
“les jeunes des banlieues,” represented as young boy, “Arab” (of Maghreb origin) or “black,” 
Muslim, misogynist, and probably “delinquent” or about to be one. It is a denial of agency – 
une assignation territoriale et identitaire, un enfermement, un conditionnement, a 
confinement: racism.  
Racisme nom masculin. 1. […] 2. Cimetière identitaire, métaphore intérieure de la 
prison à ciel ouvert. 3. Attitude d’hostilité systématique à l’encontre d’une catégorie 
déterminée de personnes. Racisme envers les jeunes : anti-Nous universel empêchant 
toute poussée dans les aigus du champ lexical qui permettrait de ne plus dire « jeune 
de banlieue » mais « jeune » tout court, en sous-entendant « citoyen » et peut-être 
même « semblable », voire « être humain ». 4. Conservatisme, virus malin, qui 
s’adapte, se développe même dans un environnement qui ne lui est pas favorable a 
priori, c’est un cancer d’un autre genre, d’un autre âge, une pathologie aux 
symptômes invisibles pour beaucoup mais qui gangrène sous la chair de nos jolis 
mensonges. (Abd-Al-Malik 2010, 61- 62)
122
 
This “cimetière identitaire” is “une assignation territoriale” that functions as “une injonction 
identitaire,” and these socio-spatial representations are the tools of a symbolic and material 
postcolonial domination (Hancock 2008). Territories are only metaphors of their inhabitants 
(Hancock 2008; Abd-Al-Malik 2010). In line with the “Republican tradition,” the rhetoric of 
“territories” allows the state to talk about communities that cannot be named ethno-
religiously.
123
 Through the stigmatization of the banlieues, the discourse assigns a 
homogenous representation of ethno-religious identity, even though the reality of the 
banlieues is much more complex. Therefore, everything that happens in the banlieues is 
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 My translation: “In France today, the inhabitants of “sensitive neighborhoods” are reduced to silence at the 
political level, maintained in a state of strong economic dependence, and dominated socially and culturally by a 
real “system” of institutionalization of racism and colonial relations.” 
122
 My translation: “Racism masculine noun. 1. […] 2. Identity cemetery, internal metaphor of the open-cut 
prison. 3. Attitude of systematic hostility towards a determined category of people. Racism against the youth: 
anti-universal Us that impedes any boost towards a higher pitch in the lexical field that would beneficially turn 
“jeune de banlieue” into “jeune” period, in an intention to hint “citizen” and maybe even “counterpart,” or 
“human being.” 4. Conservatism, malignant virus, that adapts, develops even in an environment that is not 
suitable a priori, it is cancer of another genre, of another age, a pathology whose symptoms are invisible for 
many, yet that gangrenes under the flesh of our pretty lies.” 
123
 As Boulbina has shown, colonial language is filled with a series of euphemisms such as “territories” instead 
of “countries,” “presence” instead of “occupations,” etc. 
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represented as the result of such ethno-religious identity. Through this system of 
representation, the discourse looks for the stigma it has created. This explains why the 
“question du voile” has been thought of as the female version of the question of the banlieues 
populaires (Hancock 2008).  
 In a discourse that mixes indifferently questions of “security,” “Islam,” and 
“immigration,” such assigned ethno-religious identity targets les enfants d’immigrés, and the 
stigma is located in the failure of their “integration,” filled with an irrational and rhetorical 
fear that the banlieues populaires have become the “ghettos” of the Republic. Thus, the 
dominant voices of public debate interpreted the 2005 revolts as the expression of an identity 
crisis and “quickly gave rise to debates about ‘integrating’ the children of (non-European) 
immigrants, ethnic separatism, and Islamic fundamentalism” (Dikeç 2006, 162). Implicitly, 
“race” is (re)presented as the “natural cause of deviance” of the “jeunes.” “Race” matters for 
racism. In the banlieues, however, the government uses “race” as an argument to sustain the 
very discourse that creates a situation of oppression where race/religion functions as a factor 
of marginalization along with class as well as gender.  
 Therefore, this racist discourse initially targeting the banlieues populaires leads to a 
racism that targets the descendants of the colonized populations in general. It is a racism of 
exception, an assignation of territory and identity on the basis of an imaginary of exception – 
a colonial one that in a binary logic of “us” versus “them” opposes l’indigène de la 
République to la République. Part of the functioning of postcolonial racism in the banlieues is 
that the state claims that the differentiation is not racial, that’s to say racist, but rather due to 
the “exceptionality” of the “territory.”  
 The “exceptionality” of the situation in these “territories” – also called “quartiers 
sensibles” – justifies a treatment of exception, measures of exception, which are far too 
symbolic in this historical and geographical context. Thus, in 2005, the discourse of Nicolas 
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Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior and key political figure of the revolts, reveals an urge, 
an impulse, and a necessity, to éradiquer (eradicate) the criminality of the banlieues 
populaires through phrases like nettoyage (cleansing); kärcher (German brand that sells very 
powerful outdoor cleaning machines using strong water jets); racaille (rabble); voyous (louts); 
on va vous en [la racaille] débarasser (we are going to get rid of it [the rabble] for you); 
tolérance zero (zero tolerance).
124
 On top of that, the declaration of state of emergency “added 
insult to the injury” (Dikeç 2006, 161). The implementation of a law that was created in 1955 
to kill the Algerian independentist movement and legitimized the use of torture and rape as an 
institutionalized and systematized weapon of war was nothing but a “colonial provocation” 
(Bernard 2005). “Face à quels autres citoyens le gouvernement exhumerait-il un texte 
législatif conçu pour mater une rébellion coloniale?” (ibid.)125 
The same Nicolas Sarkozy, this time as president of the Republic, reiterated these 
sentiments in 2010 in his sadly famous “Grenoble speech,” thirty minutes of sick speech 
combining hypocrisy, hatred, and diverse forms of stigmatizations towards the inhabitants of 
the banlieues populaires.
126
 
C’est donc une guerre que nous avons décidé de mener contre les trafiquants et les 
délinquants, comme en Seine-Saint-Denis. Nous avons décidé de nous occuper 
particulièrement de certains territoires qui ont besoin d’une action ciblée pour que les 
conditions de l’ordre républicain y soient rétablies. Tel est le cas de cette ville et de ce 
département. Il n’y a aucune volonté de stigmatisation. Tous les élus, ce n’est pas une 
affaire d’opposition, de majorité, de gauche ou de droite, c’est une affaire d’intérêt 
général [sic]. (Elysée 2011)
127
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 On 30
th
 of October, on the national TV channel France 3, Eric Raoult, Mayor of Raincy, a town located in the 
same département of Clichy-sous-bois, confirmed: “Nicolas Sarkozy a eu raison de faire passer le message qu’il 
y a les gens, et puis il y a la racaille.” - My translation: “Nicolas Sarkozy was right to pass on the message that 
there is people, and then there is rabble.” (youtube video of France 3 10/31/2005 program) 
125
 My translation: “To which other citizens would the government dig out a legal text produced to put down a 
colonial rebellion?” 
126
 It matters to specify that through this speech Nicolas Sarkozy officially appointed a policeman to the position 
of préfet of Isère (the highest ranked civil servant of the département) – the same measure he had taken for 
Seine-Saint-Denis, the most “famous” of all départements of “quartiers sensibles.” 
127
 My translation: “It is therefore a war that we have decided to carry out against traffickers and delinquents, 
like in Seine-Saint-Denis. We have decided to take particular care of certain territories that need targeted action 
in order to reestablish the conditions of Republican order. This is the case for this town and this département. 
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The political discourse held in cases of manifestations of violence (resistance?) in the 
banlieues populaires is a very symbolic discourse of “war,” one that led an activist from 
Vaulx-en-Velin to say “the Algerian War is not over in France” (Abdel  2002, cited in Dikeç 
2006). Ce discours de guerre est un discours de force, un discours “d’homme à homme” et un 
discours de castration. This war discourse is a “male to male,” castrating discourse– 
inherently part of the colonial relation – a phallus-centered demonstration of force that aims at 
asserting sexual power and controlling women’s bodies. 
Finally, this discourse of colonial power aims at showing the French enfants 
d’immigrés that it is not they who are the owners of their future in this “territory.” In 
assimilating issues of insecurity to the enforcement of the immigration policy, the discourse 
re-asserts that French descendants of Algeria are second-class citizens, whose future as 
members of the national community is not granted. The recurrent discourses on déchéance de 
la nationalité (loss of national citizenship) are a conspicuous example.  
 
 
As a sign of “full” belonging, a French man shows his voting registration card at a 
demonstration for equal treatment of all “territories” in Marseille, June 2013, my own photo. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
There is no intention to stigmatize. All elected representatives, it is not a matter of opposition, majority, left or 
right, it is a matter of general interest [sic].” (Stresses are mine). 
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In 2010, Abd-Al-Malik writes a powerful piece, which juxtaposes story and reality in 
the banlieues, which he entitles La guerre des banlieues n’aura pas lieu (The war of the 
banlieues will not take place). Through the voice of Peggy, a young man from a working-class 
banlieue (who becomes Suleymane through his conversion to Islam), he is able to shift the 
dominant look and reflect a subjectivity from within. Purposefully alternating between two 
literary styles – “l’auteur se fait narrateur” d’une “histoire de banlieue” (the author becomes 
the narrator of a story of banlieue) and “moi, Peggy, personnage principal, m’empare de mon 
histoire et la raconte moi-même” (I, Peggy, main character, take over my own story and tell it 
myself), he highlights the character’s radical consciousness over his own reality. Abd-Al-
Malik brilliantly shows the injustice of a hegemonic and taken-for-granted discourse that 
silences the subjectivity of oppressed lives through a unilateral power to represent and 
construct a reality that is totally stigmatized, mystified, and of which it knows nothing. He 
writes: 
Mais aviez-vous déjà pris le pouls de cette jeunesse, je veux dire avant qu’elle ne soit 
malade ? Non ! Mais vous vous confondez pourtant en diagnostics hasardeux. Vos 
intelligences peuvent-elles admettre que ce mal ne ressemble à aucun autre ? Vous ne 
le connaissez pas. Vous ne les connaissez pas. (Abd-Al-Malik 2010, 62)
128
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the dominant/consensual discourse in France on 
“diversity” and “immigration” in relation to the construction of the figure of the français 
musulmans, in particular of Algerian descent. I have heavily relied on discourses of political 
figures, often supported by conventional “intellectuals,” legal texts, institutional rules, and 
media coverage. Indeed, the French Algerian citizens are imprisoned by hegemonic 
                                                          
128
 My translation: “But had you ever had your finger on the pulse of this youth, I mean before it fell sick? No! 
But still you are effusive in your hazardous diagnostics. Can your intelligences admit that this sickness is not like 
any other? You don’t know it. You don’t know them.” 
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representations built through a stigmatizing discourse that compels “certain populations” to 
“integrate.”  
Through my research I have found that this established relation of power is determined 
by a patriarchal-racist gaze that constructs the French citizens of Algerian descent as the 
subjects of the French Republic. “Naturally inferior,” “Other,” they ought to be “disciplined.” 
Concomitantly, through this racism of exception, they, like their parents in l’Algérie 
française, are the guarantors of the French grandeur. Indeed, it is in opposition and in relation 
to the constructed figure of the “Français musulman,” from the banlieues, that the “dream” 
of the French Republic and its grand values of égalité and laïcité is, in the discourse, alive. 
The French descendants of Algeria represented as a threat to a “national identity” that 
is, in the collective unconscious, “white,” Christian, and loyal to the Republic-laïcité package. 
Through such discourse, they are “tolerated” if they remain “invisible,” that is, assimilated. In 
the Republican imaginary, the enfants d’immigrés are responsible for their own “assimilation” 
or “défaut d’assimilation” to the “nation.” Besides, only the latter is able to judge. In this 
imaginary, they do not have the right to make “errors,” and if they do, it works as the evident 
representation of their expected superficial belonging to the nation.  Through these politics of 
representation, the discourse vividly maintains the illusion of “integration” into a grande 
République égalitaire et laïque. It is through this postcolonial “mission civilisatrice” that 
France “remains grand” (white). A “mission civilisatrice” that, by definition, is un projet 
impossible, une entreprise sans fin, une guerre totale.
129
 
Such construction of self through negation of other plays out through constant racial 
and racist stigmatization that hides behind the defense of Republican values. Specifically, 
“Islam” and the “banlieues” function as the avatars of a postcolonial racism applied upon the 
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 an impossible project, an infinite enterprise, an absolute war 
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so-perceived French Muslims (most importantly) of Algerian descent. Through them, the 
dominant discourse represents Islam as a threat to laïcité and the banlieues as “territories” of 
exception. It enables the state to practice racism without explicitly targeting communities. In 
an international context of stigmatization of Islam in most Western nations, and through a 
rhetoric of fear of so-called “ghettos,” Islam fundamentalism and “illegal immigration,” the 
discourse makes the systematic confusion “jeune de banlieue,” “issu de l’immigration,” and 
“potentially fundamentalist” (and “terrorist”). It aims at reaffirming the non-full belonging in 
the “French community” of the French-Algerian citizens. It reaffirms who holds patriarchal 
power.  
More specifically, the “banlieues” are represented as a far-off space on the 
geographical and political-social periphery of the nation. Just as the Republic was constructed 
with l’Algérie française, Republican identity today constructs itself with the French 
immigrant, child of indigènes parents, represented as Muslim and from the banlieues. This 
postcolonial form of racism is complex because it plays out through the intersection of 
multiple factors of stigmatization: class, “race,” religion, gender, and history. It is hidden 
behind discourses that use an apparently non-racial rhetoric that does not specifically name. I 
have argued that these elements are perpetual tools of the patriarchal-racist gaze/discourse of 
systematic injunction to “integrate” which, in the “impensé des consciences,” is addressed to 
the (French) child of (Algerian) indigènes. 
By teasing out the racist discourse that targets all of these elements, I have tried to 
show that the latter relies on a coloniality of knowledge that reproduces and remakes the 
discourses, practices, representations, and institutions of the French colonialist project. This 
postcolonial racism is deeply internalized in a way that it is invisible. It functions in a way 
that takes for granted its white, narcissistic nature and makes the French of Algerian descent 
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unheard and unhearable. The enfant d’indigènes is concomitantly a threat and the guarantor 
for the grand Republic. 
Republic and diversity are compatible. However, it is necessary that French society 
decolonize itself as well as the political project of the Republic in order to create the space 
from where it is possible to live together in balance throughout diversities, stories, and 
identities. 
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Chapter 3: Notes towards Transformative Decolonization 
 
This is the story of a house. It has been lived in by many people. Our grandmother, 
Baba, made this house living space. She was certain that the way we lived was shaped 
by objects, the way we looked at them, the way they were placed around us. She was 
certain that we were shaped by space. From her I learned about aesthetics, the 
yearning for beauty that she tells me is the predicament of heart that makes our 
passion real. A quiltmaker, she teaches me about color. Her house is a place where I 
am learning to look at things, where I am learning how to belong in space. In rooms 
full of objects, crowded with things, I am learning to recognize myself. She hands me a 
mirror, showing me how to look. The color of wine she has made in my cup, the beauty 
of the everyday. Surrounded by fields of tobacco, the leaves braided her hair, dried 
and hung, circles and circles of smoke fill the air. We string red peppers fiery hot, 
with thread that will not be seen. They will hang in front of a lace curtain to catch the 
sun. Look, she tells me, what the light does to color! Do you believe that space can 
give life, or take it away, that space has power? These are the questions she asks 
which frighten me. Baba dies an old woman, out of place. Her funeral is also a place 
to see things, to recognize myself. How can I be sad in the face of death, surrounded 
by so much beauty? Dead, hidden in a field of tulips, wearing my face and calling my 
name. Baba can make them grow. Red, yellow, they surround her body like lovers in a 
swoon, tulips everywhere. Here a soul on fire with beauty burns and passes, a soul 
touched by flame. We see her leave. She has taught me how to look at the world and 
see beauty. She has taught me ‘we must learn to see.’  
(hooks 1990, 103) 
  
Itinerary 
This discussion takes place within a difficult context marked by the domination in the 
public sphere of “debates” involving issues of “immigration,” “race,” and the French so-
called “issus de l’immigration.” This context is also marked by the widening tension between 
the simultaneous omnipresence and denial of racism in the public space, mostly directed 
towards the so-called “French Muslims.” Finally, the descendants of the colonized indigènes 
demand full belonging and, accordingly, that the discourse of abstract Republican equality 
translates on ground, in the realities of intra-national relations. The institutions, practices, and 
representations of the state are disconnected from the people that make up French society. The 
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postcolonial reflection has slowly penetrated French Academia since the end of the 1990s and 
the beginning of the 2000s, yet it still bears great resistances from the French intelligentsia. 
The challenge that lies in front of society in France today is how it must lead this reflection. It 
is more a conceptual, methodological, epistemological question than a question of content. 
In chapter one, I explore in direct relation to Algeria as a colony how the French 
Republic is constituted by and constitutive of the differentiation between white colonial 
France and the colonized indigènes Other. I have argued that the negation to tell plural and 
complex stories of colonialism reproduces and recreates the colonial hierarchy within French 
society today. It marginalizes the citizens of colonized descent, les enfants d’immigrés, from 
the national imaginary. The contradiction between the conservatism of the French universalist 
tradition and the realities of racial and social discriminations lead to a colonial/national 
malaise. In chapter two, I tease out the existence and functioning of a form of postcolonial 
racism using analysis of legal, media, and political discourses. I focus on the French of 
colonized descent, most importantly the figures of the “Français-e-s musulman-e-s,” 
specifically “d’origine algérienne.” I have claimed that through familiar representations, 
institutions, practices, and discourses, such as the discourse of “integration,” postcolonial 
racism remakes the French colonial project of the “mission civilisatrice.” 
My intention in this chapter is to explore a transformative process of decolonization. I 
do not intend to provide a solution or to transform postcolonial conflicts. These are multiple 
and manifest in multiple forms. Rather, epistemologically and ontologically I want to frame a 
transformative process of decolonization. This requires that I shift the dominant lens explored 
in the first two chapters and demonstrate that it is possible to start the postcolonial 
conversation on the challenges of postcoloniality and diversity in different ways. I propose to 
ask how-questions, in other words to replace power as a fundamental element of the 
discussions on diversity, immigration, and postcoloniality in France. I believe that the most 
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hearable voices on French diversity and postcoloniality have rooted their position in invisible 
assumptions that condition inequality. I propose to critically re-think the grounds of debate in 
a way that is sensitive to power and power relations. I make a reflective effort of 
transformative decolonization in order to lead myself and my reader towards a higher level of 
consciousness from where I, and society as a whole, can imagine and live out more peaceful 
and more equal relationships across “race,” gender, nationality, religion, and class in France. 
In doing so, the decolonial effort questions and problematizes the French Republic’s ethno-
blind, universal representations on égalité and laïcité. Individually and collectively, it is 
important to look into such questions with humility. It is necessary to rethink the questions 
that have been asked, and to think those that have not but that help me to reframe such 
universal claims through transformative decolonization lenses – faire un effort de 
détachement, ou plutôt de déplacement. Decolonization compels people in France to make an 
effort of detachment, or rather displacement, in distinct and contextualized ways. This critical 
reflection process and questioning does not amount to demonizing, boxing, or assessing, but 
rather opens up new spaces for understanding, acting, and being in relation. It uses the power 
human beings have to transform energies, simultaneously unmaking and remaking relations 
and selves in conflict.  
There exists a tension in my research with regards to the problematization, or rather 
the un-problematization, of the nation-state, which I have not addressed yet. I focus on 
postcolonial racism in relation to people of French belonging, by culture or nationality, most 
specifically second or third (or first who partly grew up in France) generation immigrants. I 
must also problematize the concept of French belonging by culture. What is culture? Who 
defines culture? Who defines belonging? Isn’t the very subject the only person entitled to 
decide upon her own culture and sense of belonging? There are many definitions of culture, 
just as there are many definitions of peace(s). All are valid, personal, and the result of one’s 
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experience and worldview of life. Also, as culture is a core element of identity, there is a 
tension in the very defining of the term between the perceptions of the subject herself and 
how others perceive her. 
Even though I do not draw a line of belonging on the basis of legality or citizenship, 
my discussion still is located within an understanding of France as a nation. The latter is 
problematic in regards to my concerns for creating spaces of harmony in difference. The 
system of the nation-state creates a border, physical and symbolic, between a “we” and an 
“Other” on the basis of a factor of identity – national belonging – which is a construction of 
the same nation-state. In the modern system of nation-states, there is always an Other, the 
refugee, the asylum seeker, the undocumented. Also, as I focus on the specific case of the 
French, I wonder how such a system applies to and affects first generation Algerians in 
France. I understand “France” as the whole ensemble of people who inhabit/make up the 
landscape of France: territorially, spiritually, or culturally in the here and now, regardless of 
any factor such as nationality, “race,” ethnicity, language, religion/spirituality, etc. Most 
specifically, when I claim for a transformative decolonization of France, I do not limit my 
thoughts to any border of identity. In deconstructing postcolonial racism, I do focus on the 
people who, through the effects of postcolonial immigration, present cultural traits, such as 
language (understood as dynamic and plural), practices, and a common understanding of 
certain things that, relatively speaking, build a common ground for unity.
130
 I also do 
acknowledge, and it seems very important to me to do so, that I am somehow drawing here a 
border that stems from the construction of the nation-state. It does not mean I do not challenge 
such construction. I do believe in radically plural identities that transcend such a construction. 
This is partly what I explore in this chapter, as I attempt to transform and create. 
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 Even language as factor of national belonging is relative. For example, and there are many more, the mother 
tongue of most French from the Antilles is creole. Similarly, many first generation immigrants from North 
Africa and West Africa speak French. 
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In the first part of this chapter, I look at decolonizing theory in France through the 
input of feminist and post-colonial approaches. I tease out how situated knowledges, de-
centered perspectives, and decolonial epistemologies can respond to the necessity to engage 
with making silenced voices hearable in the French context. In the second part, I investigate 
the process of transformative decolonization in France. I highlight the need for the Republic 
to recognize the condition of postcoloniality in its complexities and pluralities in order to 
think of diversity as harmony in difference. Then, I explore the process of transformation as 
an unsettling, beautiful, and open process towards embracing the plurality of identities in 
contemporary France. 
I engage in an interdisciplinary adventure, borrowing mostly from Peace and Conflict 
Studies, Critical Race Studies, Philosophy, Post-colonialism, Feminism, and Human 
geography. It is the result of my on-going reflection, made of the different perspectives, that 
have enriched my thoughts over two years studying Peace, Conflict, and Development in the 
framework of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace at the Universitat Jaume I, 
Castelló, Spain. It is, like the pieces of a mind, messy. It is, furthermore, one proposition 
towards transformation, but surely not a final or sole answer. It is a more personal part of my 
work, one that reflects one image, and many images, of myself. It is moving. It connects my 
theories with my aesthetics – the creative “aesthetic agency” that fosters transformation and 
the practice of my freedom (Acampora and Cotten 2007). It is the dancing me.  
I am concerned, particularly in this part of the process, with negotiating wisely my 
own location within my topic (Rich 2003; Haraway 1988; Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 
2012). I must be sensitive to power while I argue for plurality. According to Peace Studies, I 
have an intersubjective relation with my research, which means that I, from where I stand, am 
simultaneously impacting and being impacted by the subject of my research. Thus my own 
location is fundamental. In my context of analysis, I am a white citizen who belongs to the 
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constructed French norm. My voice is a voice that comes from this position of power, with 
the realities and the blind spots that it supposes, the things it has let me see and those it has 
not.  Integral to Peace Studies is the inner work that must happen within of any conflict 
facilitator. Thus I am looking to uncover my own blind spots. 
This chapter seems more theoretical than the other two. It aims at epistemologically 
re-thinking theory. I do not enter into the redistribution debate. This work intends to be an 
initial reflection that opens the path towards making changes possible. It is an invitation to the 
imagination. I do believe that theoretical exploration, as well as theoretical reflection on 
existing theories, is, in fact, essential and integral to any process of transformation of the 
realities on the ground. In fact, I think that arguing the opposite is part of a self-supplying, 
uncritical, universal discourse of power. I believe that engaged imagination is fundamental to 
break boxes, défaire et refaire le réel.  
There is a noticeable shift from my first two chapters. I move away from the enfants 
d’immigrés algériens as a case study. My concern for transformative decolonization goes 
beyond my case study. Even though the condition of postcoloniality reflects heterogeneous 
realities, I believe that the need to decolonize French institutions and imaginations transcends 
borders within that condition. My proposal looks at breaking with perceived identities in an 
effort to unmake/remake a plural, harmonious, and imperfect whole.  
Decolonizing Theory 
In the current discussions on coloniality and postcoloniality, decolonization refers to 
an intellectual and political movement that emerged in the specific context of Latin America 
from Cultural Studies and Sociology disciplines, mostly through Aníbal Quijano (2000), 
Ramón Grosfoguel (2007; 2011), and Walter Mignolo (2000). It refers to an epistemological 
and critical project that aims at decolonizing knowledge from the hegemony of modernity by 
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giving space to diverse political, epistemic, and ethical projects, with a special engagement 
towards silenced and subalternized voices and bodies. Initially inspired by local situations, 
this decolonial movement conceptualizes a theorization of global systems of domination, 
bridging coloniality, race, and political-economy. Through the perspectives of Ramón 
Grosfoguel and Walter Mignolo, it resonates with the theory of Intersectionality elaborated in 
the US context. Drawing on the experience of women of color, Intersectionality Theory 
introduces an understanding of racism as the playing out of simultaneous oppressions on the 
basis of multiple factors of identity, mostly race, gender, class, and sexualities, intersecting 
with each other in such a way that patriarchy, capitalism, and colonialism function as one 
intermeshed system (Crenshaw 1991; hooks 1995). 
My proposal for decolonization takes place within the specific national context of 
France. It is also a political and epistemological project. It bridges the way we see and the 
way we act, looking at conceptual roots and acting upon “l’expérience historique et [les] 
expériences subjectives singulières auxquelles certaines situations économiques, politiques et 
sociales donnent lieu” (Luste Boulbina 2007, 10).131 It also deconstructs the claim of 
universality of the European modern/colonial project. However, the coloniality that is targeted 
in both contexts is very distinct. In Latin America, the formal process of political 
decolonization occurred about two hundred years ago. On the other hand, the intellectual 
movement known as “decolonial” has emerged from cultural critics departing from today’s 
social and racial realities. The latter realities are legacies of the colonial/modern system 
but/and exist on their own. My claim for the decolonization of France certainly is a claim for 
the present that starts from the present. Yet, colonialism holds a very special place in 
understanding contemporary France and thinking of its decolonization. Decolonization thus 
aims at transforming the remnants and continuities of French colonialism in France in the 
                                                          
131
 My translation: “the historical experience and singular subjective experiences resulting from certain 
economic, political, and social situations.” 
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present-day. It embraces and engages with the multiple and plural bodies that constitute the 
human community of France. Additionally, in my context, decolonization takes place in and 
within the former Empire (as opposed to former colonies), even though my understanding of 
France today is more complex than my understanding of France during colonial times. It is 
rooted in the specific context of French coloniality and postcoloniality in which the Republic 
and its dominant imaginary of white French (male) grandeur holds a central place in the 
national colonial project.  
In France, intellectual and political voices that critically bring a post-colonial lens on 
French society have recently emerged. They mostly manifest as the necessity to narrate the 
story(ies) differently. To recall Ann Laura Stoler’s words, there is in France an “aphasie 
coloniale,” a sort of “occultation du savoir,” occultation of knowledges that highlight such an 
oxymoron as the “colonial Republic” (Stoler 2010). Many authors I have referred to – Luste 
Boulbina (2012), Vergès (2012), Bancel and Blanchard (2005), Blanchard (2009), Simon 
(2005), Hancock (2008), Mbembe (2005), Guénif-Souilamas (2005) have written on the 
necessity to “decolonize knowledges,” “imaginaries,” “institutions,” “representations,” 
“mentalities,” “the Republic,” and “le regard” (the look) in France. The decolonial project in 
France bridges decolonizing minds (imaginations) and practices.  
I depart from these French, European-based intellectual and political trends. I attempt 
to bridge these with Feminist and Race Studies critics that mostly arose out of the US context. 
bell hooks is one of them. She is an influential feminist thinker and activist, one of the well-
known theorists of Intersectionality. She draws her inspiration from her own experience of 
marginalization as black woman in the United States. From the field of Cultural Studies, she 
looks at the interlocking of class domination, racism, and heterosexism in her national context 
through power and representation. Her numerous writings also explore the beauty of creativity 
that lies in the margins as power to create, to learn new ways of seeing, and to act upon one’s 
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condition of oppression. Like bell hooks, I think that systems of domination are interlocked in 
this world of “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (hooks 1995). In my specific colonial 
and postcolonial context, patriarchy takes a distinct nationalist and white-Catholic narcissistic 
form. Power structures and relations function in a way that race/religion, class, gender, and 
sexualities (to name a few) intersect as markers of subjugation and different life conditioning 
(Crenshaw 1991; hooks 1995). In particular, race and gender are co-constituted in the colonial 
project of modernity and subject us in all domains of existence (Lugones 2008). In resisting 
modern Eurocentrism, I also claim feminist partial vision of situated knowledges. Finally, I 
argue for transformative decolonization, one that takes its roots in conflict transformation of 
the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies. Decolonization aims at finding a place of 
encounter where dialogue can happen and relationships can be re-created. It is holistic and it 
moves within decolonial epistemologies of plurality. 
At last, transformative decolonization is simultaneously collective and individual. I 
start with myself. “En outre, que l’on soit d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontière coloniale, 
dans l’ancienne métropole comme dans l’ancien territoire dominé, la décolonisation 
commence et finit par soi-même, comme tout effort d’émancipation, tout combat de libération, 
tout travail de désaliénation” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 131).132 I am in the dynamics of 
postcoloniality and diversity of France. This final chapter is also my own personal (and 
relational) journey towards a self-politics of decolonization. 
Embodying Debate 
In decolonizing epistemology, I am concerned with method. What do we make theory 
for and, most importantly, for whom do we researchers make theory? From literary theory, 
Barbara Christian raises these questions in her critical essay on “The Race for Theory” 
                                                          
132
 My translation: “Moreover, whether one is on one or the other side of the colonial divide, in the former 
metropolis as in the former dominated territory, decolonization starts and ends with one’s self, like any 
emancipation effort, any liberation struggle, any de-alienation job.”  
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(1988). I cross disciplines here and raise the same concerns in the Social Sciences. Indeed, in 
my view, these questions matter, for they determine how we make theory: how we know what 
we know, what we claim to know, what we say and what we simply assume, what our body 
allows us to see and where the blind spots in our vision are. “The Race for Theory” takes 
place within the universalistic project of modernism, and its continuities in postmodernism. 
Such a project tends, on account of its positivist influences, to claim “disembodied 
objectivity” (Haraway 1988) and consecutively to lead to (the privilege of) abstraction – 
“prescriptive, exclusive, elitish” theory (Christian 1988, 74). Modernist universality has been 
the cornerstone of colonialist, capitalist, white supremacist, patriarchal, Eurocentric, 
heterosexist hegemonic world power. It has conditioned epistemology in a way that today’s 
construction and hierarchical organization of knowledge(s) still bear the legacies. While 
placing the “white” European heterosexual male as the existential norm of society, such 
modern universal structuring of the world has systematically silenced other ways of seeing 
and theorizing, being and acting in the world.  
From the 1980s onwards, post-colonial, decolonial, and intersectional feminists 
located in the global colonial powers have massively written about the importance of 
positioning one’s self in claiming her vision of the world (Rich 2003; Haraway 1988; 
Anzaldúa 1990; Suárez-Navaz and Hernández Castillo 2008; Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 
2012; among others). For as all bodies are marked by and with the structures of power within 
which they take place, all forms of knowledge(s) are embodied. They reflect a certain 
perspective determined by one’s epistemological and political location. Thus, the claim of the 
rational is the sign of partial vision: “Objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific 
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits 
and responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision” 
(Haraway 1988, 582-583). 
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The hierarchical structuring of knowledge leads to what Luste Boulbina refers to, in 
the French context, as “objective fetishism.”  
 
Le fétichisme objectif (et objectal) qui ramène ainsi, dans certains domaines plus que 
dans d’autres, les grandes personnes aux grandes questions, universelles de 
préférence, dispose ainsi sans le secours de la volonté les chercheurs et les 
enseignants sur une palette qui s’étale du plus grand au plus petit, du plus universel 
au plus particulier, du majeur au mineur, du dominant au subalterne (Luste Boulbina 
2012, 133).
133
 
 
Thus the institutional hierarchization and colonization of knowledge takes place along the 
lines of the constructed universal, that is, it parallels the subjugation of peoples in the colonial 
world. Barbara Christian (1988) talks about her own experience as black feminist literature 
writer. From her context, she echoes Luste Boulbina’s argument: “Again I was supposed to 
know them, while they [the tenants of academic (western) knowledge] were not at all 
interested in knowing me” (Christian 1988, 72). Knowledges and peoples are hierarchized in 
relation to the European core. Such epistemological blindness is a form of Eurocentric 
epistemological and ontological racism. Indeed,  
‘You do not see me because you do not see yourself and you do not see yourself 
because you declare yourself outside of culture,’ writes María Lugones. According to 
Lugones, dis-engagement is a sanctioned ethnocentric racist strategy. Whites not 
naming themselves white presume their universality; an unmarked race is a sign of 
Racism unaware of itself, a ‘blanked-out’ Racism (Anzaldúa 1990, xxi). 
The hierarchization of questions and people(s) from the most universal to the most particular 
takes place within colonialist and patriarchal structures of modern and postmodern thought. It 
is such that, for instance, a philosopher from the Global South is expected to know 
extensively Euro-centred philosophy while it is normal for a Western-based philosopher not 
to know anything outside Euro-centred philosophy and still claim (disembodied) objectivity.  
                                                          
133
 My translation to English: “Objective fetishism thus brings back, in some areas more than in others, great 
persons to great questions, preferably universal. It thus places, regardless of will, investigators and professors on 
a scale that stretches from the greatest to the most insignificant, from the most universal to the most particular, 
from major to minor, from dominant to subaltern.” 
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“Objective fetishism” is a form of blanked-out racism deeply ingrained within French 
institutions as well as imaginations. In addition, “[c]omme dans toutes les institutions, la 
méconnaissance de soi, pour être un défaut de réflexivité critique, n’en est pas moins un 
avantage objectif” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 133).134 In the French postcolonial context, such 
“avantage objectif” bears its own specificities. Indeed, French institutions of knowledge (and 
power), through the conservatism of its rigid structures and its intellectual stakeholders, tend 
to reproduce the traits of colonial hierarchization of social life (Luste Boulbina 2012). It 
follows that “objective fetishism” rests on national and metropolitan preference intertwined 
with white and male preference (ibid., 136). The same sort of blind policy that in the French 
colonies did not see racial inequality applies today through a legitimizing trust in the école 
républicaine that extends to all institutions of knowledge (ibid.). As conventional researchers 
tend to think of themselves as the undisputed owners of rational knowledge, they separate 
objects and subjects of knowledge. It is precisely because of this detachment that they tend to 
reproduce and enforce the very discriminations they vividly criticize in theory (ibid.). It 
results that maleness, as well as the differentiation between European French and non-
European French, French and non-European non-French, function as invisible factors of 
competence (ibid.).  
L’invisibilité du plafond [de verre], c’est-à-dire la cécité collective sur son existence 
et sa fonction, jusqu’à preuve du contraire, est constitutive de ce plafond. Il suffit de le 
voir, collectivement et publiquement, pour qu’il se lézarde. Or, dans le monde 
académique français, la perception des discriminations reste privée (ibid., 140).
135
 
 
In the French institutions conservatism is the rule. “Les institutions d’enseignement et de 
recherche sont donc réglées par un fétichisme qui détermine les sujets par les objets et les 
objets par les sujets comme dans toute administration des choses, comme, aussi, dans tout 
                                                          
134
 My translation: “[l]ike in all institutions, lack of knowledge of one’s self, inasmuch as it is a default of critical 
reflexivity, is equally a form of objective advantage.” 
135
 My translation: “The invisibility of the glass ceiling, that’s to say the collective blindness to its existence and 
its function is, until proven otherwise, constitutive of the ceiling. We need only to see it, collectively and 
publicly, for it to crack. Yet, in the French academic world, perceiving discriminations remains private.” 
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commerce” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 134).136 By abiding by the rules of objective fetishism, 
institutions and researchers that constitute the institutions maintain the status quo. In fact, “La 
France intellectuelle est connue dans le monde entier pour sa fermeture d’esprit : elle est 
seule à ne pas le savoir” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 139).137 In France, part of the decolonial 
project certainly is the immense work that remains ahead to decolonize the institutions of the 
French Republic, in particular the institutions that regulate knowledge and the conditions of 
its formation. 
Such objective fetishism that organizes the academic world applies to political debate 
in France. C’est l’impensé de la réflexion.138 It results that society hears some voices – those 
voices which are a narcissistic image of self, ces memes voix qui se/nous regardent le 
nombril, and disregards others for their position in what amounts to a hierarchy of 
colonial/postcolonial patriarchal landscape. In France, the discourse frames questions in 
conditions of power inequalities. For instance, when the Minister of the Interior launches a 
“debate on national identity,” he, along with the political and intellectual elite that supports 
him, is epistemologically and politically biased. The legitimacy of “debate” rests on the 
unquestioned idea that certain populations are a threat to so-called “national identity.” 
Furthermore, “national identity” is a concept that forms part of the state ideology of security. 
It is presented here as a granted and blinding fact. Finally, it is not a “debate” when its 
managers only invite some populations of the national community to take part while 
systematically excluding others from it.  
All people actually speak because all bodies are political (Butler 2011). In the margins 
and from the margins, people speak too, in voices radically theirs. Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
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 My translation: “Institutions of research and higher education are thus controlled by a fetishism which 
determines the subjects by the objects and the objects by the subjects like in any administration of things, like, 
also, any form of commerce.” 
137
 My translation: “Intellectual France is known all over the world for its narrow-mindedness: it is the only one 
that does not know.” 
138
 It is the blind spot of debate. 
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Borderlands is a brilliant example of how to creatively act upon one’s condition of oppression 
and make beauty out of, from, and in the border – la frontera. Similarly, the inhabitants of the 
banlieues populaires in France create alternative dialogical spaces of expression, mainly 
through the street, religious creativity, and hip-hop culture (Zegnani 2013).
139
 These 
alternatives, as opposed to dominant forms of political participation, are a manifestation of 
their marginalization in public space. Hegemonic discourse systematically places their voices 
at the periphery of social life, approaches their bodies as deviant and suspect, and silences 
them for being, in Carbado’s (2005) words, “racially interested.” 
In France, the discourse must re-think the frame and replace body (embodiment) as a 
central concern of politics. The elite and society must displace debate and question method. 
Like Todd Shepard in his research on the history of colonial relations between France and 
Algeria, we as a national consciousness need to start by reflecting on which histories have 
been written and which ones have not (Casanova, Izambert and Rahal 2013). In discussing 
history, identity, and diversity, I must always situate myself within the subject of debate, 
when I speak and also when I remain silent. Human beings are always transforming and 
dynamic agents. 
De-centering the “White Male” 
In the modern capitalist, patriarchal, colonialist power structures of social life in which 
most human beings, including Europeans, are framed, spaces and bodies are highly racialized 
and gendered in relation to a constructed norm that is white, male, heterosexual, and middle 
class, among others. Consequently, part of the process of displacing methodology in debate is 
to displace the norm, to de-center whiteness and maleness. Central to the idea of de-centering 
the “white male” is undoing (white male) privilege. Devon W. Carbado’s chapter “Privilege” 
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 One of my critics of Zegnani’s work is his blindness to gender. In fact these modes of political expression are 
mostly male ones. 
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intends to shift the way politics commonly thinks discrimination. Because “[o]ur identities are 
reflective and constitutive of systems of oppression,” he says, the effects of discrimination are 
“bidirectional” for “discrimination allocates both burdens and benefits” (Carbado 2005, 191). 
What is white privilege? He quotes Barbara Flagg: “There is a profound cognitive dimension 
to the material and social privilege that attaches to whiteness in this society, in that the white 
person has an everyday option not to think of herself in racial terms at all. […] To be white is 
not to think about it” (ibid., 193-194). Carbado leads a reflection on race and privilege in the 
context of the United States, which indeed is very specific. Yet, the functioning of racism 
anywhere entails an institutionalized organization of social life which privileges some for 
their perceived racial belonging, and disadvantages others on the same account. 
Consecutively, to open spaces for transforming racial (and gender-based, etc.) discrimination 
is to work dialogically on both its effects: disadvantage and privilege. Indeed,  
Informing this privileged-centered understanding of discrimination is the notion that 
taking identity privileges for granted helps to legitimize problematic assumptions 
about identity and entitlement, assumptions that make it difficult for us to challenge 
the starting points of our most controversial conversations about equality (ibid., 190). 
Indeed, privilege matters for the sake of consciousness. How do I talk about equality in 
power-blind epistemologies? Race plays out in all relational existences. This means that race 
is always there even when it is invisible. Anyone who wants to talk honestly about diversity in 
France needs to recognize that the French white European male is, systematically, 
unconsciously, violently always placed in the center – as the referent point of view. It takes 
radically de-centering one’s self to be able to see through, transcend “race.” What’s more, not 
locating privilege is to reinforce it, in other words to maintain the racist (and heterosexist, 
etc.) status quo. Locating privilege is part of the “politics of location,” that is, the 
responsibility to make one’s body visible.  
The politics of location. Even to begin with my body I have to say that from the outset 
that body had more than one identity. When I was carried out of the hospital into the 
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world, I was viewed and treated as female, but also viewed and treated as white – by 
both Black and white people. I was located by color and sex as surely as a Black child 
was located by color and sex – though the implications of white identity were 
mystified by the presumption that white people are the center of the universe.  
To locate myself in my body means more than understanding what it has meant to me 
to have a vulva and clitoris and uterus and breasts. It means recognizing this white 
skin, the places it has taken me, the places it has not let me go (Rich 2003, 32). 
In raising the question of “race” in both its effects of privilege and disadvantage, I shall be 
cautious not to “universalize [whiteness]” and “present it as a ‘cohesive identity’ in ways that 
deny, obscure, or threaten the recognition of [white] multiplicity” (Carbado 2005, 198). Part 
of the post-colonial lens is, in fact, the sweeping risk to homogenize postcolonial experiences 
that manifest in multiple ways, shapes and forms (Loomba 1998; Luste Boulbina et al. 2012). 
Likewise, I am sensitive to the possibility that I enhance coloniality through applying US-
based theory upon the French colonial and postcolonial context. Thus, my de-centering efforts 
must be intersectional and context-based in order to look at the playing out of simultaneous 
factors that condition political identities and lives in the specific context of France differently. 
In the French constructed imaginations, the center is the Republic, nationalist-universalist, 
white-Catholic European, male dominant.  
Furthermore, the claim for de-centering runs the risk of having the opposite effect, in 
other words to reinforce the center (the colonial relation) that it tries to de-center (decolonize). 
The de-centering (decolonizing) process requires me to make a continuous and continuously 
renewed effort of radical consciousness. The deconstruction of my privilege is necessary 
but/and only is useful if it is one of responsibility. I must not do it for myself or others, but for 
society as a whole, for the sake of the conscious relationality of our social existences. It is 
necessary that I de-center myself just as it is necessary that everyone in society, even though 
everyone differently, de-center him/herself. Such an effort functions as an incentive to 
transform peacefully the real (symbolic and material) effects of discrimination. De-centering 
shall push national consciousness to a higher level whereby within, despite, and aware of the 
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complex racist/colonialist/capitalist patriarchy many people are framed in, we must forget 
about color (or “race,” or colonial background, or sexuality, among others), but we must 
never forget about color (or “race,” among others). This is just like Pat Parker says to “the 
white person who wants to know how to be [her] friend” (Parker 1990, 297). De-centering 
whiteness requires these two things simultaneously. I “forget about color” when I consciously 
treat someone on the basis of our shared humanity. I “forget about color” when I resist seeing 
her as Other and treat her differently on this account because of the “color” I may perceive in 
her. To de-center myself as white also requires me to be aware of the differentiated power that 
“color” entails for different people. Most specifically, it requires me to be aware that I, my 
habits, traditions, my hair, my body, my philosophy, my music, are systematically taken as 
the norm in society; it requires me to be aware that this systematic central positioning silences 
people “of color.” Such a double consciousness is a decolonial tool to act, relate, and be in 
difference. In de-centering, I attempt to look beyond binaries while being aware of my 
privilege(s). 
Decolonial Epistemologies 
Decolonization implies a radical epistemological and political shift in the way we see. 
It is a displacement of the look, one that makes power appear in the learnt practices, 
representations, discourses, and institutions of the Republic. Part of such a displacing project 
is the necessary institutionalization in French Academia of critical Post-Colonial and Feminist 
approaches rooted in the French context (Cohen et al. 2007; Luste Boulbina et al. 2012). The 
harsh resistances to such recognition still confronted today are highly significant of the 
Republic’s limited sensitivity to decolonizing its institutions and imaginations (Luste 
Boulbina 2012). Yet,  
La nécessité de décaler le regard est à l’origine même de l’approche postcoloniale 
puisqu’elle cherche à faire apparaître un impensé radical enfoui dans les rapports 
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sociaux, masqué par les représentations dominantes. […] Le point commun des « 
études postcoloniales » est sans doute de servir de boîte à outil pour contrer les 
visions rigides des frontières identitaires, les mécanismes de sélection qui condamnent 
les uns à rester dehors (hors frontières), les autres à subir les effets des 
catégorisations, des distinctions (de classe, de race, de genre), des discriminations et 
des stigmatisations qui sont en partie – beaucoup plus qu’on ne l’admet généralement 
– liées à un héritage colonial, à des hiérarchies sociales et des représentations 
anciennes et tenaces. Elles inaugurent aussi, en lien avec un agenda politique brûlant, 
de nouvelles postures épistémologiques (Cohen et al. 2007, 11-12).
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Core to the raison d’être of Post-colonial and Feminist approaches is the idea of engagement 
that the French dominant academic perspective so critically lacks. Such engagement is 
political and counter-discursive (Omar 2008). It is committed to marginalized voices in their 
radical and intersectional pluralities. It is committed to the politics of location and to being 
attentive to power in the (re)production of knowledge.  
Like any other approach, it also bears its own limitations. Fatima Ait Ben Lmadani 
and Nasima Moujoud are two anthropologist feminist thinkers located in the French and 
Maghrebi postcolonial contexts. In an excellent article titled, “Peut-on faire de 
l’intersectionalité sans les ex-colonisé-e-s ?,” they highlight the fact that critical Post-colonial 
and Feminist approaches must engage in bridging theory and praxis; in other words, they must 
engage contextually (Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 2012).
141
 Indeed, they claim, many 
French feminists tend to uncritically apply intersectionality theory to the French context in a 
way that silences the knowledges of minorities (ibid.).  
Aussi, le concept de race ne peut prendre sa pertinence qu’au regard de l’histoire 
(post-)coloniale et l’approche en termes d’intersectionnalité ne peut être féconde 
qu’au prix d’une lecture historique, transnationale qui reconnaît les conditions 
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 My translation: “The necessity to shift the look is core to the postcolonial approach, for it aims at unveiling a 
radical blind spot stuffed in social relations, hidden by dominant representations. […] The common point of 
“postcolonial studies” is probably to function as a toolbox in order to counter rigid visions of identity borders, 
selective mechanisms that compel some to stay outside (borders), others to suffer from the effects of 
categorizations, distinctions (of class, race, gender), of discriminations and stigmatizations which are partly – 
more than we usually admit – linked to a colonial heritage, to social hierarchies, and to old and tenacious 
representations. They also initiate, within a hot political agenda, new epistemological postures.” 
141
 My translation: “Can we do intersectionality without the ex-colonized?” 
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matérielles et ce lien entre migration et colonisation. (Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 
2012, 19)
142
 
 
In the French context, a critical feminist post-colonial lens on race and identity is attentive to 
giving space to the knowledges of postcolonial minorities specifically. Thus, it challenges the 
Republican tradition. In so doing, it needs to draw on the great work done in the French 
colonial and postcolonial context in sciences, literature, philosophy, and sociology by 
intellectual figures such as Abdelmalek Sayad and Assia Djebar (ibid.). It is essential to make 
explicit the foundational connection between immigration and colonization, intersectionality 
and colonization (ibid.). It also requires valuing and drawing on activist practices, including 
but not limited to music, literature, and art, which reflect the materiality of the lives of the 
citizens “issus de l’immigration” (ibid.). It also includes approaching society in France in its 
heterogeneous pluralities, and finally, understanding “race” in its intrinsic relation with 
coloniality/postcoloniality, class, and patriarchy (ibid.). A post-colonial feminist approach of 
society in France engages critically with the French political, historical, and theoretical 
context, which is “migratory, postcolonial, and transnational” (ibid., 13). 
Such engagement is one of accountability and responsibility (Haraway 1988). It 
prompts the feminist, in an intersubjective relation with her research, to make the conscious 
effort of constantly reflecting on her own position(ing), to look beyond the simplicity of 
partial vision. 
“The split and contradictory self is the one who can interrogate positionings and be 
accountable, the one who can construct and join rational conversations and fantastic 
imaginings that change history. Splitting, not being, is the privileged image for 
feminist epistemologies of scientific knowledge. “Splitting” in this context should be 
about heterogeneous multiplicities […] Subjectivity is multidimensional; so, therefore 
is vision. The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply 
there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and 
therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. […] 
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 My translation: “Thus, the concept of race can only be pertinent in the light of (post-)colonial history, and the 
approach in terms of intersectionality can only be fruitful at the cost of a historical, transnational reading that 
recognizes material conditions and this connection between migration and colonization.” 
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Vision requires instruments of vision; an optics is a politics of positioning. Instruments 
of vision mediate standpoints; there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of the 
subjugated.” (Haraway 1988, 586) 
“[P]artial sight and limited voice” is a located vision. It allows getting closer to the real. It 
allows seeing the “connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible” 
(Haraway 1988, 590). The claim for a politics and epistemologies of location resonates with 
human geographer Edward W. Soja’s concept of Thirdspace as alternative epistemology to 
approach subjectivities and identities (Soja 1996). Thirdspace is a displaced look that is 
consciously spatialized in the uncertain, undefined, and unsettled. The condition of 
Thirdspace is “radically open and openly radical,” constantly changing and moving (ibid.). It 
allows being in and “exploring the spaces that difference makes” (ibid.). These spaces are not 
neat and uniform; they are conflictive because difference brings conflictive energies. From a 
Peace and Conflict perspective however, conflict is natural and entirely part of human 
existence. What’s more, it creates opportunities for transformation. In between modernity and 
the rejection of modernity, Thirdspace is a place of renewed, counter-hegemonic practices, as 
well as forms of being and looking (ibid.). “[I]t challenges all conventional modes of thought 
and taken-for-granted epistemologies. It is disorderly, unruly, constantly evolving, unfixed, 
never presentable in permanent constructions” (ibid., 70). It challenges the modern binary 
logic of either/or; not entirely in yet not entirely out. Thirdspace is a place of higher collective 
consciousness. It makes explicit the connection between identity and space and makes it 
possible to speak in and from the margins; it includes all and everything. Thirdspace is 
liberating. It is radically unsettled and unsettling, open and free, yet located. It is 
transformative. 
La colonisation se construit sur et construit simultanément des hiérarchies diverses et 
diversifiées et des frontières, plus ou moins éloignées. Colonial power builds and builds on 
hierarchies, diverse and diversified, and borders, more or less distant (Luste Boulbina et al. 
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2012). Ce qui est au centre de nos préoccupations, c’est l’égalité, c’est-à-dire défaire ces 
hiérarchies et repousser ces frontières. Decolonization is concerned with equality, i.e. 
undoing these hierarchies and pushing these borders away. Ce qui est à l’œuvre dans le 
déplacement du regard, c’est de repousser les frontières de la pensée. In displacing the look, 
feminism(s) aims at pushing away the borders of thought to uncover inequalities of power that 
condition theory and practice. Le savoir et le pouvoir étant intimement liés, l’un soutenant 
l’autre et inversement, transformer les frontières épistémologiques c’est aussi repousser les 
frontières politiques. For as knowledge and power are intimately tied to and sustain each 
other, to transform epistemological borders is also to push political borders. It is opening up to 
l’entre-mondes, or les entre-mondes, the in-between worlds.  
 
Colonialism is the negation of the in-between worlds for it (en)forces the conditions of 
its own world (Luste Boulbina 2011). C’est le refus de l’entre-mondes, c’est-à-dire des entre-
mondes, de ces espaces de mouvement et de l’incertain, lieux chargés de l’exil, qui ne sont ni 
l’un ni l’autre, où “l’extériorité se trouve dans l’intériorité et l’étrangeté dans la familiarité” 
(ibid., 22).
143
 Les frontières (coloniales) sont géographiques ; mais elles sont aussi politiques. 
(Colonial) borders are geographical; but they also are political (ibid.).  
La politique, comme la famille, est la construction d’un nom et d’un nous, c’est-à-dire 
d’une représentation. […] Effectivement, la politique, surtout lorsqu’elle est 
nationale, s’édifie sur le refus de l’entre-mondes. La politique est la terre d’élection 
de l’alternative. Le « ou bien-ou bien » sert, dans cette perspective, à construire, 
artificiellement, un nous à partir duquel s’unifieraient les mondes pour n’en faire 
qu’un seul. […] Le renversement de perspective […] transforme en objets ceux qui se 
croyaient jusqu’alors les seuls sujets réels, aptes à voir et à parler, à évaluer et à 
juger, dans une ignorance d’eux-mêmes aveuglante. C’est du reste ce qui irrite tous 
ceux qui arguent que cette nouvelle optique n’avance à rien, précisément parce 
qu’elle est inverse. C’est, cependant, confondre inverse et inversé. Les femmes, 
les Noirs, les Arabes, les homosexuels et tous les « autres » connus et inconnus, 
classifiés ou non-répertoriés n’offrent pas un sens opposé ou un ordre contraire, mais 
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 It is the negation of the in-between world, that’s to say, the in-between worlds, these spaces of the moving 
and the uncertain, places of exile, which are neither one nor the other, where “outsideness is located in insideness 
and strangeness in familiarity.” 
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seulement un point de vue qui n’avait pu jusqu’alors s’exprimer. (Luste Boulbina 
2011, 26-27)
144
 
L’entre-mondes est aussi une “anamorphose”, un miroir de soi. The entre-mondes is the 
condition of being in the world, mirroring self. La construction de l’Autre, c’est la 
construction de soi. The construction of Other is the construction of Self. Les entre-mondes 
sont des invitations au voyage. To embrace les entre-mondes is a shift in the lens. Like 
Thirdspace, it allows seeing from a different perspective, which makes identity necessarily 
moving and ambiguous. 
I profoundly believe that it is necessary for French society to decolonize and 
transform, and to do so in differentiated, multi-dimensional, and changing manners. With 
conscious responsibility, it must enrich with critical/located epistemologies that re-think 
identity, subjectivity, and space in order to shift the dominant lens on itself and transform 
relations beyond postcoloniality. 
Unmaking Race, Remaking Soul 
In contemporary France, displacing debate means decolonizing the structures of 
thought and practices inherited from colonial relations and dominant imaginations. In doing 
so, French society inevitably needs to de-center the Republic, the idea of the Republic thought 
as above all suspicion. Through such a process, it appears necessary to recognize 
postcoloniality in its complexities. More precisely, it appears necessary to tease out 
postcolonial racism in its everyday functioning, as well as the ways in which it intersects with 
other factors to create discriminations that derive from the migratory, postcolonial, and 
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 My translation: “Politics, like family, is to construct a name and an us, that’s to say, a representation. […] 
Indeed, politics, particularly when it is national, stands on the negation of the in-between worlds. Politics is the 
land of the choice of alternatives. The “either-or” serves, through such perspective, to build, artificially, an us 
from which worlds unify into one single world. […] The shift in perspective […] transforms into objects those 
who thought of themselves as the only real subjects, able to see and to speak, to assess and to judge, in a blinding 
ignorance of themselves. This is, besides, what irritates those who argue that this new lens is worth nothing, 
precisely because it is reverse. This is, however, confusing opposite and reversed. Women, Blacks, Arabs, 
homosexuals and all “others” known or unknown, classified or unregistered, do not offer an opposite direction or 
a contrary order, just a point of view which could not be expressed so far.” 
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transnational condition of society in France. Last but not least, it also requires recognizing the 
imperfect beauties that emerge from human relations, transform power in them, and transcend 
the status quo. 
I am aware that postcoloniality takes the colonial as a reference point in time and 
space. It runs the risk of approaching society and history in a linear way. Most importantly, it 
risks enhancing, or overestimating, the impact of and homogenizing the multiple subjective 
experiences of colonialism and postcolonialism on people’s lives. I understand postcoloniality 
as “un ensemble de circonstances caractérisé par la présence du postcolonialisme” 
(Hargreaves 2007, 24).
145
 It is a marker of identity within the nation. I take it as a point of 
departure in the here and now with the historical implications I describe in chapters one and 
two. It is meant to transform. Decolonization as a process recognizes the postcolonial space, 
and moment and transcends and moves beyond it.  
The decolonization process, in its effort towards opening dialogical spaces for 
transformation, compels resisting simplistic interpretations. “Parler de postcolonie, en ce 
sens, c’est engager des commencements plus que des achèvements, des interprétations plus 
que des explications; c’est se dégager des origines et des causes supposées des malheurs du 
monde postcolonial; c’est identifier cependant, des inachèvements” (Luste Boulbina 2007, 
19).
146
 Decolonization looks beyond the visible; it listens beyond the hearable. 
Towards a Transformative Recognition of French PostColoniality 
It is significant to note that French authors of postcolonial minorities are mostly 
studied outside France by non-French or US-expatriated French academics (Hargreaves 2007; 
Ait Ben Lmadani and Moujoud 2012; among others). In an interview given to Luste Boulbina 
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 My translation: “a set of circumstances characterized by the presence of postcolonialism”. 
146
 My translation: “To talk about postcolony, in this way, is to engage beginnings rather than endings, 
interpretations rather than explanations; it is to leave the supposed origins and causes of the tragedies of the 
postcolonial world behind; it is, however, to identify incompletions.” 
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and Simon, well-known Françoise Vergès explains how she chose to study French 
colonialism in the USA because the level of debate surpassed and moved way beyond the 
point where the conversation currently stands in France (Luste Boulbina and Simon 2012). 
Indeed, post-colonial discussions, often referred to as the euphemism “la question coloniale,” 
slowly appeared in the middle of the 1990s – more than 30 years after the colonial Empire 
finally collapsed with the declaration of independence of Algeria. Researchers have mostly 
approached it as a matter of the discipline of History, as a matter of history (Luste Boulbina 
and Simon 2012; Luste Boulbina 2012).  
In France, epistemological and political decolonization entails the recognition of 
postcoloniality. This recognition effort is radically open, openly political but politically free. 
In other words, I claim that the decolonizing process needs to recognize the condition of 
postcoloniality as complex and intercrossing realities that challenge modern notions of time 
and space. It engages both with the realities of the present/past and with the bigger outlook 
towards transformation. Finally, it provokes a critical reflection on the Republic and the 
construction of French citizenship. 
As I have demonstrated in chapters one and two, conversations involving 
postcoloniality, race, and the French enfants d’immigrés are dominated by deep conservatism. 
Such standpoint rests on a constructed untouchability of the Republic and its model of 
universal equality. Within such an ideological position, discriminations are invisible and 
widely negated, yet they are and they divide. I claim that in order to move on from this 
colonial/national “fracture,” the epistemological and political process of decolonization needs 
to put the Republic in a place of vulnerability whereby it is possible to critically reflect on its 
strengths and weaknesses in the light of the present migratory, postcolonial, and transnational 
condition and context. In fact, vulnerability is a place of humility. It is humanity, where the 
Republic needs only to be listening and looking openly. 
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This is not an easy process. During the 2010 Cannes festival, Rachid Bouchareb’s film 
Hors-la-loi brought to light the massacre of thousands of Algerians in the Setif 
demonstrations on May, 8
th
, 1945, nine years before the official start of the War of 
Independence. The film triggered great controversies and was scolded for being “anti-French” 
(Benbassa 2011). This is just one example among many of the obstacles that constitute the 
decolonizing process. Trying to approach (get close to) the realities of colonization, such as 
the multiplicity of subjective experiences, is not an easy and simple task. In France 
particularly, challenging the dominant colonial narrative faces many resistances, for 
history(ies) and memory(ies) are often associated as one single imperative of History.  
Le « bilan » de la colonisation, brandi devant ces demandes [de relecture des archives 
de l’histoire], induit un jugement qui éloigne de la complexité historique, inhibant 
l’analyse des multiples dimensions du passé colonial de la France. […] Il faut donc 
abandonner la notion de bilan pour tenter d’aborder l’épaisseur de chaque fait 
historique et comprendre l’impact de la colonisation sur les sociétés colonisées et la 
métropole. Par contre, il faut revenir encore et encore, car le sujet est loin d’être 
épuisé, sur la longue histoire du colonialisme européen, sur toutes ses contradictions, 
sur ces [sic] conséquences inattendues, imprévisibles qui ont fait aussi de ces espaces 
colonisés, des espaces de rencontre, de solidarités transcontinentales, et d’expressions 
trans-culturelles (Vergès 2007, 110).
147
 
 
As I have explained in chapter one, it is important to overcome the place of negation in which 
the Republic finds itself with regards to history and to embrace the multiple stories that make 
up the national memory. Recognizing postcoloniality implies that I look into myself and the 
Republic deeply in order to reflect upon the contradictions and ambiguities that rest in the 
universal Republican model. It undoes assumptions and it displaces. In the French context, 
indeed, strong resistances to recognizing postcoloniality stem from the fear of transformation, 
of unsettling power. In the French Republican tradition, the colony “existe comme symptôme 
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 My translation: “The ‘assessment’ of colonization, brandished in response to these demands [to re-read 
archives] induces a judgment which moves away from historical complexity, inhibiting the analysis of multiple 
dimensions of France’s colonial past. […] It is thus necessary to give up the notion of assessment to attempt to 
approach the thickness of all historical facts and understand the impact of colonization on colonized societies 
and the metropolis. On the other hand, it is necessary to go back, again and again, for the subject is far from 
being exhausted, on the long history of European colonialism, on all its contradictions, on its unexpected, 
unpredictable consequences, which are also made of these colonized spaces, spaces of encounter, 
transcontinental solidarities, and trans-cultural expressions.”  
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d’un malaise au cœur de la pensée universaliste” (Vergès 2007, 103).148 Indeed, “si [les 
principes de la République] relevaient de l’universel comment expliquer l’exception ?” (ibid: 
102)
149
. Consequently, the postcolony exists in the nation as fracture, a sort of malaise hiding 
wounds and frustrations. If equality within the Republic is out of touch, how do I explain 
postcolonial racism?  
The evolution over the years of resistance movements – such as the political 
movement of the “Indigènes de la République,” the 2005 revolts in the banlieues populaires, 
or hip-hop culture – is a demonstration that the myth of the egalitarian Republic is dying. 
Additionally, it is a demonstration that it is time to honestly talk about race in the Republic. 
The 1980s social movements, like the marches against racism and for equality, were 
predominantly anti-racist with a social and political understanding of discrimination; in other 
words, most of them were still in line with the liberté, égalité, fraternité tradition of the 
Republic (Robine 2006). On the other hand, today’s expressions of resistance are marked by a 
disbelief in the “myth of the Republic.” Activists apprehend discrimination in a way that 
“race” is an “objective reality;” it reflects everyday experiences of specific communities like 
the youth in the banlieues populaires (ibid.). At this stage, the state, supported by its 
institutions, cannot keep up with the same disconnected discourse that, through its blindness 
to “race,” roots racism deeply. Thus, decolonizing the Republic requires that society, 
including myself, undo the myth of the Republic, the idea that the Republic is beyond “race” 
as it guarantees equality across identities. In undoing the myth, society must listen, from a 
place of transformation and humility, to all voices in their multiple expressions. 
Internalized postcolonial racism plays out in all areas of life in all aspects of social 
relations. In fact, “[i]l n’y a rien de plus ordinaire que de discriminer” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 
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 My translation: “exists as the symptom of a malaise central to the universalist thought.” 
149
 My translation: “if [the principles of the Republic] were universal, how to explain the exception?” 
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139).
150
 The idea(l) of grandeur corrupts institutions, imaginaries, discourses, and practices 
within the Republic. It roots racism deeply, as it is a form of nationalistic narcissism unaware 
of itself that rests on the complex of superiority of the French white man and serves as the 
norm of all political and social debates. The Republic is corrupted by the denial of such 
narcissism.  
The current resistance to the emergence of memories and histories that belie the 
narrative of the universal demonstrates again what Fanon saw as a form of narcissism 
deeply ingrained within the French political psyche, the idea that the French people is 
incapable of mass murder, crimes and massacres (Vergès 2010, 95).  
Yet, “La négation n’est ni la mémoire, ni l’oubli. Elle est une forme de censure qui relève de 
la raison d’État et de ses artifices ; elle est corrélativement une forme d’évitement de la 
responsabilité” (Luste Boulbina 2007, 14).151  Reconnaître la postcolonialité de la France 
c’est faire descendre la République de son piédestal tout blanc. To recognize French 
postcoloniality is to bring the Republic down its all white pedestal. It means that I deconstruct 
French narcissistic patriotism. The sentiment de grandeur, so particular to the French colonial 
mentality, is rooted in dominant national discourses and actions; it indicates the ways in 
which such understandings of the French nation apprehend the Other and see her. 
More than that, it entails that I recognize the realities of postcolonial racism. To 
recognize postcolonial racism today involves recognizing it as the recreation of a deeply 
engrained colonial-patriarchal imaginary that conditions all relations in contemporary France 
differently. In particular, it involves an understanding that the Republic tends to reify the 
figures of the enfants d’immigrés as the “subjects” of a remaking of the grand civilizing 
mission. It also includes recognizing that there remains a strong differentiation within the 
nation, along the colonial divide (even though the latter is blurry), that works in such a way 
that makes some citizens more French, some histories more central, some cultures more 
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 My translation: “[T]here is nothing more ordinary than to discriminate.” 
151
 My translation: “Negation is neither memory nor oblivion. It is a form of censorship that falls under the 
reasons of State and its devices; it is correlatively a way to avoid responsibility.” 
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acceptable, some voices more legitimate, some bodies more neutral, some lives more 
valuable. 
Consequently, displacing debate leads me to re-think citizenship and identity within 
the Republic. The French conceptualization of the Republic is strongly tied to the idea of the 
nation. This is key to understanding the dominant imaginary in France. In the French 
construction of the nation-state, the different elements that make the nation, the political, the 
cultural, the territorial, and the emotional all merge as one, that is, they are interconnected and 
inseparable from each other (Robine 2006). The Republic, the political project, and the nation, 
the historical project, function as one. Thus, Saïd Bouamama states,  
On a bien là, derrière le vocabulaire de la nation politique, l’idée que la nation 
politique par excellence c’est la nation culturelle française, qui est une culture 
abstraite en plus, parce qu’elle est faite à partir de plein de composantes et qu’elle 
n’est pas si homogène que ça. [...] Il y a confusion entre unité politique et unicité 
culturelle, et ça, c’est vraiment l’histoire de la conception nationale française, et cela 
imprègne les inconscients politiques, à droite comme à gauche. Le blocage est plus 
grand en France qu’ailleurs à cause de la spécificité de la conception française de la 
nation (Robine 2006, 134).
152
 
 
On top of that, such patriotism was built with and through the nationalist-colonialist project in 
Algeria in particular. It was at the core of Tocqueville’s arguments. The idea of the French 
(cultural) nation was built on the differentiation and on its negation of what/who is French and 
what/who is not, that is, colonial racism. French universalist nationalism has existed through 
“l’impensé de la race” (blind race) – the superiority of the white European (male) over the 
colonized populations, “subjects” of such superiority. While the Republic keeps negating it, 
(post)colonial racism resists in renewed ways, shapes, and forms. However, the Republic 
supported by the universalist paradigm lives through the political project of equality: the 
Republican idea rests on the idea of a nation where all and any have equal place. Postcolonial 
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 My translation: “There lies indeed, behind the lexicon of the political nation, the idea that the political nation 
par excellence is the French cultural nation, which in fact is an abstract culture, because it is constituted of many 
components and it is not that homogeneous. […] There is a confusion between political unity and cultural 
uniqueness, and that is truly the history of the French conception of the nation, and that penetrates political 
unconscious(es), Right and Left. The blockage is more important in France than elsewhere because of the 
specificity of the French conception of the nation.” 
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racism, or the remaking of the colonial project, lives in the deeply ingrained, almost 
schizophrenic contradiction between the Republican ideal and its differentialist practices. 
C’est toute la violence du projet républicain, tel qu’il a été conçu dans la tradition 
philosophique et politique française.
153
 
Par enchainement d’idées (ou d’impensés), it follows that the dominant discourse 
pictures (represents), through the rhetoric of assimilation/integration, the figure of the 
“Français-e issu-e de l’immigration,” particularly when s/he is perceived as “Arabe 
musulman-e,” as the problem, the malaise of the Republic. I think that the malaise does not 
stand where the dominant voice thinks it does. Saïd Bouamama pinpoints: 
Le rapport colonial ou l’imaginaire colonial n’est pas un problème lié aux 
caractéristiques des immigrés, il est un problème lié à la manière dont on aborde 
l’étranger, et ça c’est un problème français. [...] J’ai un copain turc qui me dit : mais 
moi je suis un Algérien dans le regard des gens. (Robine 2006, 128)
154
 
 
Bouamama’s words reflect that conflicts lie, in my view, in the fact that the dominant society 
applies a patriarchal-racist gaze, inherited from the colony and remade in the postcolony, 
which constructs and stigmatizes so-called minorities for being “visible.” Consequently, it 
primarily thinks diversity through assimilation. “Le paradigme dominant [pour percevoir les 
populations “issues de l’immigration”] reste le paradigme intégrationniste et culturaliste” 
(Bouamama in Robine 2006, 128).
155
 The dominant gaze sees the so-called “ethnicization of 
society” but does not see that its constructed identity is ethnic – white, middle class, Catholic. 
The “problem” is neither Muslim nor the visibility – that is, inassimilability – of postcolonial 
minorities. Le problème n’est ni musulman ni la visibilité, c’est-à-dire l’inassimilabilité, des 
minorités postcoloniales. Rather, the malaise perceivable in the debates on “immigration” and 
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 There lies the violence of the Republican project, as it was conceptualized in the French philosophical and 
political tradition. 
154
 My translation: “The colonial relation, or the colonial imaginary, is not a problem related to the 
characteristics of the immigrants, it is a problem related to the way one apprehends strangers, and that is a 
French problem. […] I have a Turkish friend who says to me: but I am Algerian in the way people look at me.” 
155
 My translation: “The dominant paradigm [to perceive the populations ‘of immigration background’] remains 
the integrationist and culturalist paradigm.” 
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“diversity” is the manifestation of the deep gap between the construction of so-called 
“national identity” and the plurality of identities/faces France has today.  
This is at the very foundation of the “Indigènes de la République.” Houria Bouteldja is 
a well-known French activist and one of the main founders of the movement. She explains: 
Nous, ce qu’on veut montrer, c’est qu’il faut que la France repense l’identité 
française. L’identité française doit exploser, elle est étriquée aujourd’hui. Il faut 
repenser la question de la citoyenneté. Le problème c’est qu’en France la nation est 
ethnique, l’identité est très ethnique […] Je pense qu’aujourd’hui le Français doit 
accepter sa part arabe, et musulmane... et sa part africaine, antillaise, berbère, et sa 
part chinoise s’il y a des Chinois... et nous-mêmes, on doit accepter tout ça, je dois 
accepter ma part chinoise [...] c’est prendre acte de toutes les composantes de la 
société, c’est la réactualisation de l’identité en fonction des gens qui sont là (Robine 
2006, 130).
156
 
 
Bouteldja’s words resonate with the necessity, collectively and individually, for me and for all 
in France, albeit differently, to de-center as French citizens. In other words, it is important to 
displace along the circles of familiarity and proximity to the constructed national core. I 
enlarge here the understanding of citizenship and nationality to one where all second, third, 
fourth generation immigrants, “Français-e-s issu-e-s de l’immigration,” who are not 
necessarily French citizens on paper, are so in my discussion on identity and citizenship. De-
centering as a French citizen, or just as a human in France, in relation to the migratory, 
postcolonial, and transnational society allows me to have a located standpoint where it is 
possible to see the bigger picture and its potential dialogical spaces for transformation. 
Indeed, in rethinking identity and citizenship within the Republic, in decolonizing the 
Republic in dialogue with society in its whole, what matters is harmony. So far French 
citizenship is not equal. I mean this in the sense that “race”/religion, colonial background, 
gender, and class still construct hierarchies of national universality – the French norm or 
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 My translation: “What we want to show is that it is necessary that France rethinks French identity. French 
identity needs to explode; today it is narrow. It is necessary to rethink the question of citizenship. The problem is 
that in France the nation is ethnic, identity is very ethnic […]. I think that today French people need to embrace 
their Arab, and Muslim, part…and its African, Antillaise, Berber part, and its Chinese part if there are 
Chinese…and we too, must embrace all this, I must embrace my Chinese part […] it is to acknowledge all 
constituents of society, it is to renew identity according to the people who are there.” 
141 
 
Republican neutrality. As explored in chapter two, the perceived Others of the Republic are 
required to assimilate to this norm and do so “in their own benefit.” Sociologist and activist 
Saïd Bouamama, key member of the Indigènes movement, adds: 
 
L’intégrationnisme est le refus de la diversité culturelle française, c’est l’idée que la 
personne [issue de  l’immigration postcoloniale] n’est jamais tout à fait française : 
elle est indigène, elle a toujours un effort supplémentaire à faire. Et on va expliquer 
ses difficultés par une intégration insuffisante, jamais par une inégalité ou une 
domination (Robine 2006, 133).
157
 
 
In an interview with Jérémy Robine, Bouteldja explains further: 
 
Mais l’objectif essentiel c’est de poser la question sociale, la question de l’égalité, la 
question de la citoyenneté, de l’égalité entre citoyens, entre humains, même, parce 
qu’on n’en est pas là, lorsqu’on est issu de l’histoire coloniale, on n’est pas des 
humains égaux : toi tu es l’universel, dont émanent toutes les valeurs universelles, les 
droits de l’homme, etc., tu m’illumines de tes Lumières, n’est-ce pas ? J’apprends de 
toi, on n’est pas dans une relation d’égalité, c’est toi qui m’apprends des choses et pas 
moi qui t’apprend des choses, on n’est pas dans une relation de réciprocité, c’est ça 
qu’il faut détruire. On partage la même citoyenneté, plutôt la même carte d’identité, et 
pourtant on n’est pas des égaux. C’est le fruit du mythe [de la République] et nous, on 
veut détruire le mythe, pour une égalité réelle (Robine 2006, 132).
158
 
 
This quote is extremely important, for it shows what postcolonial racism means in terms of 
the differentiated places and power it entails for different people within the whole constitutive 
of the nation. It argues that there cannot be equality in France without mutual recognition and 
reciprocity from a place of shared citizenship and humanity. It is important to raise the 
question of equality in the French context because equality is at the core of the 
conceptualization of the Republic but, in fact, as I have explained in chapters one and two, the 
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 My translation: “Integrationist ideology is the negation of French cultural diversity, it is the idea that the 
person [who descends from postcolonial ‘immigration’] will never be fully French: she is indigène, she always 
needs to put forth additional effort. And if discourse will explain her difficulties on the account of limited 
integration, never will it do so on the account of a form of inequality or a form of domination.” 
158
 My translation: “But the main objective is to ask the social question, the question of equality, the question of 
citizenship, of equality between citizens, between humans, even, because we aren’t there yet, when we descend 
from colonial history, we aren’t equal humans: you are the universal from whom all universal values follow, 
human rights, etc, you light me up with your Enlightenment, don’t you? I learn from you, we aren’t in a relation 
of equality, you are the one who teaches me things and I’m not the one who teaches you things, we are not in a 
relation of reciprocity, this is what we need to destroy. We share the same citizenship, or rather the same ID, and 
still we aren’t equal. This is the result of the myth [of the Republic] and we [the indigènes movement] want to 
destroy the myth, for a real equality.” 
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ethno-blind, universal conceptualization of equality simultaneously negates and favors 
inequality – that is the “myth of the Republic.” So, it is important for me to start from there in 
the process of decolonization of the dominant imaginary in France. 
Yet the idea of equal citizenship raises many questions. Even if equal citizenship 
contributes to harmony, the latter is not complete because this still leaves first generation 
immigrants, including the undocumented, outside the national group or community. Besides, 
is it even possible to build equal citizenship within the nation? Can anything national be 
equal? By definition, from the moment there is a nation, there is a “we” and there is a “they.” 
The very idea of nation relies on an onto-epistemology of exclusion. Consequently, there are, 
even within the nation, within the “we,” a differentiation of citizenship. In this regard, 
decolonization shows a tension with the nation-state. Indeed, if decolonization overcomes and 
moves beyond fixed and assigned identities, it also has to question the nation-state. It is 
interesting to me that the philosopher Rada Iveković, in her reflection on decolonizing 
knowledges, demonstrates that there necessarily needs to be a denationalization of 
knowledges alongside their decolonization in order for the latter to occur (Iveković 2012). It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to explore further the relation between decolonization and 
denationalization, but it does provide the space for needed future investigation. 
Following my conversation on equality, when it comes to transformation, thinking in 
terms of plurality brings me to another level of awareness entirely where equality is no longer 
relevant. The point of transformative decolonization is to build harmony in difference. In 
short, “penser la postcolonie” amounts to re-thinking identity and citizenship within the 
postcolonial Republic through de-centered and pluralist epistemological lenses. Overall, 
“[t]hough Left and Right might recognize that there were violations of republican and 
universalistic principles, the question that lingers is: to what extent does the Other have the 
right to intervene in the national debate?” (Vergès 2010, 102). Indeed, in the French 
143 
 
imaginary, “la « diversité » c’est les autres” (Luste Boulbina 2012, 133).159 “Penser la 
postcolonie” implies re-thinking “immigration” and “diversity” in a way that opens identity 
towards a place where diversity becomes harmony in difference. Like I said earlier, 
decolonization is radically political. Such transformation of imaginary must reach all spheres 
of social life and permeate all relations, including institutions and practices. Diversity is real 
when color and race matter but do not matter, are visible yet invisible. Postcolonial minorities 
are “French” not only to win the World Cup or be a good comedian when they suit the 
dominant representation of the good immigrant. Rather, all human beings inhabiting France, 
in the present, are part of one community, always, everywhere, in every bit of our relations 
and existences. Diversity is real and beautiful when it breaks borders.  
Additionally, decolonization crosses through political divides. The conventional Right 
and Left political opposition movements must make an effort of reflection. Beyond their role 
as decision makers, they bear an important role in shaping discourses, imaginaries, and 
representations. It is their responsibility to look honestly at the present and ask themselves 
how the “Français-e musulman-e” is, in the national imaginary, the figure that (re)makes the 
national consensus of the civilizing mission. It is indeed not the result of the rise of the 
extreme right FN party. Rather, the rising popularity of such a party is the result of the 
scourge that postcolonial racism represents. It is important that the French elite hear the state 
of malaise and encourage dialogue. I am not talking about any dialogue, but rather one that is 
engaged and open, critically feminist and transformative.  
Towards Embracing the Peaceful Aesthetics of Plurality 
France’s postcolonial conflicts are also an opportunity for change. Conflict is part of 
life and the driving essence of movement. It must be a constitutive part of the discussions to 
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 My translation: “‘Diversity’ is others.” 
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open dialogical spaces for a transformative decolonization. Transformation is always a 
process, never-ending, dynamic, open and multidimensional (Lederach 2005; J. Lederach and 
A. Lederach 2010). Like peace, it is plural, indefinite, and imperfect. Peace(s) and conflict 
transformation are creative processes. They are naturally unfixed, ambiguous, made of 
conflicts and peace(s). I want to start from here because this philosophy for peace makes up 
the lenses through which I see life and relations.  
Indeed, my proposal is a relational approach to humans and conflicts. My input into 
the discussions on decolonization in France is transformation. In the context of decolonization 
and transformation, I relate John Paul Lederach’s approach of conflict transformation to the 
aesthetic agency theory of women of color located in the US context. Although both authors 
in their respective disciplines come from very distinct places, they both, in my view, radically 
open spaces for transformation. In bridging elicitive conflict transformation and feminist 
critical race theorists, I argue that decolonization is the individual and collective process that 
leads me, and society, to learn new ways of seeing (hooks 1990 in Soja 1996; Acampora and 
Cotten 2007). It compels society to use creativity and the imagination as strategies to find 
home, a place of encounter with one’s self and with others where emotions find their way 
(Lederach 2005; Acampora and Cotten 2007). It is this tension between the personal and the 
collective (communal) that makes home. Transformative decolonization is finding a place of 
encounter between past and future that can reframe present. It is a place where the personal 
and the collective come together to re-make relationships. Decolonization is therefore a 
process that starts from the present (Vergès 2012). There comes Françoise Vergès and her 
critical interdisciplinary approach rooted in the French colonial and postcolonial context. Of 
all authors I have read in this context, she is the closest one to my Peace and Conflict 
perspective: the relational approach of conflicts and the transformative nature of the spaces 
for decolonization. 
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Transformative decolonization is multidimensional and non linear. It is also cyclical 
and repetitive, transcending fixed notions of time and space. It transcends the borders of 
memory, identity, and territory in a way that embraces the “unlimitedness” of plurality. It 
means that color, religion, and colonial background, among others, interact together in 
unexpected and disorganized ways. The frame is constantly moving, unsettled, radically open. 
There are no hierarchies of time and space; periphery/center; before/after. They are all lived 
experiences in the present. These are the transformative new ways to see, act, and be from 
where I am located (hooks 1990 in Soja 1996; Acampora and Cotten 2007). It is constitutive 
of E. Soja’s Thirdspace epistemology that consciously embraces the unsettled, subjective, and 
radically open spaces for resistance and transformation that lie in the spatiality, historicality, 
and sociality of human life. 
I have argued for a contextualized (critically engaged with the realities of people’s 
lives) decolonization, epistemological and political – of imaginaries, discourses, and 
practices. My main concern, as I see French postcolonial conflicts, is harmony across 
diversities, or how to transcend postcolonial racism. This concern takes place within the 
wider, transcendental search for (imperfect) peace(s). The difficulty for French elites to see 
“race” and not just social class as a factor of marginalization in France clashes with the real 
experiences of post-colonial minorities. This is at the core of France’s postcolonial conflicts. 
As Robine points out in his analysis of the “Indigènes” movement, this is a tricky position. 
How do I politically highlight “indigénéité” while not reifying the place of exception induced 
by history by the term “indigènes”? How do I recognize “race” without falling into the trap of 
reinforcing it? How do I merge recognition and transcendence? How, on the other hand, do I 
highlight postcolonial racism without downplaying class as a factor of marginalization?  
I want to argue for a higher consciousness whereby critically aware of the functioning 
of differentiated power, people in France embrace society, in its radical plurality, as one. The 
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real challenge France faces today is to look at itself in the mirror. “[Q]ue cette histoire 
coloniale, où le colonisé était pensé comme extérieur, ne soit plus transmise comme une 
histoire du rapport à l’autre, mais comme une histoire du rapport à soi” (Cohen et al. 2007, 
68).
160
 Decolonization only can take place if society in France becomes aware of the socio-
political dynamics that make up itself in a way that is radically open to the plurality of its 
histories, subjectivities, and identities. Françoise Vergès says: 
 
Je pense qu’il faut que la société française comprenne de quoi elle est faite, c’est-à-
dire en grande partie de cette longue histoire de la colonisation. Il y a sur son sol des 
Amérindiens, des Canaques, des enfants d’immigrés de l’immigration postcoloniale, 
comme on dit, des descendants d’esclaves, de colons, de bagnards, de migrants de 
l’époque coloniale et postcoloniale jetés à travers le monde… Si sa langue, sa culture, 
son histoire, ses arts, sa philosophie, son droit, et ses citoyens sont aujourd’hui 
pluriels, c’est aussi en grande partie le résultat de cette histoire de la colonisation. 
[…] On passe son temps à ne pas mettre les morceaux du puzzle ensemble. […] La 
transformation, ce serait déjà que la société française se rende compte de quoi elle est 
faite et que ça pénètre les consciences profondément, qu’on parte d’aujourd’hui et pas 
du passé, qu’on se demande pourquoi c’est comme ça, qu’on tire les fils et, partant de 
là, qu’on voit ce qui se passe. (Luste Boulbina and Simon 2012, 151-152)161 
 
Il s’agit surtout… Que la décolonisation fasse l’objet d’une vraie prise de conscience. Une 
prise de conscience de ce que la France est aujourd’hui. En effet, c’est reconnaître des choses 
qui sont là. Les traces abondent de la postcolonialité (Hargreaves 2007). Elles sont partout, 
tout le temps et dans tout, hors de l’espace et du temps. Les identités françaises et les identités 
en France sont plurielles, indénombrables et postcoloniales. Toutes les voix s’expriment, 
qu’elles soient au centre ou à la périphérie des choses, qu’elles soient au-dedans ou au-
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 My translation: “[T]hat this colonial history, where the colonized was thought as outsider, be not passed on as 
a history of the relation to the other, but as a history of the relation to self.” 
161
 My translation: “I think that French society must understand what it is made of, that’s to say mainly this long 
history of colonization. There are on its land Amerindians, Kanaks, children of immigrants of postcolonial 
immigration, as we say, descendants of slaves, colonizers, convicts, migrants of the colonial and postcolonial era 
thrown out throughout the world… If its language, its culture, its history, its arts, its philosophy, its law, and its 
citizens are today plural, it is mostly the result of this history of colonization. […] We spend the time not fitting 
the pieces of the puzzle together. […] Transforming French society should start by realizing what it is made of 
and that it deeply penetrates the minds, that we start from today and not from the past, that we wonder why it is 
this way, that we pull the threads, and from there, we see what happens.” 
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dehors, ou, comme la langue d’Assia Djebar, “à la fois au-dehors et au-dedans” (Luste 
Boulbina 2007, 24).
162
 Imperfect and imperfectly beautiful.  
French society will never be able to be as one if the discourse keeps on talking in 
binary terms of an undefined “we” opposed to a stigmatized “they” even within the very 
nation. The national/colonial malaise comes from the immense gap between discourse 
(dominant, hegemonic) and reality(ies). What’s more, it comes from the negation of 
responsibility, the inability of the elite to speak with. It is the inability to think beyond 
borders. While the French elite mostly holds onto an ethnocentric look on race and diversity, 
transformative decolonization exists for society in order to embrace the plurality of the “entre-
mondes” (in-between worlds) and to build an open “entre-nous” (in-between us).  
Ce nous idéologiquement, rhétoriquement édifié affirmativement dans « l’identité 
nationale » à la française et négativement dans l’invention d’un « bouc émissaire », 
masque le fait que le politique est plutôt la constitution réglée d’un entre-nous 
possible. La conséquence est importante : le rapport politique est vertical et 
autoritaire quand il s’agit du « nous », horizontal et démocratique quand il s’agit de 
« l’entre-nous » car, dans le premier cas, on distingue « eux » et « nous » alors que 
dans le second, les « eux » ont disparu, il ne reste plus que la diversité et la pluralité 
des sujets (Luste Boulbina 2011, 26-27).
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For instance, to talk about “immigration” as a fact looked at from above amounts to blindingly 
shutting oneself up in a binary vision of social relations where French people are not French 
equally. It is to radically disconnect from the subjective experiences that constitute the 
multiple faces France shows today.  
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 What matters mostly is…That decolonization be a space of realization. The consciousness of what France is 
today. Indeed, it is to recognize things that are there. Traces abound of postcoloniality (Hargreaves, 2007). They 
are everywhere, always and in everything, off space and time. French identities are plural, uncountable, and 
postcolonial. All voices express, whether they are at the center or the periphery of things, whether they are inside 
or outside, or, like the writing of Assia Djebar, “at the same time outside and inside” (Boulbina, 2007: 24). 
163
 My translation: “This we ideologically, rhetorically constructed, erected affirmatively in ‘national identity’ à 
la française (French-style) and negatively in the invention of a ‘scapegoat,’ masks the fact that politics rather is 
to manage the building up of a possible in-between us. The consequence is important: political relationships are 
vertical and authoritarian when it comes to ‘we;’ they are horizontal and democratic when it comes to the ‘in-
between us.’ The first case distinguishes ‘them’ and ‘us’ while in the second, ‘they’ disappear, the only thing that 
remains is the subjects’ diversity and plurality.” 
148 
 
To decolonize French society and the French state is to recognize that colonization, 
immigration and multiraciality are intrinsically related in the whole society, not only for so-
called minorities. Said differently, the relation between race, immigration, and 
(post)coloniality makes France’s moving and plural face. Les réalités sont imbriquées. 
Realities overlap and intertwine. The Republic no longer can talk in binaries and borders. It 
must embrace the complexity and ambiguity, beautiful, messy, ugly, dynamic, of human 
relations. The decolonial Republic pushes the borders of identity, to move beyond a view of 
itself as territorial, cultural, national. In fact, Vergès argues, to break the borders of “national 
identity” is to re-think the Republic in its relation to time and space, repenser la temporalité et 
la spatialité de la République (Luste Boulbina and Simon 2012). I want to argue for a de-
centered perspective that embraces the Republic in its complexities and pluralities, one that 
resists shortcuts. For instance, the decolonial Republic must recognize the histories of the 
populations from the French overseas territories as well as its intrinsic ties with and place 
within French colonial and postcolonial history (ibid.). Slavery and the slave trade are indeed 
essential to the relation between postcoloniality and “race” in contemporary France (ibid.). 
Vergès argues: 
La contradiction entre l’annexion territoriale des colonies comme parties de la 
France et en même temps leur extranéité constante est très importante, elle est 
absolument au cœur de la façon dont la République, la France même, se constitue. 
Cette césure temporelle et spatiale est très française, mais elle est artificielle et 
reviendra par la fenêtre tant qu’on n’aura pas transformé cette cartographie (Luste 
Boulbina and Simon 2012, 154).
164
 
 
In the national (un)consciousness, France still is (white) metropolitan France. In decolonizing 
imaginaries and practices, France moves beyond fixed notions of time and space, identity and 
memory, determined by the Hexagon. In so doing, the decolonial Republic is plural not only 
symbolically but politically in its representativity. Decolonization is democratic. It works on 
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 My translation: “The contradiction between the territorial annexation of the colonies as parts of France and 
simultaneously their constant foreignness is very important, it is absolutely central to the way the Republic, 
France even, builds itself up. This temporal and spatial divide is very French, but it is artificial and will come 
back again as long as this cartography has not been changed.” 
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imaginaries but also institutions and practices of the Republic. And, it also responds to the 
materiality of people’s lives. 
France’s postcoloniality is made of the multiple dynamics of migration, “race,” 
memory, gender, sexuality, religion, social class, and age, and the ways in which all these 
elements interact/intersect to make up complex and moving identities. These identities are 
constituted with and constitutive of power, they are beautiful. The decolonial Republic 
embraces that a French citizen of Algerian parents is not entirely one and not entirely the 
other, both at the same time or neither of the two, and many other things. It embraces that my 
identity is mine and it is people’s but/and it is not fixable. In his reflection on the beautiful 
mix of French-Algerian identity in French youth, Mustapha Harzoune says: 
Pour en finir avec les assignations culturelles et les raccourcis identitaires, il serait 
peut-être temps de penser les identités dans leurs complexités symbiotiques et 
changeantes, de fournir à tous des outils permettant de penser cette complexité et 
surtout de la vivre malgré le lot d’incertitudes et de doutes qui parfois en découlent. 
Cela bouscule les catégories ordinaires de la pensée, déplace les frontières, 
réintroduit des principes d’incertitude et d’impermanence, mais ouvre sur d’autres 
espaces de liberté, exige de nouveaux rapports d’égalité et passe par une fraternité 
renouvelée. (Harzoune 2003, 58)
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Decolonization is liberating. It induces unsettlement and radical openness. It induces 
embracing the unsettling character of transformation in order to embrace the process. It is 
important to give ourselves – individually and collectively – the time to think, look, listen, 
and reflect upon multiple expressions of reality – in everything that surrounds us – and 
imagine differently. Françoise Vergès expresses it in this way: 
Je pense aussi […] à des choses plus « abstraites » : comment aménager des espaces 
où débattre dans l’apaisement, éviter l’hystérisation qui fait obstacle à toute écoute. 
On ne comprend pas très bien pourquoi et comment c’est l’apaisement ou l’hystérie 
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 My translation: “To put an end to cultural assignations and shortcuts of identity, it may be time to think 
identities in their symbiotic and moving complexities, to provide all with tools that make it possible to think such 
complexity and most importantly to live through it despite the possible share of ensuing uncertainties and doubts. 
It upsets the ordinary categories of thought, displaces borders, reintroduces principles of uncertainty and 
impermanence, but opens the way towards other spaces of freedom, requires new relations of equality. and 
induces a renewed fraternity.” 
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qui domine à un moment donné et qui fait taire les voix qui cherchent comment 
reconstruire du commun. Ce n’est pas de l’idéalisme ou du gnangnan sur le vivre 
ensemble, mais les êtres humains ont besoin de silence, de tranquillité, de temps pour 
imaginer et penser. (Luste Boulbina and Simon 2012, 155)
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In decolonizing, we human beings nurture new ways to see and open ourselves to serendipity 
(Lederach 2005). In nurturing peace(s), we nurture our abilities to feel. Transformation 
requires pausing and breathing; letting go of the past and embracing present; opening and 
sensing. In decolonizing, we human beings explore the spiritual dimension of transformation 
(ibid.). We, the people that inhabit this place called France, must allow ourselves to trust and 
love and dream, and look for a place where we nurture the art of living together as one. As I 
demonstrated in chapters one and two, postcolonial racism is institutionalized, normalized. 
Thus, this transformation is hard because it touches deeply ingrained elements of selves. Is 
society ready to do this? Am I ready to do this? Starting with this very piece of work, I find 
myself transforming relations yet at times reproducing borders, I see contradictions and I also 
see power and creativity. It is the very nature of transformation, cyclical, unresolved, and 
conflictive. 
Transformation is not easy; it is tortuous and long. It is a forever re-start where 
peace(s) and conflict(s) constantly mix in blurry and imperfect ways. Decolonization involves 
all of society, as a whole and in its radical pluralities; it transcends time and space; it is both 
symbolic and material, epistemological and political. For all these reasons, it is full of 
contradictions and ambiguities. Most specifically, in decolonizing, I shall be aware of the real 
tendencies to recreate/reproduce the binaries that frame our epistemologies and ontologies in 
the modern world. Deconstruction goes hand in hand with construction – constantly unmaking 
and remaking. We must interweave the dance of power and the power of dance – we must 
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 My translation: “I am also thinking […] of more ‘abstract’ things: how to arrange spaces for debating 
peacefully, how to avoid falling in a hysteria that hinders any possibility to listen. We do not quite understand 
why and how peace or hysteria dominates at a given moment and silences voices that aim at building something 
in common. This is not idealism or sentimentality on the art of living together, but human beings need silence, 
tranquility, time to imagine and think.” 
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nurture our imagining selves. I understand decolonization as a radically open reflective 
process that embraces difficulties, ambiguities, and contradictions. It aims at bringing society 
to a higher level of consciousness, similar to Anzaldúa’s process of creative resistance and 
acceptation of self (Anzaldúa 2012). In the foreword to the fourth edition of her 
transformative “Borderlands,” Norma Cantú writes: “that it is possible to both understand and 
reject, to love and detest, to be loyal and question, and above all to continue to seek 
enlightenment out of the ambiguity and contradiction of all social existence” (Anzaldúa 
2012). Transformative decolonization compels human beings to open themselves to the re-
thinking of the frames of mind normally used to approach social relations and existences. In 
my understanding, it is very important that society in France let itself be unsettled by de-
centered and renewed perspectives in our ways to see, act, and be. 
Alors qui a peur du postcolonial ? Il n’y a pas de réponse simple à la question qui 
ouvre ce dossier. Pas d’ennemi principal à dénoncer, sinon l’impensé colonial qui 
ronge la société française et les hiérarchies sociales dont il assure la pérennité dans 
une « continuité discontinue ». Pas de complot républicain à découvrir, mais une 
difficulté spécifiquement française à revisiter les fondamentaux de la République et à 
les confronter aux faits de sa propre historicité. La décolonisation n’est pas terminée, 
nous le savons, c’est le principal message porté par le postcolonial. Ce message, il est 
urgent d’en prendre acte contre les tenants d’une « identité nationale », qui veulent la 
rendre plus fréquentable parce que prétendument fière de sa nouvelle multiculturalité, 
affichée dans les ministères. Penser la France postcoloniale, c’est précisément re-
politiser ces identités, s’attacher à leur conflictualité, pour construire leur 
convergence. Ce numéro est donc une critique radicale qui invite à déconstruire nos 
structures de pensée et d’action pour les débarrasser du pli colonial sur lequel se 
fondent le racisme et les discriminations aujourd’hui. (Cohen et al. 2007, 12, in the 
editorial of Qui a peur du postcolonial ? Dénis et controverses)
167
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 My translation: “So, who fears the postcolonial? There is no easy answer to the question that opens this 
report. No main enemy to denounce, other than the colonial assumptions that eat away at French society and the 
social hierarchies to which they ensure long life in a ‘discontinuous continuity.’ No Republican conspiracy to 
discover, but a difficulty specifically French to rethink the grounds of the Republic and confront them to the 
facts of its own historicity. We have not seen the end of decolonization, we know that, it is the main message put 
forward by the postcolonial. In fact, it is urgent to record this message in front of the upholders of ‘national 
identity’ who want to make the latter more respectable because it is supposedly proud of its new multiculturality 
displayed in the ministries. To think postcolonial France is precisely to repoliticize these identities, to devote to 
their conflicting nature, in order to build their convergence. Thus this issue is a radical critique that invites to 
deconstruct our structures of thought and action to liberate them from the colonial pattern on which rest racism 
and the discriminations of the present-day.” 
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Today a strong malaise has penetrated all parts of French society. As a recent 
investigation has shown, the young generation feels out of place, unheard (le mouv’ 2014). 
Despite this, society is changing and opportunities for change, that is, serendipity, abound. 
The new generation, in all its diversity, creates new forms of relating; new ways of being are 
many. However, distrust may be the most salient symptom of and the most dangerous factor 
of conflict. France is in a critical moment and it is important that we, society in France, look 
for a place of consciousness from where we can work as a whole. I understand this necessity 
not for our individual selves, but for the sake of relations and the consciousness of the 
intersubjectivity of our existences in society. If we allow the unsettling character of human 
and social relations to thrive, we will be able to open a discussion that questions the way we 
have thought relations across diversities until now. It will open “un espace gigantesque” in 
which embracing plurality and decolonizing minds become possible (Blanchard 2009, 126).   
Reprendre le Fond de l’Histoire pour Transformer les Relations…et Conclure, 
Momentanément. 
Through these “notes,” I have attempted to open the path towards a transformative 
decolonization of contemporary France. My concern is equality. Decolonization is a process 
that encompasses the whole society and aims at building new ways to relate across identities. 
Decolonization touches all disciplines and all areas of life. It is epistemological and political. 
It simultaneously works on imaginaries, discourses and representations, institutions and 
practices. Decolonization is complex and tortuous as it bridges realities, transcends borders of 
time and space, identity, territory, and memory. Most importantly, it leads to re-thinking 
hidden assumptions of thought – les impensés de la colonie. Indeed, I have argued that debate 
in France, whether academic or public, rests on a deeply colonial and patriarchal, power 
unequal, epistemological lens. Such a perspective reinforces and creates postcolonial racism 
or, in other words, the remaking of the colonial project through the figures of postcolonial 
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minorities, particularly the so-called “French Muslim of Algerian origin.” I claim that it is 
necessary that discourse displace, that I embody my discourse. 
Indeed, national imaginaries are deeply ingrained with a “very French” form of 
universalist narcissism that negates “race.” If France is to critically think its condition and 
relations of postcoloniality, it is indispensable that decolonization deconstruct French 
nationalist universalism, the racially-blind arrogance which traces a fixed line between French 
and francophone and establishes national grandeur on a form of national purity drawn on 
colonial power, race, and sexualities. Dominant narratives must open to the de-centering 
character of situated knowledges, the unsettling nature of Thirdspace, the beauty of the entre-
mondes. Embracing the vulnerability of human existence allows me to emancipate from and 
wave ourselves through constraining boxes that imprison our thoughts in time and space.  
I have argued for a shifting lens that can see through borders. In wearing decolonial 
lenses, I attempt to free from the coloniality of rational thought. A decolonial vision is a 
vision aware of itself, that is, situated knowledge(s). In so doing, decolonization radically de-
centers the European white male from the universal pedestal where modernity places the 
norm. A critical positioning is an engaged epistemology. French society is very late in 
reflecting upon colonialism and the conditions it has created in the present, in the postcolony. 
It is urgent that critical epistemologies penetrate knowledges in the French political and 
academic context to unsettle the deep fetishism of its institutions. In my approach, such a 
shifting lens is post-colonial and feminist. It opens radically to new ways of seeing and 
relating.  
French societal context is “migratory, postcolonial, and transnational.” Traces of 
postcoloniality manifest in multiple and unlimited ways. They are everywhere; they are 
diverse and beautifully imperfect. In speaking of postcoloniality, I necessarily speak about 
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race/religion, class, gender, sexuality, and of course memory, and how all these elements 
make new and renewed subjectivities, transcending fixed notions of the nation and its relation 
with identities. This leads me to reassert that it is important that decolonial transformation 
recognize postcolonial racism, the deeply ingrained differentiation of who is “really” French 
and who is not. It is important that it recognize “race” (in its intersecting functioning with 
religion, class, memory, colonial background, gender, sexuality) as real factor of 
discrimination in 2014 France. French elite must take this responsibility in order to transform 
the national/colonial malaise into a brighter place. In the light of my findings in chapters one 
and two, it is important that French citizens de-center as French citizens. It is also important, 
however, that transformation move beyond these borders. If human beings in France, 
individually and in relation, manage to de-center ourselves as human beings in France, we 
will all together be able to hear differently and speak differently. 
Decolonization is transformative. It is to find a place of encounter – of imperfect 
peace(s) – where people come together and reframe the present through transforming 
(recreating) relationships. Unmaking and remaking are simultaneous, cyclical and repetitive. 
Most importantly, decolonizing is unsettling and opening to the beauty and plurality of human 
existences. In this process, human beings in France must learn to see. Transformative 
decolonization must lead us to a higher consciousness where it is possible to both recognize 
and transcend, to be critical and believe, to engage and imagine. It is rewarding and liberating 
to embrace serendipity and the creativity of life. It is urgent that society in France look at 
itself with multiple eyes and re-conceptualize France as a complex, plural, transterritorial, 
transnational, postcolonial, trans-cultural, inter-subjective, imperfect, and changing, a 
creatively ambiguous whole of humans in relation, harmonious in difference. 
La fracture est là, il faut ouvrir la brèche. 
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“This is the end of these notes, but it is not an ending” (Rich 1984, 41). 
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Conclusions 
The quality of this phrase [the moral imagination] I most wish to embrace reverberates in 
[the] potential to find a way to transcend, to move beyond what exists while still living in it. 
 
(John-Paul Lederach 2005, 28) 
Dadirri – listening to one another. 
(Judy Atkinson 2010, foreword of J. Lederach and A. Lederach 2010, xiv) 
 
This journey has been one towards consciousness, combining my own with my 
intention to raise one. I have observed that France, as a community, is facing socio-political 
conflicts that are expressed in the face of a latent malaise that divides people. In these 
conflicts, the image of the Republic – equalitarian, one, and indivisible – appears as the 
central reference of discourse. The malaise, I have argued, emerges from the immense gap 
that lies between discourse and the realities of the populations that inhabit France today. I 
have started from the assumption that France is a postcolonial place, for it is an actor of the 
colony, in other words, of the colonial relations. Following from such an observation, society 
in France needs to decolonize its national consciousness. Indeed, I argue that dominant 
discourses reproduce colonial racism in present-day France in the way that they approach 
issues of diversity, postcoloniality, and immigration. Through a set of representations, 
practices, and discourses inherited from the colonial imaginary, these discourses remake the 
French colonial project of the civilizing mission. They do so specifically in relation to the so-
called français-e-s de l’immigration, or représentant-e-s de la diversité, the French who 
descend from the colonized populations who migrated to France in the colonial and 
postcolonial eras. The functioning of this set of discourses and practices recreates a 
differentiation within the community that constitutes the nation; this is what I call postcolonial 
racism. In particular, I have argued that the French who descend from Algeria as a colony and 
a postcolony usually referred to, in the colonial imaginary, as the “French Muslims,” are 
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particularly targeted by postcolonial racism. The latter reproduces in them a colonial position 
of subjects of the Republic.  
Through this research, I have embarked on a journey towards a transformative 
decolonization of myself and of France as a postcolonial and plural place. This has been for 
me a reflective journey in which I have learnt a lot about myself as a person, myself within 
France, and the challenges that France – and the world – faces today. I have tried to balance 
anger and transformation, deconstruction and creation. It is a journey towards discovery and 
peace(s). My concern is le vivre-ensemble. How can we, as human beings, live together in 
harmony beyond the functioning of factors of inequality, which are constructed socially, 
politically, and culturally yet matter in the realities of human beings-in-relation. In the French 
context specifically, I am concerned about the continuities of the colonial domination within 
the community that makes France. I have attempted to shift the dominant, conventional, 
uncritical lens towards an open, transformative, and de-centered view of present-day plural 
France. 
I have used a transdisciplinary approach of research that relies heavily on philosophy 
through the writings of Algerian female author Seloua Luste Boulbina, for example. She has 
triggered in me a radical process of decolonial reflection. I also have dug into history, as it 
constitutes the discipline in which the slowly emerging post-colonial approach has stayed so 
far in the French context. Anchored in Peace and Conflict Studies, I have endeavored to 
apprehend postcolonial conflicts through the lenses of relations and human beings in relation. 
I have tried to see the creativity and transformative serendipity that lies in any spacemoment 
of life. I have approached research in an inter-subjective way, as well as through a feminist 
ethic. Thus, I have been fully part of this research and have endeavored to be transparent at all 
stages. I have also pushed the boundaries of research and of myself through it. 
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In the first chapter, I have explored French colonialism and its relationship with racism 
in colonial and postcolonial France, focusing specifically on Algeria as a colony and 
postcolony. I have looked into the place the Republic and its imaginary hold in relation to the 
colonial/postcolonial projects of France. In doing so, I have also examined its relation with 
colonial history. I have found that the Republic and its deeply rooted imaginary have been 
constructed with the colonial experience, specifically with Algeria. Colonial France 
constructed within the Republic a differentiation between nationality and citizenship. In 
l’Algérie française, those constructed as musulmans français were subjects of the Republic – 
those who, by their status of exception, provided France with the narcissistic grandeur 
characteristic of its nationalistic universalism.  
France, specifically, has developed a nationalist, abstract conceptualization of 
universality whereby the Republic is the symbolic representation of equality in a way that, in 
the national conscious, the Republic guarantees intrinsic equality. Yet, this tradition rests on 
“whiteness” as the constructed center that only envisages the Other as the image of oneself. 
Thus, through the colonial/patriarchal gaze, the Other can only exist as equal if she 
assimilates to the constructed French, white, male center. This deeply ingrained Republican 
imaginary concomitantly asserts the inexistence of “races” and invisibilizes the real effects of 
“race” in France. In so doing, it participates strongly in maintaining a hierarchization of 
people in France whereby discriminations are vivid and intersectionnally racial, memorial, 
social, and sexual. 
The non-recognition of “race” functions as the non-recognition of certain parts of the 
populations who have historically been assigned identity (and essentialized) in opposition and 
in relation to the constructed white French center. Indeed, I have found that immigration is 
closely, inherently related to colonization, or, in other words, colonization has created the 
conditions for immigration to occur. Therefore, the French of Algerian descent are not any 
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kind of immigrant in France as much as the relations in question are not any kind of relations 
– they are the continuities, the living traces of colonialism.  
I have found that colonial history has been the object of an “aphasie coloniale,” to use 
the words of Ann Laura Stoler. Up to this day, it is very rare to hear a de-centered, critical 
version of French colonial/postcolonial stories. The national discourse widely negates the 
colonial fact, le fait colonial. Furthermore, the national imaginary tends to create a division 
between colonial and national in the way it approaches history, the memories of history, and 
by extension, the human beings whose subjectivities do not appear in the telling of the 
story(ies). It leaves outside the scope of the national the French who descend from the 
colonized stories. In this negation, Algeria as a colony/postcolony, appears as “the tree that 
hides the forest” (Luste Boulbina 2008). It holds, like in the colony, a place of exception in 
the national memory. It appears as a “familiarité étrangère.” Unveiling Algeria would unveil 
the abomination of the system of French colonialism across times and places, and it would 
give leads for comprehension and ways towards a better understanding of the present; in other 
words, it would unsettle the status quo.  
The telling of the colonial story(ies) reproduces the imaginary that sustains 
colonialism because it reproduces the dynamics of power/knowledge – who can speak and 
who cannot, who tells the story and who is absent from it. The telling of the story functions as 
a negation of the legitimacy of the place, within the nation, of the colonized and their 
descendants who constitute France today. It provokes a deep feeling of marginalization, 
which seems to combine history/memory and “race.” It coincides in the cases of the banlieues 
populaires, with a social marginalization. As I explain in chapter two, the banlieues 
populaires appear as the peripheral “territories” (in colonial language) of the Republic that 
show uncomfortably close resemblance to the colonies. I argue that it is necessary to 
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decolonize history (knowledge) and replace politics – how rather than what – in the center of 
concerns to recreate, that is, unmake and remake identities in the present.  
Additionally in the second chapter, I have teased out postcolonial racism in everyday 
discourses that permeate public space – mostly in the media, political discourses, and legal 
texts. I have tried to understand how these discourses remake colonial relations and the 
civilizing mission. I have found that through a national discourse of “integration,” the 
Republic reproduces the differentiation of citizenship within the nation. Such discourses 
specifically target the so-called “French Muslims,” who, as I argue, the colonial imaginary 
associates to an Algerian “origin.” In such a discourse, égalité and laïcité are two aspects of 
the same package that places the Republic beyond all suspicions. Through the example of the 
2004 law on secularity and wearing of religious symbols in schools, I demonstrate how, 
through discourse, the colonial mission has transformed from the populations to civilize to the 
populations to discipline. Indeed, it envisages the French of Algerian descent as the Other – 
Muslim, immigrant, deviant – making invisible the very racialization of itself, the 
construction of the racial norm as white/Christian, French, and male. In this unconsciousness 
of oneself and of power in postcoloniality, discourse sees in the French of Algerian descent 
the reproduction of the subjects of the Republic, who are part of the community to be 
assimilated to “white French superiority.” 
Ascétisme is the consequence of the Republican centeredness, which thinks of 
tolerance as the correction of a fault – the conceptual roots of the civilizing mission. It is the 
mask that the immigrant is compelled by the patriarchal/colonial gaze to wear as the condition 
of her humanity. Yet, assimilation (or integration), the promise of ascétisme, is an illusion. It 
will never be fully reached, for it is impossible to se défaire de soi-même (get rid of oneself). 
The indigène always remains indigène – and any “mistake” or any expression of the plurality 
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of herself functions, in discourse, as the evidence of her condition of “natural inferiority,” her 
deviance, and her superficial belonging to the nation.  
Similarly, the discourse of “diversity,” which has emerged as the new paradigm of 
integration in the last few years, appears as the confirmation of the national dichotomy 
between the citizens who are “French” and those who are “representative of diversity.” 
Furthermore, it does not imply a reflection of the challenges of plurality in postcoloniality, 
such as the need to bear special attention to inequalities inherited from a historical 
hierarchization of lives, as well as the need to work on the creation of a place of harmony 
across potential factors of division, “race,” religion, memory, gender, and social class.  
I have found that discourse represents the French of Algerian descent, and by 
extension, the so-called “French Muslim,” as a threat to “national identity.” By looking 
beyond the visible, I have seen that instead, they are, in the national unconscious, a threat to 
the white-Christian construction of the Republic. The discourse of laïcité rests on a rhetoric 
that pictures a constant threat of ethnic separatism in a mythical Republic where equality is a 
taken-for-granted, undisputable fact. The Muslim community in France is particularly 
targeted by such discourse of fear and hatred. Most specifically, the French of Algerian 
descent are, in the unconscious conscious, the target of a discourse that essentializes and 
assigns a constructed (through the power of representation) ethno-religious identity – the 
prison of racism. I have found that the discourse of “Islamophobia,” which supposedly intends 
to call attention to the dangerous increase in violence reflecting anti-Muslim racism, tends to 
function as legitimating such racism. What’s more, the discourse of “Islamophobia” is part of, 
and is created by, the discourse of the elite to legitimate a reality – anti-Muslim racism – that 
it has created. 
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In the unconscious imaginary of the nation, the banlieues populaires specifically 
appear as off spaces, immaterial reality, imagined and imaginary spaces called “territories” as 
a metaphor for its inhabitants – it appears as the reenactment of the colonial theatre. They are 
“territories of exception” that, by this account, need “treatment of exception.” This 
colonial/patriarchal discourse hides racism. It hides that racial assignation determines, along 
with other intersecting factors – colonial history/memory, social class, differentiation within 
the national landscape.  
Finally, I reflect on the need for the French state and French society to decolonize the 
deeply rooted national imaginary that supports colonial/postcolonial discourses. I argue that 
the process of decolonization must include all human beings inhabiting France, yet all 
differently. Indeed, it implies that French society recognize postcolonial racism and the 
hierarchization of lives within the Republic as well as the different positions citizens hold on 
the basis of their relation to the colonial/patriarchal history. It implies, therefore, that French 
society recognize that France is a postcolonial place, and that we look at history from the 
present, through the lenses of the present, as a way to re-think identity, memory, and territory 
in the present. I do argue that there is an important demand on the part of society to 
understand who we, as a collective whole, are, and how our histories connect in a way that 
explains where, who, how we are, here and now. 
Transformative decolonization must be political and epistemological. It is both 
individual and collective. I do not propose a how-to of decolonization. Rather, I argue for 
different ways to see. I promote alternative epistemologies to look at life and one another, 
human beings-in-relation, most specifically in France. These epistemologies aim at 
embodying knowledge, situating self, and consequently, de-centering self and knowledge 
from the constructed “white,” colonial (French) center. It is a matter of making the invisible 
visible, of making the partiality of one’s vision visible. Decolonization requires a critical 
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contextualized post-colonial lens on French society and history. I claim that part of this 
reflective effort is the institutionalization of Post-colonial and Feminist Studies in France. 
Such an approach must engage with marginalized voices and knowledges in the French 
colonial and postcolonial context. It must place at its foundation the intrinsic intersection 
between colonization and immigration in this very context. 
French society is proud of its universalistic model. Yet, the latter is violent, inherently 
tied to and permeated with the deeply rooted imaginary inherited from the construction of 
colonial relations. The effort to undo this unhealthy pride, which intends to revivify the 
national grandeur, is of extreme necessity in order to create a place of harmony between 
human beings in France with their plural stories and identities – a place where it is possible to 
see the beauty and richness that emerges from/lies within the complex intermeshing of people. 
De-centering and locating the self is the condition of a critical vision, of a vision that 
recognizes the effects of “race” in the country. The challenge of such vision is to be one that, 
while being aware of the fictitious nature of “race,” makes the conscious effort to act upon the 
differentiated functioning of race in relation to colonialism in France. 
Further, the challenge of decolonization is to move beyond binary understandings of 
conflicts. Transformative decolonization is a process that transcends borders of time, of space, 
and of identity, in order to create a space where it is possible to come together and create new 
energies to transform and recreate relations. Transformation requires the Republic to unsettle, 
and to do so in plurality. Transformative decolonization is the movement towards embracing 
the complex plurality of beings, the multiple expressions of identity that make France. Only 
then can society in France de-center itself; only then can I de-center myself. Starting from 
myself, I intend to shift lenses and inspire a wave of consciousness, to create radically open, 
imperfect, and moving spaces for peace(s) in France. Transformative decolonization is not 
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easy; it is full of contradictions and tensions, as is my thesis. It is cyclical, constantly 
changing, and never-ending, yet it is radically open, liberating, and beautiful. 
I am honored to write about my home, about myself. Our here and now in France is 
full of opportunities for change. I do believe strongly that in the coming together of all 
energies inhabiting France there exists an immense power to transform life. French society 
rests on a highly conservatist tradition that presents harsh resistances to challenge the status-
quo, that is, relations of hierarchy. It tends to resist youth and change and unconventional 
ideas; it tends to hang on to the ground of established power. This may be one reason why 
French society seems to be in a deadlock, to be stuck in its own journey, stuck in an old 
version of itself far from its here and now. It is time for French society to unsettle its status 
quo, as well as the immobility of its institutions, and rather believe in the transformative, 
beautiful power of our combined energies. It is time to look beyond the visible, to shift habits, 
and to push boundaries. Things are changing; the young generation acts and speaks in new 
ways. Society needs to listen, sense, and embrace the opportunities of the here and now. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This work bears some limitations, some of which I am aware. To start with, my 
research question is broad. It might have hidden from me some of the complexity and 
heterogeneity of postcolonial relations within France. For example, if postcolonial racism 
functions in an intersectional manner, to what extent does social class have an impact on its 
functioning? How does postcolonial racism differ between women and men, and across 
sexualities?  
Secondly, discourses and the dynamics of relations are changing rapidly both in 
France and globally. Most importantly, the study of postcolonial relations in the French 
context is a very current and emotional topic in France. I have mostly focused on the 
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discourses and practices of the last ten to fifteen years. Yet, I can picture change in discourse 
between pre and post-9/11 in terms of the relations the Republic establishes with its Muslim 
community. To what extent do international relations impact the vivre-ensemble across 
diversities within France? How has the construction of “race” in relation to colonialism 
changed over the last decade in France? This could be the object of further research.  
Furthermore, I have chosen to focus my research on the human beings who, by 
nationality or culture, are French. In this regard, I have argued that postcolonial racism 
functions in a way that it recreates a differentiation within the nation on the basis of “race” 
intersecting with colonial background. Yet, how are the limits between who is culturally 
French and who is not drawn? I am dealing with imaginaries that are mostly unconscious. So, 
how can I draw a line between racism towards the “French Muslim” and racism towards first 
generation immigrants? I have argued for a decolonization that transcends borders and one of 
these borders certainly is the nation-state. Yet, I think it would be interesting to problematize 
the nation-state in relation to postcolonial racism and examine how postcolonial racism 
applies to postcolonial immigrants who are not French by nationality or culture, yet are part of 
the community that constitutes the country. 
For reasons of time, I have chosen not to pursue field research to conduct my 
investigation. Yet, I do argue that the colonial imaginary of the Republic is deeply ingrained 
in the minds of the people in France. Thus I do think that primary sources from interviews of 
the people inhabiting France, with a representation of a wide range of their pluralities, would 
certainly enrich my understanding of postcolonial conflicts. It would, further, allow me to 
enter into the spaces of resistance and analyze to what extent “dominant discourses” are 
indeed dominant. Additionally, it would allow me to evaluate to what extent Algeria as a 
postcolony still functions as “the exception within the exception.” 
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I have faced difficulties in reading in French, thinking in French, and writing in 
English, for both languages come from and reflect different colonial/postcolonial realities. I 
am not sure whether it has been a limitation, but it has certainly been a challenge. At the same 
time, it is part of the originality of this work. My plural lenses have allowed me to see 
different perspectives and create my own. 
Finally, I have embarked on a journey towards a higher consciousness. In doing so, an 
important part of my own process has been to deconstruct dominant discourses. My attempt 
has been to transform myself and to decolonize my mind through research. My intention has 
been to open space for discussion from my position, to take a stance, and raise consciousness. 
Simultaneously, I am also aware that I bear my own tensions and contradictions. I have 
sometimes deconstructed in violence. This might have limited me at times in understanding 
relations and humans peacefully, from a place of wisdom where I can go beyond simplistic 
views and embrace complexity. It could also have made my words appear as a reenactment of 
the colonial center or as a reproduction of racism. Thus, my limitations have also been to 
confront myself and my emotions throughout the process. 
Besides the openings for research that lie in the limitations of this piece of work, I 
think it would be interesting to study racism within France in relation to black people. More 
specifically, I have found that the need for a post-colonial reflection in the light of the place of 
the citizens of the overseas territories (les Antilles françaises) in France is huge. It is the blind 
spot of the yet limited French post-colonial thought. It would be interesting to investigate to 
what extent this form of postcolonial racism resembles and differs from the 
colonial/patriarchal imaginary that objectifies the descendants of Algeria.  
Point-virgule. 
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This is the beginning of a journey I have started to transform myself and others 
through research. Reading and writing have unlimited power to transform realities. This is 
only a trace of my own understanding of life and my place within it. I am aware that it comes 
from my location in the landscape of human and social relations. I hope, however, that 
through my partial vision, I have been able to contribute to the current discussions and 
reflections on “race” and coloniality, as well as peace(s) and conflict transformation, in the 
French context and beyond. I hope that I have been able to offer new perspectives on how we 
human beings relate to each other in our multiple identities and stories. Music is on hold for a 
moment, and so is my body. The breath, the energy, and the soul of life remain vivid. This is 
only the first act of a long dancing piece.  
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